Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Chinese Agriculture's Declining Competitiveness

A Chinese expert acknowledged the declining international competitiveness of his country's agricultural sector and advocated an emphasis on family farms and improvement of rainfed agriculture as critical steps to improve productivity and cut costs.

Dang Guoyang is a prominent researcher at the Rural Development Institute at China's Academy of Social Sciences. In an interview with Peoples Daily, Professor Dang observes that China's agricultural output has expanded at a remarkable pace since "reform and opening" (after 1978), but he is concerned that China's agricultural sector's international competitiveness has declined. Production costs are higher than those in developed countries, and Dang insists that this lack of competitiveness will affect Chinese agriculture's long-term development.

Ironically, the first problem Dang cites is high labor costs in Chinese agriculture. While daily wages paid by U.S. farms are 5 times higher than in China, U.S. labor productivity is 100 times higher on U.S. farms, says Dang. Consequently, the labor cost per unit of output is higher in China because so much labor is used.

Fertilizer and other inputs are another high-cost item in Chinese agriculture, says Dang. He attributes this to per-acre fertilizer application rates that are three times higher in China than in the United States.

Dang also cites China's lack of technological prowess. He says that 80 percent of new technologies are imported to China from developed countries.

Dang's prescriptions for improving competitiveness include:

  • changing the agricultural technology model to emphasize rain-fed farming methods
  • promoting family-operated farms as the foundation for a new model of organization for the agricultural industry
  • raising the efficiency of government policy support for farms.

Professor Dang calls for limits on commercial investment in large-scale company-operated farms. He thinks rural families need some breathing room to develop commercial-scale farms large enough to operate with their own labor. Such "family farms" will be large enough to exploit size economies, but not so large that they reach the point of diseconomies of scale.

Dang thinks an industry composed of family farms can form a foundation for successful development of farmer cooperatives. Dang is critical of recent efforts to develop farmer cooperatives, observing that farmers actually have little interest in joining them and most are poorly managed. Dang blames the disappointing results of China's cooperative campaign on the tiny scale of household farms and a misguided emphasis among rural officials of starting as many cooperatives as possible.

With larger-scale farms, Dang said, farmers may see greater benefit from forming cooperatives and stoke enthusiasm for joining them. Taking it slow in forming cooperatives will avoid another problem--the scarcity of management and technical personnel to operate cooperatives. He recommends exploring ways of integrating commercial investors with farmer cooperatives in a way that brings benefits to both parties. Prof. Dang thinks effective cooperatives comprised of "family farmers" will give them more bargaining power over prices of inputs and sale of commodities.

Dang also seems to recommend that agricultural officials shed their obsession with irrigation and focus on how to improve production in dry areas.

Historically, China's major farm production regions were in the well-watered southern provinces which exported rice to the north. Now the balance has shifted to the drier northern provinces which have more flat land conducive to mechanization. Most of the northern fields do not have irrigation systems and must rely on rainfall. Prof. Dang says it is critical to find methods to raise productivity on rain-fed land.

Dang says agricultural officials wrongly denigrate rainfed farming as "depending on heaven for food." Dang points out that farming in developed countries is largely rainfed. He says that irrigation accounts for about 30 percent of labor used in Chinese farming--another source of high costs. According to Dang, irrigation costs have increased a lot in recent years for many wheat producers in northern China.

He advocates paying more attention to disseminating techniques that raise productivity for farmers in dry regions. An example is a "plastic sheeting, dual furrow" technique used with good results in areas of Gansu and northern Shaanxi Provinces where annual precipitation is 400 mm or less.

Dang's call for improving competitiveness is even more urgent than he lets on. Prices of most major Chinese commodities have already climbed above international prices. A new OECD/FAO outlook report for the next ten years anticipates that global farm prices will remain low for the next several years after record harvests in multiple countries. Thus, to ensure profits for its high-cost producers China will struggle to keep its prices elevated above world prices for years to come and will need to erect more and more trade barriers to stop imports from flooding into its market.

Saturday, July 19, 2014

China's Subsidized Rice Glut

In a pattern being duplicated for many major commodities, Chinese authorities have been giving farmers subsidies and price supports to grow rice that can't be sold. Now authorities are having to subsidize construction of warehouses to store the subsidized rice.

