China Wants its Anti-Poverty Efforts to be the World Model

China is promoting its poverty alleviation program as a model for world. Today the "Global South Modernization Forum" was held in Beijing where 60 poverty alleviation scholars from China and abroad praised China's approach to poverty reduction. China considers itself to be a leader of the "Global South," a label for developing countries used by the UN and some other international organizations.  The forum was featured in multiple Chinese State media outlets such as China Daily. Xinhua and China Daily posted articles about the forum on Facebook and Youtube, platforms that are banned in China.

Xinhua featured a speech to the foum by the head of the Communist Party's propaganda department.

A seminar on "China's Poverty Alleviation and the Global South's Poverty Reduction Efforts" focused on "the global significance of China's victory in the battle against poverty." The description in Chinese news media included the Chinese regime's usual stock phrases: "building a community with a shared future for mankind" free from poverty and with common development. China wants to "share its experience in poverty reduction," "deepen cooperation among the Global South," and "jointly address global challenges in poverty reduction and sustainable development," and work together to implement the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

According to State media, "guests" gave Xi Jinping accolades for his leadership in "winning the war on poverty" and consolidating its achievements in development that is "people centered," "equitable," and "inclusive."

"Guests" were probably shown pretty pictures of neatly planned model villages while speaking only in the abstract about aging rural people with no pension and no children to care for them, "hollow villages," "cooperatives" that are fronts for companies, piles of trash, insolvent rural banks, closed rural schools, and nutritional deficits.

News articles did not mention that Chinese government officials have been under orders to prevent rural regions from regressing into poverty over the last two years. 

The forum probably did not include any discussion of recent unrest in Hainan where farmers were enraged that a rubber company claiming ownership of their land pulled up betel nut trees they had planted. 

A Vice Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs attended the meeting, but Minister Han Jun apparently did not. Last week Minister Han was in Gansu Province investigating results of antipoverty efforts from potato and beef cattle industry development strategies. The article on Han's visit hailed the results of a Dingxi County potato project but did not mention that funds and work effort have been poured into this county's potato project for 20 years. Han also investigated Kangle County's beef industry development project. After antipoverty efforts gave loans to pork, dairy and beef companies to set up operations in impoverished areas these sectors have been coping with excess supply, depressed prices and losses. Last year the agriculture ministry held a meeting to discuss rescue efforts for the beef and dairy industries. This year all hog producers are losing money except indebted behemoth companies Muyuan and Wens who claim to have cut production costs.

There was probably no mention of rural families who are deep in debt because they bought apartments in county towns before the property market imploded.

Not visible from Beijing conference room.

Hog Farms Lose Money, Cancel Expansions

Farms will incur losses of RMB -179 per head from fattening hogs, according to a November 11 report from China's National Development and Reform Commission. The report said farms are reluctant to stock up on pigs or engage in "second fattening." Similarly, a weekly report from Shandong Province estimated an average loss of RMB -80 from farrow-to-finish and RMB -170 from fattening purchased piglets to market weight. The Shandong report attributed losses to low prices under pressure from strong supplies and weak demand. 

A year ago hog prices were high and feed prices were dropping. In October 2024, the NDRC estimated profits of RMB 322 from fattening hogs. Since then, hog prices have dropped dramatically, and profits have turned to losses. 

Data from China Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

Big companies sold large volumes of hogs during October, adding downward pressure on prices. Sales by the top 3 companies during October were their largest of the year. Muyuan sold 7.076 million head during October, up 13.17% from a year ago, Wens Foodstuff sold 456,900, up 45.7% yoy, and New Hope sold 344,400, up 34.4% yoy. A second tier of companies increased their October sales by 60% from a year ago. Hog prices reported by Muyuan and Wens were down by about 33% from a year earlier.

Compiled from monthly reports.

Chinese hog farming companies are in a game of "chicken" to see who can last out the down cycle. Several elite companies claim to have cut their production costs to RMB 11.5 per kg and are close to breakeven at the recent low level of prices. Other companies and small farms with production costs of RMB 13.5 or higher are incurring heavy losses. 

 An analysis posted on Chinese livestock industry news sites last week suggested that Chinese companies have canceled dozens of giant pig farming projects over the past year. Most announcements cite financial losses for the cancellations and said they plan to shift funds to shore up working capital. The news appears to signal a reversal of last year's breakneck expansion plans, but it could be meant to demonstrate fealty to government officials who have been nagging them to cut back production capacity over the last 6 months.

A year ago, Muyuan Foods announced plans to invest RMB 576.8 million in 7 huge swine farming projects with combined capacity of over 1.3 million head. The company has now proposed terminating fund-raising for the projects and instead says it will devote funds to working capital and daily operations. 

Wens Foodstuff halted construction of two giant pig breeding projects in Hubei Province that had been funded as part of RMB 9.3 billion bond issuance in 2021. Fourteen other projects are also being suspended. Wens will use funds for biosecurity upgrades and other projects.

This month, pig company Luoniushan told investors the company will terminate its collaboration with a pig farm in Guizhou Province to stem losses incurred by the farm and protect the company's stockholders from the industry's deteriorating outlook. On the same day, Bunge Technology announced it was canceling acquisition of 6 pig farming companies in several Chinese provinces, according to the analysis. The acquisitions had been part of a plan to create a vertically integrated industry chain extending operations from pig feed to livestock farming. 

In September, Tianbang announced it had cut the number of its sow farms in Shandong Province and carried out renovations in order to improve performance in swine breeding and bring down operation costs.

In July, Shennong Group canceled a plan to issue RMB 290 million in in stock to fund a giant 240,000-head piglet production base. The decision was prompted by changes in the swine market and capital market situation.

In March, Tiankang Biological terminated plans for a farming project in Gansu Province that would have produced 300,000 piglets and 200,000 finished hogs annually. Funds meant for the project are being used to supplement working capital and fund core business operations. Tiankang is focused on improving efficiency through upgrading existing facilities, optimizing breeding pig quality, and adopting a light asset expansion strategy. 

Last December Dongrui Co. announced termination of a 200,000-head multi-story pig farming project in Huizhou, Guangdong Province. Funds will be shifted to working capital.

A year ago, Tangrenshen announced termination of a pig farming poverty alleviation project in Guangxi Province it had announced after its IPO several years earlier. A farming project in Hainan was canceled because the land was designated as "permanent basic farmland" which banned use for livestock farming, and another project was canceled because it was not likely to achieve the expected economic and social returns. 

