China is setting up an ecological police system (生态警务机制) that combines citizen surveillance with law enforcement and prosecution to crack down on "environmental and resource crimes" as a strategy for beautifying the countryside.
The system is led by the Ministry of Public Security--highlighting the focus on law enforcement--in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, the central government's planning ministry, and ministries responsible for environment, agriculture, water management, grasslands, forests, and the coast guard. The plan set forth in an "Opinion on Building an Ecological Police Mechanism" (关于加强生态警务机制建设的意见 which does not seem to be publicly available) aims to have the basic mechanism in place by 2027 and fully operational by 2035.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs said the policing system will severely punish environmental pollution, destruction of wild flora and fauna resources, damage to ancient and famous trees, illegal fishing, illegal mining of mineral resources, illegal extraction of river sand and gravel, and illegal occupation of agricultural land. The Opinion promises to investigate and coordinate large-scale strikes on professional violators, organized crime, and interregional exploitation schemes.
Building on experiments by localities over the last several years, localities will be encouraged to designate river and lake police chiefs (河湖警长), forest police chiefs (林警长), and ecological police chiefs (生态警长). Law enforcement officials will link up with officials responsible for watching fishing, mining, farming, forests, and other resources in "ecological policing joint operation centers" (生态警务联勤中心) and "joint operation workstations" (联勤工作站). Local prosecutors are included in the mechanism to ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted.
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| "River-Lake Chief + Police Chief + Prosecutor" officials in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province gather for a photo-op |
An example is a "River-Lake Chief + Police Chief + Prosecutor" (河湖长+警长+检察长) mechanism set up in Shicheng County, a district of Ganzhou Municipality in Jiangxi Province. A coordination meeting held 3 years ago was led by the county public security bureau and prosecutorial office with participation by the county branch of the environmental protection bureau, forestry bureau and river chiefs from each township in the county. The deputy director of the public security bureau reported that 7 cases of illegal fishing and 34 cases of illegal hunting of wildlife had been filed during the year, 17 people had been disciplined, and authorities had seized 100 wild animals, 100 kg of fish, and 300 hunting implements.
Farmland is one of the resources monitored with this system. This blog previously reported on "field captains" (田长, I previously translated as "field boss") established several years ago to monitor use of farmland. Some localities have implemented a "Field Captain + Prosecutor + Police Chief" system that relies on field captains to monitor land use, while public security and prosecutorial organs provide law enforcement powers to punish violators. The so-called "iron triangle" is meant to maintain rural stability, rule villages by law, and resolve land and ecological protection disputes and strengthen public security management.
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| River chiefs meet with prosecutors |
A description of the "Field Captain + Police Chief + Prosecutor" system in Fangcheng, Guangxi Province said work focused on farmland protection, crackdowns on illegal mining, and restoration of abandoned mines. In Liaoning Province's Anshan City the system was set up to detect and punish shoddy construction of "high standard fields." In Zhaoqing, Guangdong Province the system led to the arrest of people who converted farmland to fish ponds.
It is unlikely that this system will work since it requires cooperation and coordination among 10 different organizations as well as coordination between rural, municipal and provincial officials. The ratio of organizational effort to benefits for officials seems high. One thing it does demonstrate is that China's vague and incomplete assignment of property rights inevitably leads to ever-increasing degrees of surveillance and application of force by the State.
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