According to Outlook (瞭望), a government-supported news magazine, rice-growing regions in southern China claim they don't have enough space to store the new rice crop. A big crop of early-season rice is expected this month. With abundant supplies of rice already in storage and downward pressure on prices from imported rice, officials anticipate that they will have to purchase significant volumes of the new rice crop and store it in reserves to prevent prices from falling.

The main early-rice provinces--Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei--still have a lot of early-season rice stored from last year, so there is not enough space for this year's anticipated purchases. Hunan's early-season rice harvest is estimated at about 8.5 mmt, with 5 mmt to be sold by farmers. They anticipate a 1-mmt storage deficit.

In 2013, China's rice production posted a tenth-straight increase in output. Yet supply exceeded consumption. Jiangxi and other southern provinces purchased a record amount of rice for reserves last year. Nationwide, Chinese authorities purchased 32.6 million metric tons (mmt) of rice to support prices--about 16 percent of the rice produced. This included 5.67 mmt from the early-season crop, 13.37 mmt from middle and late-season crops, and 13.57 mmt of japonica rice grown mainly in the northeastern region (plus Jiangsu and Anhui). Adding these quantities to the rice purchased in previous years, China has an "astonishing" amount of rice in storage.

In Yichun City, Jiangxi's largest grain-producing prefecture, state-owned companies have 1.5 mmt of grain in storage (about 600,000 metric tons have gone bad due to poor facilities), including a record volume of rice purchased in 2013. They only managed to sell 175,000 mt this year to clear out space for the new rice crop, but they anticipate having to purchase 675,000 mt this year.

The Jiangxi Agricultural Development Bank--which finances reserves--estimates that its customers are holding 11.25 mmt of grain. They estimate there is about 3 mmt of space left for the new crop--about half in granaries for reserves and about half in rice mills. They estimate that there will be a 2-mmt deficit if they have to buy rice to support prices.

The rice glut was reflected in Premier Li Keqiang's June 25, 2014 order to build more grain storage facilities, with special emphasis on rice-producing areas in southern and northeastern China. Storage was said to be seriously insufficient in some regions. Li called for making greater efforts to sell off existing reserves and old grain, building private and on-farm storage facilities, ensuring that grain-consuming regions hold at least a 6-month supply of grain in reserves, and checking granaries to verify they actually have the reserves they reported to authorities.

Premier Li's speech also ordered granaries to sell off old grain at a faster pace to make room for the new crop. However, injecting this old grain into the market is further depressing the market price.
In Hunan, the purchase price for early-season rice is now about 2400 yuan/metric ton, and old grain from reserves is selling for 2000-to-2300 yuan/metric ton. These prices are far below the minimum price of 2700 yuan set by authorities for 2014. Hunan authorities expect they will have to buy more rice this year to prevent the price from falling.

The Hunan branch of China's Agricultural Development Bank has allocated 8 billion yuan ($1.29 billion) to purchase an expected 3 mmt of early rice at the minimum price. This is 2 billion yuan more than in 2013.

The vice director of the Hunan Grain Bureau says they don't have enough space to store the new rice. He says farmers are having to line up and wait extended periods of time to sell their rice. This is the dreaded "hard to sell grain" (卖粮难) problem. Refusal of grain and payment with IOUs bred dissatisfaction among farmers during the 1990s and stability-obsessed authorities are trying to prevent it from recurring.

While the grain-storage alarm is partly aimed at getting subsidies to build new granaries, there does seem to be a serious rice glut. No one has pointed out the irony that Chinese officials have been heavily subsidizing production of early-season rice for the last three years, and all of this subsidized rice is going into subsidized government warehouses. Someone let me know when China has become a market economy.

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

COFCO's Golfing Sins

China National Oils Cereals and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) has been fingered by the Communist Party's Central Discipline Commission as one of several corrupt government/business units in its 2014 report. The terse report accused COFCO of spending public funds on golf and other luxury items, a violation of Secretary Xi Jinping's "eight rules" which ordered government officials to cut back on excessive banqueting, travel, and car purchases. COFCO is China's largest agribusiness company and the largest importer of corn, so the agricultural implications of the censure of COFCO may be worth speculating about.