China Refused to Confirm U.S. Soybean Purchase Commitment

China's Commerce Ministry refused to confirm that China committed to U.S. soybean purchases at the October 30 Trump-Xi meeting. Reading the tea leaves, it looks like China is in a passive-aggressive state over bilateral trade with the U.S. and has no intention of fulfilling this commitment--if it was ever made.

At a November 13 press conference an unidentified "media reporter" asked whether the Ministry of Commerce could confirm the White House's claim that China committed to purchase 12 million metric tons of soybeans this year and 25 million metric tons in the following 3 years. Spokesperson He Yadong gave no direct confirmation, but he didn't deny it either. 

He responded with a word salad stating that "the Ministry of Commerce had recently released information regarding the joint arrangements for the China-US Kuala Lumpur trade consultations, outlining the main achievements and consensus reached, including on agricultural trade." He followed up with: "China is an important participant in global agricultural trade and will continue to uphold an open and cooperative attitude, deepening mutually beneficial cooperation with global trading partners to jointly safeguard an open, stable, and sustainable global trading system."

It's possible the spokesman was caught off guard by the question, but this is looking like a nonconfrontational approach to saying "no." He could have given a more friendly non-answer, but the non-answer he did give appears to be a disguised denial intended to give the White House a middle finger. Chinese leaders are undoubtedly furious that President Trump has been reaching out to ASEAN and Central Asian trade partners -- territories China views as its backyard where it has focused its foreign trade and investment initiatives as the foundation for expanding China's role as a global leader. 

Many Chinese news sites posted an abbreviated report with the title "The Ministry of Commerce briefed the public on issues related to China-US soybean trade" that omits the question about soybean purchase commitments and doesn't even mention soybeans in the text. I found only a couple of reports that actually reported that the soybean purchase question was asked at the press conference.

Commerce Ministry spokesman He Weidong at November 13 press conference.

It's unclear who raised the soybean question at the press conference. The transcript of the press conference identified the questioner only as "media reporter" (the reporter also asked about China's new rare earth export licensing system). Most reporters asking questions at the conference were identified as State-owned media: Phoenix TV, China Global TV Network, Fengmian News (operated by Sichuan Daily), and China News Service. But Deutsche Press asked the final question. The question could have bee planted by the Commerce Ministry in order to issue its passive-aggressive response on the soybean commitment. 

China Not Very Serious About Buying U.S. Soybeans?

Chicago soybean prices keep rising based on expectations of renewed Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans. Yet, nearly 2 weeks after Xi and Trump met in Korea China seems to be dragging its feet in buying U.S. soybeans. 

China has imported a cumulative 95.7 mmt of soybeans for January-October 2025, up 6.4 mmt from the same period in 2024. Imports from the U.S.in the first 10 months of 2025 are only 16.8 mmt. 

According to the White House, China committed to buy 12 million metric tons (mmt) of soybeans by the end of 2025, an amount that will be hard to achieve with less than 2 months left in the year. China also reportedly committed to buy at least 25 mmt annually during 2026-28. Beijing consultancy Boyar observed last week that China has not confirmed these figures, and traders are still closely watching for signs of large-scale purchases. 

On November 3 China waived punitive tariffs on U.S. agricultural products that had been imposed at the height of the trade war in March, but a 10% tariff on all U.S good (in retaliation for U.S. fentanyl tariffs) puts the tariff on U.S. soybeans at 13% versus 3% for Brazilian soybeans.

China's State-owned COFCO reportedly purchased 3 cargoes of U.S. soybeans just before the October 30 Trump-Xi meeting. Widely interpreted as a symbolic gesture, that amounts to about 180,000 metric tons. It has been rumored that COFCO has purchased several additional cargoes.

On November 7 COFCO signed a soybean purchase agreement at a "China-US Agricultural Trade Cooperation Forum" held at the Shanghai International Import Expo, but no amounts or timing have been publicly announced. The U.S. Soybean Export Council had meetings with buyers at the meeting, but no deals were announced. 

This week China restored import rights that had been suspended in March for Minnesota cooperative CHS, grain trader Louis Dreyfuss, and a partnership that includes Bunge and Pan Ocean America.

Today Chinese media revealed that COFCO also signed a separate agreement to purchase nearly 20 mmt of Brazilian soybeans, soybean oil, palm oil and other agricultural products at the Shanghai Expo. The agreement was signed on November 6--the day before the agreement to buy U.S. soybeans. The Brazilian agreement to strengthen agricultural economic ties with Brazil was signed with four so-called ABCD multinational grain trading companies that China has in the past identified as working to advance American interests. They included Bunge and Louis Dreyfuss whose import rights had been restored the previous day.

At the China-U.S. forum, the director of a Ministry of Commerce's Office of American and Oceania Affairs said that China would buy U.S. soybeans if "the price is competitive, the quality is good and supply is sufficient." These caveats appear to give China an excuse for not meeting targets.

As if they are reading from the same cue cards, most market analyses on Chinese web sites now point out that, indeed, the price of U.S. soybeans is not competitive versus Brazilian soybeans, so there is no incentive to buy from the U.S. Estimated C&F values posted daily on a Chinese feed market site show that the cost of importing soybeans from U.S. origins is now higher than costs of importing from Brazil. Many analyses cite a Chinese purchase of 20 Brazilian cargoes to highlight Brazil's price advantage. 

Source: Data from feedtrade.com.cn.

It is also a bad sign that China's Sinograin--the government's grain reserve company--did not show up to buy at the Shanghai International Import Expo where Sinograin had made deals in the past. At the 2023 Expo Sinograin signed an agreement to purchase 12 mmt of soybeans from the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The 2023 purchases followed Sinograin commitments to buy a cumulative 39.8 mmt of soybeans at the previous 5 Shanghai Import Expos. 

State media spoke glowingly of the Shanghai International Import Expo, a signature initiative of Xi to promote consumption and use China's big market to gain global influence. Besides claiming that the U.S. agricultural forum represented a revival of trade ties, Economic Daily pointed out how COFCO's agreements to buy wheat from 7 countries, sugar from Brazil, coconut water from Thailand, wine from Italy and Chile, and cheddar cheese from New Zealand advance China's Belt and Road Initiative, embody its "buying globally and benefiting the world" concept, and improve residents diets by providing more high-quality protein sources. 