Over the last two years, the discipline commission has singled out local officials in a number of provinces, a mining company in Inner Mongolia, Fudan University, and the Ministry of Science and Technology for censure and possible legal action. COFCO seems to be this year's example of profligacy and lack of oversight over state-owned enterprises.  Other officials are accused of manipulating land auctions, skimming money from fake research projects, improper promotions, and other sins.

The corruption crackdown seems to echo Mao-era rectification campaigns with rhetoric railing against "formalism, hedonism, bureaucracy-ism", "ill winds," "mass lines," and posters plastered on every available wall reminding communist party cadres to follow 12 virtues, increase the party's value and achieve the "China Dream." The crackdown also seems to be calculated to address the Chinese public's fermenting anger over the privileges granted to officials and their abuses.

The COFCO censure reveals a fallacy of China's trade and industrial policy which assume that a Chinese company has the interests of China in mind. The government grants preferential trading rights, access to capital and other benefits to large state-owned companies on the presumption that such companies will do the State's bidding. These companies are helped as a means of preventing multinationals from gaining a dominant market share since they are presumed to be threat to China's interests.

For example, a recent book, Agricultural Trade Research 2009-2013 (农业贸易研究2009-2013), explains that China's WTO negotiators insisted on awarding most of the tariff rate quota to state-owned companies--like COFCO--as a means of controlling imports. COFCO has 60% of China's corn import quota and 90% of the wheat quota.  But does COFCO really pursue the interests of its owner--the State?

The presumption that COFCO is more reliable than multinational companies is based on the fallacy that a State-owned company pursues the interests of the State. In reality, managers of both COFCO and multinationals pursue their own interests. Managers of state-owned companies avoid paying dividends to the State and take advantage of their position to enrich themselves. Chinese consumers would probably be better off with multinationals competing for the market than if the market is handed to COFCO.

A prime example of corrupt managers pursuing their self-interest is Sinograin--China's grain reserve monopoly--where grain depot managers fled the country with millions of dollars, suspicious fires destroyed granaries, and grain was misused.

The scolding of COFCO could have another hidden motivation deriving from the company's favored position as designated dominant grain importer. Chinese officials are desperate to whittle down their massive corn stockpile before this fall's grain harvest--3 months away. They don't want cheap imported corn competing with the expensive domestic corn being sold from stockpiles, so they are doing whatever they can to keep a lid on imports. However, with U.S. prices dropping further and the import margin widening to 400-500 yuan per tonne, there are riches to be made by importing corn. COFCO is also a processor of corn, a feed miller and a pig and dairy farmer whose margins are shrunk by high corn prices. The temptation to sin by importing corn is strong.

The disciplinary commission's inclusion of COFCO on its bad boy list may be an implicit threat of prison if officials are caught importing or smuggling corn, with exoneration promised if they follow the party line on corn imports.

Monday, July 7, 2014

Auctioning Imported Reserve Corn

Chinese authorities are auctioning off old imported corn from their "temporary reserve" stockpile. The corn--bought from the U.S. several years ago--is attracting attention because of its price and quality.


China began importing significant volumes of corn in 2010, but a lot of it was locked away in warehouses to bolster reserves. The 1.57 million metric tons (mmt) imported in 2010 mostly went into state reserves but has already been sold off and replaced. The nearly 1.7 mmt imported in 2011 at a cost of over 2200 yuan/metric ton also was placed in reserves and is now up for auction. The price is said to be about 300 yuan/metric ton less than domestic corn and similar to the price of imported sorghum. The imported corn is said to be attracting interest mainly from feed mills.


Much of China's domestic corn supply is stockpiled in northeastern provinces. It can't be sold because its sale price has to exceed the price paid for the corn. New imports of corn and DDGS are mostly blocked by the MIR162 variety non-approval.


The auctions of old imported corn from reserves are being held in southern provinces Guangdong, Hunan and Jiangxi. The volume is relatively small and the auctions are far enough from the northeastern region that it won't put downward pressure on northeastern corn prices. The auctions also inject some corn into thirsty commercial channels and might also be intended to slow sorghum imports.

Thursday, July 3, 2014

"5 Big Problems" for China's Agriculture

China's Minister of Agriculture warned of five big problems facing agriculture that can't be underestimated.

Minister Han Changfu issued the warning in remarks at a July 2, 2014 conference on the rural economy. First, he warned that weather forecasts indicate a risk of droughts and floods this summer that could prevent another big harvest. He urged local officials to take early preventive measures to ensure another big harvest.