China's Grain Fields are a "Hotbed of Espionage"

China's Security Ministry warned today that grain-producing areas are a "hotbed of espionage" where rampant collection of Chinese seeds by foreign spies threatens China's national food security. The warning posted on numerous Chinese sites effectively puts the kibosh on independent on-the-ground gathering of agricultural market intelligence in China.

The article (English summary in Global Times) warned against an increase in foreign espionage and intelligence agencies'--"black hands of foreign powers"--infiltration of grain-producing regions to obtain genetic data by illegally collecting soybean, corn, and rice seeds. The article cites "a certain foreign intelligence agency" that "coveted the country's grain data and germplasm resources" and bribed an individual named Zhu to export seeds in falsely declared shipping containers. Later in the article the focus narrows to rice seeds.

Foreign "black hands" infiltrating China's grain industry.
screen shot from propaganda video on Douyin.

The Ministry of State Security emphasized that seeds are the "silicon chips" of agriculture and warns that national food security is threatened by allowing foreigners to obtain them. Foreign sale of parent seeds used in breeding is strictly prohibited. 

The Ministry's warning cast suspicion on any agriculture-related investigations by foreigners. It cited an interdisciplinary team of investigators sent by the consulate of "a certain country" to an important agricultural area under the guise of "conducting visits and investigations" (走访调查). The foreign investigation team illegally "probed and collected information" on the production and reserves of a specific crop, traveling on rural roads and making temporary stops near fields. The foreign investigators were excessively cautious in their work, and allegedly evaded detection by changing modes of transportation when traveling between grain-producing areas. 

The warning also is meant to warn citizens against sharing information with foreigners. The article notes that Zhu was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months in prison and 17 individuals engaged in the case received varying degrees of administrative penalties. The article encourages readers to report suspicious activities to security officials, noting that Zhu was caught through a tip from the public.

Warnings against foreign spies and bans on unapproved investigations of crop status have been common for years, but the agriculture specificity of this warning is unusual. There are several possible interpretations:

• Security Obsession: Is this the latest in the obsession with security under Xi Jinping that has already led to security laws on Anti-Terrorism, Management of Overseas NGOs, Cybersecurity, Nuclear Safety, the Biosecurity, and the Data Security. China may have ramped up seed theft again as leaders have prioritized the seed breeding industry in the last few years. 
• Projection: China often accuses a foreign country of unsavory activity to divert attention from China's engagement in the same activity. China has been stealing seeds for years. In 2016 employees of a Chinese seed company were caught stealing corn seeds in the U.S. Midwest (details were very similar to the accusations in today's article: the Chinese thieves drove to seed company test plots around Iowa and Illinois and sent seeds to China disguised in popcorn jars), and in 2017 a Chinese national working for a rice breeder in Kansas was sentenced to prison for passing rice seeds to visitors from a Chinese crop research institute. 
• Tit-for-tat: This warning could be retaliation for the prosecution of a scientist from China working at the University of Michigan who smuggled a wheat fungus into the United States.
• Covering up: China could be trying to cover up problems in its countryside the leaders don't want foreigners to know about...such as rural protests over low farm prices, unpaid migrant wages and failure to pay crop insurance claims; impacts on corn and peanut crops from calamitous floods in north China this month; devastating floods in southern provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan; the spread of African swine fever from Vietnam or other animal disease epidemics; fake grain reserves; bankrupt pig and chicken farms.

It is unclear why the United States or any other country with espionage capabilities would want to steal Chinese rice seeds. Multinational companies have had seed research enterprises in China for decades. Chinese leaders have often bristled at the popularity of corn and vegetable seeds from foreign companies. 

A 2021 celebration of the anti-espionage law warned that
foreign organizations had illegally collected specimens from
protected natural areas in China.

The warning's proscription on foreign sales of rice seeds, in particular, is seemingly at odds with China's efforts to build goodwill with African and Asian countries by establishing rice-breeding centers and demonstration farms in those countries. 

China does not distinguish between industrial espionage and gathering of market intelligence, and the warning makes it clear that any foreign efforts to collect market intelligence in the world's largest agricultural country could be considered espionage. With a ban on unsupervised travel in the countryside, it will become that much harder to verify official Chinese data and market reports. Chinese contacts threatened with punishment for helping spies will be less willing to share any information with foreigners. Chinese leaders seem eager to revert to Mao-era secrecy, a time when foreign diplomats had to base their assessments of the rural situation in China on Peoples Daily headlines and interviews with refugees who escaped to Hong Kong. 

Social media comments by Chinese viewers of a video version of the warning show varying reactions:

• "Agriculture is the most poisonous drug of them all."
• "Besides rice, what else?"
  
• "Sentenced to death"
• "Constantly blaming this and that is just a way to divert public attention! It's 2025 now, let's not go back to the old ways...
• "It's true that the food situation is precarious.  I heard that while some people make money or lose money in business, farmers now lose money even when growing grain?"

Chinese Buyers Grumble Over Pricey Brazilian Soybeans

Most commentary leading up to today's Trump-Xi meeting seems to ascertain that China doesn't need U.S. soybeans. Beneath the surface, though, Chinese soybean buyers are showing signs of angst as they pile up financial losses and look longingly at U.S. soybeans that are substantially cheaper than the Brazilian beans that have comprised 80-to-90% of their supplies since May. Cracks are appearing in the seemingly cozy China-Brazil soybean relationship as Chinese buyers try to scarf up as many beans as possible from the shrinking Brazilian supply.

China purchased 180,000 metric tons of U.S. soybeans this week -- probably meant as a show of good will ahead of today's inconclusive Trump-Xi meeting. The only signal to markets from the meeting itself was President Trump's vague assurance that Xi has authorized "massive" Chinese purchases of American soybeans. 

Chinese crushing plants have been processing about 9-to-10 million metric tons of soybeans monthly since record-large Brazilian supplies began arriving in May. The crushers are pumping out huge volumes of soybean meal for the Chinese feed manufacturing industry which is also producing at record levels. Soybean oil is also flooding the market and keeping a lid on prices, contributing to China's emergence as a significant soy oil exporter for the first time this year. 

Trouble is, China's soybean processors are not making money. With Brazilian soybean prices edging up and prices weak for soybean meal and oil, the crushers have had negative margins for several months. Market reports from China indicate availability of cheaper U.S. soybeans would be welcomed by crushers who have been watching losses pile up.

An October 17 article posted on the Chinese soybean industry association web site reported that high Brazilian prices were deterring Chinese buyers from purchasing beans to cover needs for December and January. The article reported an 8-to-9 million-ton gap in supplies that Chinese buyers were hoping would be filled by a release of Chinese State reserves and/or by renewed access to cheaper U.S. soybeans in the event of a Trump-Xi agreement. 

An October 27 Futures Daily soymeal market analysis echoed a similar slowdown in purchases due to a negative RMB 230 yuan/ton crushing margin for Brazilian soybeans for December shipment. According to Futures Daily, as of mid-October China had bought 5.26 mmt of soybeans for November, covering 88% of needs. They had bought just 726,000 mt for December, covering 16% of needs; and none for January. The article predicted a significant shortage of soybeans for January to March 2026. 

An October 27 National Grain and Oils Information Center (NGOIC) analysis reported that the cost of December Brazilian soybean shipments increased $8 per metric ton last week, translating to a RMB 65 per metric ton increase in C&F cost for importers in southern China to RMB 3943 per ton. The crushing margin for December Brazilian soybeans was estimated at negative RMB 263 per ton.

A rise in Brazilian prices since mid-2025 led to an unusual premium of Brazilian over U.S. soybean prices as China stopped buying U.S. soybeans and turned to purchasing Brazilian soybeans almost exclusively. Historically, FOB prices for U.S. and Brazilian beans were typically near parity. But the price of Brazilian beans soared more than 17% from early March to a mid-September peak, resulting in a rare premium for Brazilian beans. The fob price of Brazilian beans rose above the U.S. fob price in late May, and the spread between them widened to 12% in mid-September.

The Brazilian currency appreciated about 7% against the U.S. dollar between March and September this year, a factor contributing to the rise in Brazilian prices. The price of soybeans in local Brazilian currency shows a spike in April when Chinese buyers first flocked to buy from Brazil. After a decline in early May, the Brazil price in local currency rose 9 percent to its peak in August. The price dropped 5% in a week during September 17-24--apparently when Chinese buyers browbeat Brazilian sellers into cutting prices, as discussed below. Since then, the Brazilian price has rebounded less than 2%.

Source: CEPEA, converted to Reais at official exchange rate.

Brazil also crushes its soybeans, so Chinese buyers have to offer higher prices to lure soybeans away from Brazilian users. One recent analysis observed that crush margins in Brazil also deteriorated with the rise in prices for Brazilian soybeans. An American Soybean Association analysis noted this competition and estimated that Brazilian ending stocks could fall to half of a month's crush demand.

Outrage over accusations of Brazilian price gouging erupted in dark corners of Chinese media this month. An October 25 article, "2 Million Tons of Soybeans Rot at Port! Brazil Gambled but Forgot China Already Held 3 Trump Cards," told a bombastic story of Chinese traders banding together during September to resist alleged price-gouging by Brazilian suppliers by postponing 8 million tons of sales and leaving 2 million tons of beans to rot on Sao Paulo docks. According to this account, Brazilians emboldened by their monopoly position demanded an increase in soybean prices that would have priced their beans at a $66 per ton premium over U.S. beans (a premium of about 11%--consistent with the fob prices reported above.) The author of the article claimed that China pressured Argentina to suspend its tax on soybean exports last month so Chinese traders could buy from Argentina as leverage against Brazilian price increases. Global news media reported this was an emergency measure to bolster Argentine foreign currency holdings. However, the timing of the tax suspension did coincide with the drop in Brazilian soy prices and so many Chinese buyers pounced on Argentine beans that the tax suspension meant to last more than a month was canceled within days.  

Chinese social media reactions to the article--widely posted on Chinese and Hong Kong sites--reveals that the China-Brazil relationship may not be as cozy as most outsiders presume. Here are sample comments: 

• "Is Brazil's short-sighted price increase a misjudgment of the situation and a risky gamble, or a display of confidence based on leverage?"
• "What kind of underlying strength lies behind China's calm response? The answer lies in the strategic chessboard that both sides have already laid out." 
• "Brazil is truly ungrateful and treacherous, burning bridges after crossing them."  
• "Seeing that we weren't buying American soybeans, they thought they had us cornered and arbitrarily raised soybean prices. Have they forgotten that they're not the only country in the world that produces soybeans?" 

A puzzling aspect of the Chinese market situation is that low prices and financial losses are not curbing Chinese soybean crush volumes. According to the NGOIC analysis cited above, volume by main crushing plants was 2.37 mmt during the week of October 24, up 200,000 mt from the previous week and up 100,000 mt from a month earlier. Similarly, there has been little reduction in hog and poultry production despite these producers also incurring losses. Feed demand is expected to remain strong into Q4. The peak demand season for meat and oils is during the January-February Chinese holiday period.

While Brazil's new harvest will begin in January--predicted to be even larger than this year--those beans are unlikely to effectively add to Chinese supplies during Q1 2026. Analysis of 2025 customs data from Brazil and China shows it took 2 months for Brazilian exports to show up as imports in China customs data. During Q1 2025 China's crushers scraped by and Chinese soybean meal prices spiked before Brazilian beans began arriving in April. 

It's not at all clear how many soybeans are in China's State reserves. China reveals nothing about the volume and estimates by USDA and other organizations outside China are wild guesses. Many soybeans in reserves are domestic soybeans purchased to support prices. This month authorities have been releasing domestic soybeans from reserves--thousands of tons with only tepid sales--but these beans are not competitively priced for use by crushers. There has been no indication from authorities that they will release imported soybeans from reserves in large enough volumes to effectively supplement supplies in December-January.

China Promotes International Food Safety Scheme for BRI Countries

A country with a bad food safety record aspires to lead a new approach to setting food safety practices in international trade. This is part of China's plan to leverage its Belt & Road Initiative in order to boost its influence in setting international rules, standards, and inspection practices. So far, it's off to a slow start.

On October 15, China's customs administration held a meeting of its 2-year-old "Import & Export Food Safety Cooperation Mechanism for the Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative" in Shanghai with participants from food agencies and embassies of 21 Belt and Road countries. 

Director General of the Customs Administration Sun Meijun stated that China's customs administration is willing to work with food safety authorities of all countries to collaborate on food safety regulation and promote safer and more efficient trade in food and agricultural products. At the meeting member countries affirmed the "Shanghai Declaration on Promoting Trade Facilitation and Sharing Food Safety" and launched a "Silk Road Food Safety" information platform.  