Minster Han also worried that downward pressure on agricultural prices this year threatens to weaken farmers' production incentives. Grain inventories are at their highest-ever level, warned Han. What he failed to mention is that the declining trend in prices is due to the big increases in grain output last fall and the recently-completed big wheat harvest. With a glut of grain of historical proportions, markets tend to push prices down to discourage adding to the excess supply.

Falling prices are ruled out because that would restrain growth in rural incomes. Han warned that difficulty raising rural incomes should not be underestimated. He fretted that falling prices and bulging grain inventories could lead to farmers having difficulty selling their grain. This would threaten a replay of the 1990s when farmers were often paid with IOUs or had their grain refused on spurious "quality" issues. Rural China teetered on the brink of instability during that decade and officials worry that this might resurface.

Han warned that the complexity and arduousness of rural reforms should not be underestimated. He did not elaborate on this point.

The fifth problem not to be underestimated is the risk of food safety and animal disease outbreaks. In the second half of the year, most of the crops come on the market and it's the peak consumption season. It's also the peak season for animal disease, warned Minister Han.

When prices fall, profit margins are squeezed, giving traders and processors greater incentive to cut corners or substitute inferior ingredients. Farmers tend to use low quality feed and crowd pens and barns to cut costs.

Han's warnings are internally inconsistent. He wants big production, but big production brings big problems. Endless increases in grain output push down prices. Crowded animal pens transmit disease.

China's leadership wants the market to have a "decisive role in resource allocation," except when it conflicts with one of its policy objectives, which is almost all the time since there are so many objectives that can't be achieved simultaneously. Thus, the government retains its "decisive role" when the market fails to achieve all of the government's internally-inconsistent objectives.

Monday, June 30, 2014

China Aims For Target Prices and Big Grain Stockpiles

Premier Li Keqiang recently announced China’s intent to adopt “target price” subsidies for grains and to boost state reserves. The new measures are a continuation of Premier Li’s strategy of moving toward a more market-oriented farm policy, but they also reflect an attempt to deal with giant stockpiles and price distortions that have resulted from the current price support policies.

In January 2014, Chinese leaders announced an experimental “target price” program to begin this year in northeastern provinces for soybeans and Xinjiang Autonomous Region for cotton. The June 25 announcement signaled the State Council’s intent to eventually adopt the target price model as a general subsidy approach that will replace the current support price programs for major commodities. The new announcement seems hasty since the experimental programs haven’t begun yet, and officials haven’t even announced the details of how the trial target price programs will be implemented with the harvest just a few months away.

The target price subsidy is a payment based on the difference between a government-set “target price” and the market price—when the market price is below the target. This is described as a more market-oriented policy that will still protect farmers’ income and motivate them to produce. However, it is likely to produce massive subsidy payments as producers make their planting decision based on the high target price, expanding supply, driving down the “market” price, creating big gaps between the target and market prices. With no way of verifying production or sales by tens of millions of producers, the program will be an invitation to fraud and corruption.

While the error-riddled China Daily article picked up by English-language news media emphasized the target-price subsidy, the Chinese-language official news media emphasized expansion of grain storage and purchasing as the main theme of the State Council’s decision. The call for more grain storage capacity appears to be motivated by a confusing mix of objectives: a short-term urgency to create more space for this year's crop and a long-term need to use huge stockpiles to control prices under the more "market-oriented" target price policy.

Noting the recent growth in grain production—including this month’s big wheat harvest--the announcement noted that some regions are seriously short of grain storage capacity. The announcement said grain purchase and storage is currently “an urgent matter” and also “a long-term responsibility.” Officials want to make sure that farmers can sell their grain at ever-rising prices. The security-obsessed Chinese regime is probably worried that problems selling grain could set off rural uprisings.

The first specific task identified by the announcement was to sell off existing grain reserves to make room for the new harvest. Grain production has continued booming over the last two years but consumption has plummeted, thus the government has had to take millions of tons off the market to prevent prices from falling. With bins full in many places, officials have recently been holding auctions to sell millions of tons of reserve corn, but there have been relatively few takers since the price is too high.