No, not a game show. 11 country reps + China Customs Director Sun signed the
terms of reference for China's import-export food safety initiative at the Shanghai meeting.

According to Director Sun, the food safety mechanism will:

• be guided by morality and rule of law 
• give food enterprises the primary responsibility for quality and safety
• adhere to scientific supervision that gives full play to international rules and standards
• strive for shared responsibility for food safety throughout the entire chain from farm to table. 

Sun also mentioned that this food safety initiative is part of China's aspiration to engage in global governance. She did not mention it, but the idea for the BRI food safety initiative dates back 10 years to the 2016-20 and 2021-25 five-year plans. 

China launched the "Import & Export Food Safety Cooperation Mechanism for the Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative" in 2023. At this month's meeting 11 new countries signed the charter, bringing the total member countries to 18. My arithmetic indicates there were only 7 countries before this month's meeting was held. China claims to have over 150 countries in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), so participation is not overwhelming. There does not seem to be a list of members, but countries mentioned in articles about the initiative include Indonesia, Belarus, Iran, South Africa, Turkey, Cambodia, Bolivia, Brunei, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. 

Chinese Customs held a belt and road food safety training session in Shanghai during September 2025 
for attendees from Brunei, Mongolia, Pakistan, Serbia, Rwanda, South Africa, Papua New Guinea, and Panama

News about the October 15 Shanghai meeting was featured in several articles on the Chinese version of the customs web site and other Chinese state media. English articles in China Daily and other State media outlets briefly mentioned the Shanghai meeting, emphasizing granting of access to new products and downplaying the BRI food safety mechanism.

State media claims that food trade with BRI countries grew 2.5% this year. That was less than half the 6.2% growth in all trade with BRI countries.

In a world under China's food safety governance, look for inflexible and overly detailed traceability requirements, zero tolerances for certain substances, blanket bans of meat from an entire country when a disease outbreak occurs in a particular region, enforcement/inspections that oscillate between lax and excessively strict depending on China's market/political situation, and promises of efficient transmission of documents belied by numerous rejections of imported foods each month for documentation problems. In short, excessively complex requirements for which Chinese inspectors can always find a violation if they want to.

In September Chinese customs rejected 443 food shipments, but the list is released only in a Chinese pdf. Rejections included dozens of shrimp shipments from Ecuador containing sodium metabisulfite or animal disease, bird nests from Indonesia that contained aluminum, beef from Argentina and Brazil with incomplete documentation, bird nests from Vietnam with registration problems, milk chocolate candy from India with improper labels, shrimp from Pakistan with incomplete documents, non-GMO rapeseed oil from Kazakhstan containing GMOs, beef broth from Vietnam with salmonella, degraded pistachios from Iran, and beef from Mongolia with high bacteria counts.

U.S. Soy Exports to Non-China Destinations up 45% so far

U.S. soybean exports to non-China destinations have increased 45% year-over-year in the first 7 weeks of the 2025/26 marketing year. But that growth made only a slight dent in offsetting the lost demand from China's boycott of U.S. beans.

Analysis of USDA export inspection data for September through October 16--the first 7 weeks of the 2025/26 market year--shows that exports are overall down -2.5 million metric tons from the same period in 2024. Sifting through the USDA database shows that exports to China during this period last year were 4.2 mmt versus 0 this year. Exports to non-China destinations were 3.8 mmt in the first 7 weeks of MY2024/25, but they increased to 5.5 mmt so far in 2025/26. That's a year-on-year increase of 1.7 mmt, or 45%, but plugs less than half of the 4.2-mmt hole left by China's snub of U.S. beans. 

Most of the top overseas markets for U.S. soybeans have increased their purchases. The U.S. has exported soybeans to 34 destinations so far in MY 2025/26. The top markets are Mexico, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Japan, each of which registered increased sales year-over-year. Sales to Bangladesh and Pakistan each increased by about 400,000 mt from last year. Italy, Spain, Turkey, Taiwan, and Iraq registered increases ranging from 76,340 mt to 194,642 mt. Germany, the 6th-largest destination so far, had a drop in sales of nearly 240,000 mt. 

China is also a top buyer of U.S. sorghum, and the latest USDA report indicates that exports of sorghum for MY 2025/26 are down -346,397 mt year-over-year. On the other hand, MY 2025/26 corn exports are up 3.5 mmt and wheat exports are up 1.9 mmt year-over-year, despite lack of sales to China for these grains.

How Long Can Brazil Sustain China's Soybean Supply?

It's confirmed that Brazilian beans continued to almost single-handedly sustain China's soybean supply during September 2025--and actually increased supplies from the previous month. However, China probably cannot sustain its supplies year-round without importing U.S. soybeans. The Brazilian beans arriving in September represent the end of Brazil's peak shipping season. Brazilian shipments to China began to drop in August and September, which probably means Chinese supplies will begin to shrink in October and November. While Brazil is expected to have another monster harvest beginning in January, the new Brazilian beans probably won't clear Chinese customs until April.

As reported last week, China's September 2025 soybean imports increased by 592,000 metric tons from the previous month to reach 12.87 million metric tons (mmt). Detailed customs data confirm that China's imports of Brazilian soybeans increased by 476,000 mt in September, accounting for most of the increase. Brazil supplied 10.96 million metric tons (mmt) of China's September soybean imports during September, an 85% share (nearly the same as in August). Imports from Uruguay were up 239,000 mt and imports from Argentina were up 123,000 mt. China imported small volumes from Russia, Canada, and Ukraine. (Phantom imports from the U.S. reported by Chinese customs in August did not reappear in September.)  

As reported here last week, the volume of soybeans exported by Brazil to China in a given month roughly corresponds to the volume of Brazilian bean imports reported by Chinese customs 2 months later. However, the comparison does not match exactly and suggests that soybeans seem to have gained some weight somehow in their journey from Brazil to China. 

Brazil exports to China from Brazilian customs.
China's imports from Brazil from Chinese customs.

For example:

• In July 2025 Brazil reported exporting 9.58 mmt of soybeans bound for China. 
• In September, China reported that 10.96 mmt of Brazilian soybeans cleared customs--nearly 1.4 mmt more than Brazil had reported exporting two months earlier. 

The cumulative trade for 2025 so far suggests inflation of China's import volume by about 2.1 mmt

• From January to July 2025, Brazil reported exporting a cumulative total of 58 mmt of soybeans bound for China. 
• From March to September (a 2-month lag), China reported importing a cumulative total of 60.1 mmt of soybeans from Brazil--2.1 mmt more than Brazil reported exporting to China. 

It's evident from the chart above that July was the end of the peak export season for Brazil's soybeans. Brazil's August exports to China totaled 7.93 mmt, down about 1.6 mmt from July. In September Brazil exported 6.77 mmt to China, down 1.16 mmt from August. These monthly declines in Brazilian shipments should result in a drop in China's arrivals of soybeans in October and November. More declines are likely in December 2025 through March 2026. Purchases from Argentina earlier this month will arrive in early 2026 and only fill part of China's deficit if there are no purchases of U.S. soybeans.

China's Food Prices Under Downward Pressure

The food component of China's CPI for September 2025 was down -4.4% from a year ago, while the nonfood component was up 0.7%, according to a report by the National Bureau of Statistics. The overall CPI was down -0.3% from a year ago.

Prices were down from a year ago for most food categories. Pork (-17%), vegetables (-13.7%), and eggs (-11.9%) stood out with the largest year-over-year declines in price. Fresh fruit (-4.2%), edible oils and milk (both -1.4%) and grains (-0.7%) were also down year-over-year. 

While food prices in September were down from a year ago, prices were up 0.7% from the previous month (August). Vegetables, eggs, and fruit were up from the previous month.

The Food CPI is cyclical. This month's year-over-year declines reflect a reversal of increases that occurred a year ago, especially for pork and vegetables. A year ago, China's Food CPI was up +3.3% in September 2024, and it was down -3.2% in September 2023. Pork, in particular, remains highly cyclical, registering a 17% decrease in September 2025, a 16% year-over year increase in September 2024, and a -22% decrease in September 2023. 

Data from China National Bureau of Statistics.

The informal title of "Consumer Pork Index" still applies due to the role of pork price fluctuations in the CPI. According to the Statistics Bureau report, the decline in vegetable prices contributed -0.35 percentage points to the overall CPI decline, pork contributed -0.26 percentage points, and eggs contributed -0.08 percentage points.

The decline in pork prices has gained momentum during October. Wholesale prices started falling in mid-September. The average price for a lean pork carcass reported at Beijing's Xinfadi market declined from RMB 8.9 per 500g on September 9 to RMB 7.4 per 500g on October 18, a cumulative decline of nearly 17% in about 5 weeks. A number of videos on Chinese social media marvel at incredibly low pork prices in consumer markets around the country.

Average price for a lean pork carcass, Beijing Xinfadi.com.cn.

Industrial prices in September were down year-over-year: the producer price index for industrial products ex-factory was down -2.3% from a year ago. The index of raw material prices was down -3.1% year-over-year. 

The industrial producer price index for food products ex-factory was down -1.7% year-over-year in September. The textile industry PPI was down -2.4% and the clothing and apparel PPI was down -0.6% from a year ago. 

Pictures of Rain-Soaked Corn Harvest in China

 

College students harvesting corn in the rain near Jinan, Shandong.
Source: Jinan Times.

October 1, a student saw this when he returned home
to Qi County, Kaifeng City, Henan Province. Source: Huoxing Caijing.

Farmer prays for his 200 mu of corn soaked by rain. Frame from Douyin video.

Moldy corn in Henan Province. Grandpa spent RMB600 per mu to grow corn
and can sell it for RMB 1 per kilogram. Douyin video frame.

Drying corn on the roadside in northern Anhui Province. Douyin video frame.

Combine harvesting in a flooded field. Douyin video frame.

Getah Virus Spreading in China's Pigs: "Worst Crisis Since ASF"

 China's swine industry is struggling with an epidemic of Getah Virus, also known as GETV (盖塔病毒). One video posted on Chinese social media calls GETV "The biggest crisis since African swine fever." 

The mosquito-borne virus can infect entire farms, causing diarrhea, staggering movements, and discoloration of skin. It causes sows to abort and reduces survival rates of weaned piglets. An article appearing in mid-September reported that the virus had been detected on pig farms in Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, Henan, and Sichuan Provinces. It has also appeared in Hebei. Most information about the current outbreak comes from farmers posting short videos on Douyin (China's Tick Tock) about GETV outbreaks and sharing guidance for avoiding it. Videos posted as recently as yesterday show barns filled with dead pigs, excavators dumping live pigs into burial pits, sows with blotches on their skin, and pigs staggering around a pen.

Thumbnails of videos about GETV outbreaks posted on Douyin yesterday.

The GETV outbreak does not appear to be mentioned in any official news media, pig industry websites, or market analysis reports. Last month's article cited monitoring by China's Animal Health and Epidemiology Center as showing that GETV is spreading, but I cannot even find a web site or any online reports by this organization. Today, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs held a videoconference on upgrading work on swine quarantine and slaughterhouse monitoring, but there was no mention of GETV or any other specific disease. Local officials were ordered to take prompt action and proactive measures to improve animal disease prevention, find new ways to supervise slaughter in small facilities, and plan work for the New Year and Spring Festival holidays. 

Getah Virus was first discovered in mosquitos around Malaysian rubber plantations in 1955 (Getah is the Malay word for "rubber") and has since spread across Eurasia and the Pacific region, evolving into multiple strains. Worldiwde, the virus is more common in horses (for whom it is not lethal) than in pigs. GETV does not cause illness in humans, but antibodies against the virus have been found in humans.

 The virus was first isolated in China during 1964. Scientists in China have published dozens of academic studies of the virus. Scientific papers indicate the virus has impacted commercial swine in China for years, including a study that found 1.3% of samples collected in Shandong Province during 2022-23 were infected and an epidemiological study using samples collected from 16 provinces in 2021-22. A July 2025 paper published in the scientific journal Virulence documented an epidemic of GETV on farms in 21 of 157 counties in Henan Province during July to September 2024. The Henan study's authors speculated that last year's spread of the virus could have been even wider than they had detected. This year's epidemic also began in Henan and has spread to at least four other provinces. 