Another clue about the urgency of whittling down corn reserves is a proposal floated in the announcement to “give support to corn processors in areas with storage problems.” On June 24, Heilongjiang Province announced a 100-yuan-per-ton subsidy for processors with capacity of 100,000 tons or more for 2014-15. Subsidies for processing corn into starch and alcohol products are a sharp turn-around from less than two years ago when officials were trying to rein in industrial use which had broken through their 26-percent maximum share of corn consumption.

Premier Li’s announcement called for boosting grain storage by 50 million metric tons (mmt) during the next two years, focusing on northeastern corn-production areas and southern rice regions. Local governments are urged to boost reserve capacity by 25 mmt this year, and to keep a 6-month supply on hand. Private operators are urged to invest in grain storage facilities and grain-drying equipment.

Why is China in urgent need of so much grain storage? It has roads and rail that can transport grain to any corner of the country within days, if not hours. China is the world’s largest international trader and a big owner of shipping. Grain can be transported from the Americas or Europe to China within weeks. Surely, China is not planning to engage in a war that will disrupt shipments from a major grain-supplier during its “peaceful rise”? ;)

Friday, June 20, 2014

China's beef prices and imports surge

A 2013 beef market report by the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) noted that Chinese beef prices rose 30 percent during 2013 and have tripled since 2002. Soaring prices and a surge of imports during 2013 were due to tight supplies combined with flourishing demand.

At the end of December 2013, the average price in beef-producing provinces was 57 yuan per kg (about $4.23/lb) and the price in southeastern provinces was over 70 yuan ($5.20/lb). Since then, prices have gradually fallen but remain at a high level. Compared with pork prices--blamed as a chief cause of inflation in past years--beef prices have shown much stronger upward momentum since 2011 (see chart).
 
Source: China Ministry of Agriculture data analyzed by dimsums.blogspot.com.


According to official statistics, China’s beef output increased 1.7% during 2013 to reach 6.73 million metric tons. However, some doubt the accuracy of the numbers. An Economic Reference News article on the beef industry in early 2013 reported that beef cattle numbers have been falling dramatically in Shandong and Anhui, two traditional beef-producing provinces.
The CAAS analysis cites several reasons for sluggish growth in production. First, a grassland ecological restoration program has reduced the number of cattle (and sheep--also soaring in price) in major pastoral regions of western China to rehabilitate overgrazed pastures. The program has raised production costs by channeling livestock from nomadic-style grazing to confined production systems with higher costs. (Interestingly, this program was initiated in 2011, the same year beef prices began their surge.) The analysis says this is a short-term disruption of production.
The CAAS analysis also cites higher costs of labor, feed, disease prevention, transportation and other factors. A 200-kg calf now costs 8,000-10,000 yuan in 2013, up from 5,000 yuan in 2011. Net returns are low, and the long production cycle of fattening cattle makes it uncertain that farmers will recover their investment. Thus, many farmers have quit raising cattle and slaughtered their heifers.

Consumer demand for beef is rising in China. Beef and mutton were traditionally consumed by Muslims, Mongolians and other ethnic minorities in grassland regions. Now the predominant Han ethnic group—which traditionally consumed pork as their primary meat—is increasing consumption of beef due to health considerations and popularity of hot pot and barbeque restaurants. The average per capita purchase of beef was reported to be 2.5 kg per person in urban areas and 1 kg in rural areas during 2012, well below the world average. Economic Reference News cites experts who believe two-thirds of beef is consumed away from home.

During 2013 China imported 294,200 metric tons of beef valued at $ 1.27 billion, a four-fold increase from the previous year. The average unit value of imports was equal to about $ 2/lb, less than half the Chinese price of beef. Imports came from Australia, Uruguay, New Zealand, Canada, and Argentina. China’s exports of beef fell by half to 5,874 metric tons.
 
The flourishing demand and high prices have stimulated a new mode of beef production in Heilongjiang Province. A Harbin investment company has just announced a plan to entice farmers to invest in an 11,000-head Angus beef cattle production project. Chinese farmers contribute 500 yuan to a "risk fund" for each animal they raise in the facility. The company centrally purchases feeder cattle and provides free feed, vaccines, and water treatment. Farmers raising cattle at the facility receive a payment of 4 yuan per kilogram of weight gain. According to the announcement, the net return to the farmer/investor/employee is expected to be 1000 yuan per head. This is described as a new style of cooperation between companies and farmers.