The Virulence study's authors reported that the 2024 outbreak originated in Nanyang, a region of Henan that also happens to be headquarters for China's largest swine-producing company. The authors also warned obliquely that small farmers purchasing pigs from large companies is a practice that heightens the risk of transmission. The stern warnings issued to large hog companies over the last 5 months to ban selling pigs for "secondary fattening" may have actually been meant to stop the spread of GETV (it was described as a measure to reduce excess supply).

The spread of GETV is linked to mosquito activity which explains its concentration during summer months in southern provinces. Mosquito density 25% higher than normal following this year's extensive typhoons and flooding may have contributed to this year's GETV epidemic.

It is common for early information about epidemics to be spread by anecdote. In past epidemics authorities covered them up until they no longer could be hidden. In 2018, the African swine fever virus had been circulating in China for 2-to-3 months before the first official case was announced in August of that year. PRRS ("blue ear virus") spread for about a year in 2006-07 before it became a national crisis in the Spring months of 2007. 

The usual pattern is for pork prices to fall in the outbreak's initial phase as pigs are culled en masse and infected pigs are illegally slaughtered and sold in the market. The GETV outbreak may be partially responsible for crashing pork prices this fall. The November 2025 contract on the Dalian Commodity Exchange fell nearly 20% between August and mid-October. After the first round of sow deaths/culls impacts supplies 6-to-8 months later pork prices skyrocket. Hog contracts for 2026 also declined sharply over the last 2 months but the September 2026 contract is trading at a 23% premium over the November 2025 contract.

November hog futures on Dalian Commodity Exchange

This virus appears to be mosquito-borne. On one hand, heavy rains across northern China and resulting standing water could contribute to spread to northern provinces. On the other hand, cold weather could bring some relief by reducing mosquito populations. Big swine producing companies raising pigs in enclosed buildings claim to be free of the virus. The current outbreak is likely to add momentum to the consolidation trend that is pushing independent hog producers out of the business. 

Weak China Corn Market Could Get a Jolt from Mold Problem

China's corn prices have been under downward pressure, but there are early signs of a turnaround in the market due to quality problems in the northern plain region. 

On October 14, the Dalian futures price closed at RMB 2093 per metric ton, down 5.5% from its September 8 peak.

China Dalian Commodity Exchange.

 A Feed Industry Information Net report today reported the national average cash price for corn was RMB 2,201.70, down 4.19% from a week earlier. The increased volume of new corn coming on the market is driving down prices, the report said. The agriculture ministry estimates that the corn harvest is more than 50% complete. Corn output estimated to be up this year due to a slight increase in area and yield improvements achieved by a nationwide campaign to raise grain yields that was declared by the communist party's "Document No. 1." Buying is cautious despite a stubbornly high swine inventory and August feed output of 20.36 million metric tons that was up 3.7% from the previous year. 

A separate analysis posted on several sites Monday predicted that China's corn prices could soon turn upward in the northeastern region. The analysis noted that northeastern farmers will soon cut back their sales of corn as falling prices are now approaching the production cost. When profits disappear they will be less eager to sell. Second, the analyst observed that companies are converging on the northeast to buy corn because corn quality has been degraded in Shandong Province and other parts of the northern plan corn belt where heavy rains have been falling since mid-September. As competition for good quality corn in the northeast region heats up, the price will rise. According to the analyst, businesses in the northeastern region are beginning to feel a sense of crisis and will have to raise prices in order to buy enough corn for their needs.

The Feed Industry Information Net analysis also cited heightened risk of mold in north China as drying capacity is insufficient, and piles of newly harvested corn are getting wet. That analysis predicted that a monthly decline in corn prices during October is likely but advised readers to pay close attention to weather conditions during the harvest period.

China's Soybean Imports Increased to 12.9 mmt in September. How?

China imported 12.9 million metric tons (mmt) of soybeans in September 2025, according to summary data released by the customs administration. The import total was up from the previous month's 12.3-mmt total, and it was the 2nd-highest-ever monthly volume after May's 13.9 mmt. 

China is still importing nearly all of its soybeans from Brazil, a pattern that surely continued in September. China has not yet released detailed data that will reveal the source of beans imported in September, but it is surprising that imports increased from the previous month with South American supplies shrinking after the Southern Hemisphere marketing season passed its seasonal peak. 

The chart below shows that China's monthly fluctuations in imports have reflected changes in imports from Brazil over the last 2 years. Last year China's imports from Brazil peaked in August and began declining month-to-month by 2-mmt during Sept-Nov. This year imports from Brazil peaked in May at 12.1 mmt and were between 10.4 and 10.6 mmt during June-August. The seasonal pattern suggests a decline in imports from Brazil in September.

Data from China Administration of Customs.

The chart below overlays China's imports from Brazil with Brazil's exports of soybeans to China. There seems to be a consistent 2-month lag between Brazil's exports and China's imports of Brazilian beans.  Brazil's monthly soybean exports to China began falling in July, fell about 2.7 mmt in August and fell about 1.4 mmt September (Brazil releases its customs data earlier than China does). Brazil's July exports suggest a China import volume from Brazil of about 9.6 mmt in September. Given a total of 12.9 mmt, that suggests about 3.3 mmt came from other sources in September.

Data from China and Brazilian customs.

For reference, the most recent detailed China customs data for August 2025 show 10.5 mmt of the 12.3-mmt import total came from Brazil. If imports from Brazil declined to 9.6 mmt in September, imports from other sources -- Argentina 1 mmt in August, Uruguay 444,000 mt in August, Russia 46,000 mt in August, Canada 22,000 mt in August, and Ukraine 4,000 mt in August -- would have to double to achieve the September import total of 12.9 mmt. (China also reported 227,000 mt of imports from the U.S. in August even though no U.S. exports to China have been reported since April--perhaps these were stuck in prolonged inspections or released from bonded warehouses). 

We'll find the answer next week when detailed data are released.

RMB484mil Disaster Relief and Expedited Insurance Payouts for Rain-Soaked Harvest

"Wet soil and waterlogged farmland have hindered the movement of agricultural machinery, negatively impacting harvesting, drying, and clearing stubble for wheat sowing," according to official Chinese news media. The Xinhua report proclaimed, "We must unite our efforts to protect autumn crops and strive to overcome disasters and achieve a bumper harvest!"

A Xinhua reporter claimed to see crawler-type harvesters working nonstop. Source: Xinhua.

A special meeting on agricultural insurance indemnities was held on October 10 to consider how to speed up insurance payments to farmers impacted by heavy rains in the Huang-Huai region of northern China. The meeting was held to address complaints about slow processing of agricultural insurance claims and low payouts. Insurance companies were instructed to expedite claims, use remote sensing and drones to verify losses, pay the full amount promptly, and ensure that grain is harvested and dried. 

The meeting was convened jointly by the Planning and Finance Office of China's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) and the Property Insurance Supervision Department of the State Financial Supervision and Administration Bureau. Companies engaged in agricultural insurance attending the meeting were ordered to improve their sense of responsibility and level of service. The State Financial Supervision and Administration Bureau will monitor payouts and threatened companies slow to process claims with punishment. Companies attending including PICC Property & Casualty Insurance, CPIC Property & Casualty Insurance, China Property & Casualty Insurance, China Life Property & Casualty Insurance, Ping An Property & Casualty Insurance, Zhongyuan Agricultural Insurance, Guoyuan Agricultural Insurance.

China's Finance and Agriculture Ministries issued RMB 484 million (US$ 67 million) in agricultural disaster relief funds on October 11 to provinces impacted by heavy rains, according to the web site of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. Funds are to support early harvesting by agricultural machinery, drying of wet grain, drainage of farmland, and moisture-resistant sowing of winter wheat to ensure a good harvest of autumn grain and a good storage of every grain. Seven provinces received funds, including Hebei, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Shandong, and Shaanxi.

Grain drying enterprise in Hebei Province. Source: Xinhua.

China's Fall Grain Harvest Stuck in the Mud

Grain harvesting equipment can't get into muddy fields and the corn crop is at risk of mold due to heavy rains across much of northern China. This is also China's main winter wheat region, so delays in planting in flooded and waterlogged fields could impact next year's wheat crop. While corn prices in China have been under downward pressure and imports of corn and wheat have been minimal over the past year, this weather event could tighten up China's grain markets.

On October 9, the agriculture ministry and meteorological administration issued a warning for October 10-12 of continuous rain and waterlogging of farmland across parts of Northern and Northwest China and parts of the Huanghuai region. An "orange alert" was issued for Xianyang, Tongchuan, and Weinan in Shaanxi Province; Linfen, Yuncheng, Changzhi and Jincheng in Shanxi Province; Xingtai and Handan in Hebei Province; and Dezhou and Binzhou in Shandong Province.

Soil moisture October 9. Blue indicates excessive moisture.

The rainy weather notice advised farmers in high-risk areas to promptly harvest crops and exhorted them to dry grain and use ventilation to prevent germination and molding of grain post-harvest, promptly drain waterlogged fields and prepare land for autumn sowing of over-wintering wheat crops. 

Rainy weather during the fall harvest season is rare in these regions where most rain is concentrated during summer months. Many of these regions suffered from drought during last winter and spring, but a record wheat crop was nevertheless reported during the summer months.

Minister of Agriculture Han Jun inspected difficulties harvesting corn and preparing to plant the winter wheat crop in Henan Province on October 8-9. Minister Han commended upgrades to harvesting equipment in Zhoukou City to enable machinery to access fields by substituting larger wheels and using 4-wheel drive and tractor crawler equipment. Han also stressed the need to deploy grain drying equipment to farms and storage facilities to prevent soggy grain from molding. Han exhorted local officials to improve drainage ditches and to improve agricultural disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief capabilities utilizing "comprehensive grain service centers." 

Minister Han discusses tractors that can navigate muddy fields in Henan Province.
The rain apparently stopped for this photo, and no one has mud on their shoes.

Han stressed the need to plan for winter wheat planting, to increase the supply of seeds and fertilizers and to guide farmers on avoid impacts of excess soil moisture on wheat plants and late-sowing of wheat to ensure that winter wheat planted area remains stable. 

Minister Han's remarks raised concern over grain markets by emphasizing the importance of grain price stability, ensuring reasonable net returns for grain farmers, and coordination of grain procurement and insurance claims. 

State media in Hebei Province reported using 186,000 crawler-type harvesters since conventional equipment cannot access fields. These tractors can harvest over 100 mu per day--about 16 acres. 

The State Administration of Food and Commodity Reserves also issued a notice on October 9 demanding that grain purchasing and storage officials in provinces hit by rains prioritize grain procurement, coordinate deployment of grain drying equipment to farmers, ensure grain is stored in waterproof facilities, monitor risks of mold and toxins in grain, and the step up coordination of policy and market procurement and state and local procurement, and carry out targeted procurement and disposal of substandard grain. 

The notice advised officials to prepare to implement the minimum price procurement policy for rice, probably an indicator that rice prices are near the minimum level and also to avoid mixing substandard rice in State reserves. 

A wheat expert interviewed by Farmers Daily acknowledged the delay of corn harvesting and winter wheat planting, then emphasized that rains will replenish moisture in soil and aquifers, improving growing conditions for next year's wheat crop. He pointed out that extensive flooding in Henan Province during 2021 was followed by a big wheat harvest the following year.

13% of Wheat Purchased at Support Price

China purchased 13 million metric tons of wheat through its minimum procurement price program this year, according to the director of the State Administration of Food and Commodity Reserves. Purchases were made in provinces of Henan, Anhui, Hebei, and Shandong. 

The director also announced that a total of 100.16 million metric tons of wheat has been procured during the peak marketing season. Thus, 13% of this year's crop was purchased at the minimum price and stored in government reserves.

The director said wheat procurement began early this year and proceeded smoothly as most farmers sought to sell their grain as soon as it was harvested. The minimum price program gave farmers a "bottom line" that guaranteed that farmers could sell their wheat at a good price, the director said.

The minimum price for wheat this year is RMB 2,380 per metric ton for grade 3 wheat. The Chinese support price works out to US$ 9 per bushel at the current exchange rate. By comparison, the futures price for U.S. wheat is currently about $5.07 per bushel.

The simple average of procurement prices paid for all wheat reported weekly by the Administration of Food and Commodity Reserves from May to September was RMB 2,410 per metric ton.

China reported producing 138.16 million metric tons of wheat this year, so 9.4% of all wheat produced in 2025 was purchased at the minimum price. (The minimum price program only operates in 5 provinces representing about 82% of wheat output.)

The value of the wheat purchased at minimum price is RMB 30.94 billion ($4.3 billion at the current exchange rate). 

A calculation with simple assumptions shows that the value of wheat purchased at minimum price was 8.5% of the value of wheat produced in China this year.