"Poison Rice": Blame Bad Guys, Not the System

Heavy metal-contaminated rice has been turning up in China's market for decades. Officials blame bad actors rather than the system that shovels loans to trusted government-run companies with no market discipline, little oversight, and with protection from nosy journalists--except when it suits authorities' interests to unleash the reporters. 

This month a husband-wife team was found guilty of selling "poison rice" by a court in the Guangdong Province city of Yangjiang. The couple named Zhu and Yan was sentenced to 15 and 10 years in prison, respectively, and ordered to pay 87 million yuan in penalties. According to news media, over the course of 8 months in 2019 Zhu and Yan purchased 5,884 metric tons of rice with excessive levels of cadmium from a granary in Hunan Province operated by the national grain reserve. Their contract specified that the rice had to be used as animal feed and could not enter the market for human food, but Zhu and Yan were accused of knowingly packaging the rice for sale in shops around Yangchun City, a county-level city in southwestern Guangdong Province.

Cadmium-tainted rice came to the Chinese public's attention in 2009 when Guangzhou news media revealed that the Shenzhen City Grain Group had purchased 13,584 metric tons of rice contaminated with cadmium that ended up in Guangzhou retail markets. 

Cadmium is a heavy metal that is not easily processed or eliminated from the human body, and can cause kidney disease, brittle bones, and painful disease after long-term exposure.

In 2013--four years after the first scandal--Guangzhou news media reported that the local food and drug administration found 44.4% of rice samples collected in the local market exceeded the maximum tolerance for cadmium. A reporter said he collected his own samples from the largest local wholesale market and submitted them for testing which revealed that 11 brands of rice had excessive heavy metal contamination.

In 2020, Science and Technology Daily reported cadmium-tainted "poison rice" was discovered in Zhaotong City in Yunnan Province. The contaminated rice was said to have been supplied by 7 rice milling companies in Hunan Province's Yiyang City. The article listed a series of cadmium-contamination incidents going back as far as 1987.

Science and Technology Daily listed poisonous rice incidents in various provinces.

The cadmium contamination was attributed to accumulation of cadmium in the soil resulting from use of phosphate fertilizers and runoff into waterways from non-ferrous metal smelting operations along the banks of rivers in rice-producing provinces of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi. (Couldn't be related to those cadmium batteries that are in every piece of electronic equipment? Nah.) Most of the cadmium-tainted rice was supplied by Hunan--one of China's top two rice-producing provinces. Guangdong--a highly industrialized province with little farmland--relies on neighboring Hunan to fill its rice deficit. 

In 2013, China released a national soil survey that found 19 percent of farmland had excessive contamination with pollutants. Cadmium was the leading contaminant. The soil survey had begun in 2006 and completed in 2010, but results were withheld for 3 years. Another soil survey began in 2022 but results will not be reported until 2025.

In 2014, a rice breeder recommended planting super rice varieties that could absorb the cadmium from the soil and supply rice to make biofuel. The rice breeder making the proposal estimated that 12 million tons of contaminated grain is produced each year.

In 2017, the World Bank loaned China $100 million to clean up polluted farmland in Hunan Province. The Hunan Provincial government was expected to kick in an extra $11 million. The project was scheduled to run through 2023.

The same year, Hunan Province issued a long document on a soil remediation program that included 3 sentences on cadmium contamination of rice with vague plans to choose unspecified technologies to address the problem. The program promised to ban metal-working facilities on riverbanks and clean up contamination from cadmium and lead-acid batteries. 

This month's news about conviction of the two rogue rice-dealers in Guangdong reflects Chinese leaders' standard strategy of blaming problems on evil bad actors--while exonerating the system itself. Recent news articles fail to show much interest in the culpability of state-owned grain trading companies tasked with supplying food to China's richest cities--Shenzhen and Guangzhou--as well as government reserve warehouses in rice-growing areas. 

A Chinese scientist who has advocated cleanup of soil for decades told Sci-Tech Daily the persistence of "poison rice" is partly due to the "monopoly" of soil-testing data by "experts" in local areas with a vested interest in grain sales who falsify reports and then inflate their estimates of costs to remediate the problem. The scientist said local governments focus their attention on prominent image projects that advance their careers like huge metal-working factories and mines. An example he gave was "construction of high-yielding fields" that can bring in funding of 10 million yuan or about 1000 yuan per mu ($18,750 per hectare) to build vast fields, roads, irrigation ditches, pumps, and other shiny infrastructure. Soil-remediation programs cost 20,000-60,000 yuan per mu and have fewer photo-ops for herds of officials. 

Interestingly, news media in Guangzhou seem to have been the driving force in publicizing the rice contamination problem over the years. While journalists may have done some digging to expose the problem, the news could not have been released without the OK of Guangdong Provincial authorities. Thus, the cadmium rice issue is in large part a behind-the-scenes battle between the interests of officials in Guangdong--who have an interest in protecting their consumers--versus the interests of neighboring Hunan authorities in protecting their farmers and rice mills. 

Poison rice invades Guangdong. Source: Shanghai Oriental TV

Meat Smuggling Booms to Skirt Import Barriers

China is waging war on meat and seafood smuggling as authorities pile on barriers to legal imports that include strict approvals, reams of documentation, and onerous covid testing, disinfection and tracking.

Chinese state-controlled media have reported a series of smuggler interceptions this year from just about every coastal province. Several articles reveal there is a national crackdown on smuggling underway.

Coast guard authorities board a ship in Shandong Province
suspected of smuggling in March 2022. Source: Xinhua.

Official media reported that the coast guard had intercepted 75 ships smuggling over 8000 metric tons of frozen products from January 1 to March 15 this year. 

Local media in Jiangmen City in Guangdong Province reported that the coast guard intercepted two boats loaded with 70 metric tons of beef and tripe packed in white bags on May 25 and 27. The products were valued at 7 million yuan (over $1 million). In April, Guangdong's anti-smuggling office reported 398 cases involving over 18,000 metric tons of frozen food smuggling this year, with 1667 people arrested. Guangdong raised the maximum reward for turning in smugglers from 200,000 yuan to 500,000 yuan.

A man wearing a sheep mask accepts a 100,000-yuan award for turning in smugglers.
(Guangzhou's nickname is "sheep city") Source: Yangcheng Daily.

Beihai City in Guangxi Province announced the sentencing of a pair of smugglers who conspired to transport 7 tons of smuggled Indian beef to the provincial capital of Nanning last December. India has not been approved to export beef to China due to concerns about foot and mouth disease.

On May 13-14 the coast guard in Xiamen, Fujian Province, intercepted two boats smuggling 340 metric tons of Brazilian beef and offal.

Last week authorities in Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province, reported the launch of an anti-smuggling crackdown system targeting frozen food, agricultural products, refined petroleum and wild animals and plant products. An "alliance" coordinated by Shandong's anti-smuggling office includes a district government in Jinan, the police, market supervision bureau, city postal bureau, and the first association of "volunteers" from the business community is said to be a model for inland provinces (Jinan is a couple hundred miles from the ports of Qingdao and Yantai).  The alliance's slogan, "communist party-guided + government leadership + volunteer friends," was praised by national anti-smuggling authorities. 

At the Shandong anti-smuggling meeting, officials were warned to be soberly aware of the continued high incidence of smuggling, and that smugglers are specialized, organized, and using high-tech methods to better evade authorities. Officials were ordered to be aware of the urgency, open the main door and block the evil door, and to resolutely maintain an orderly market economy with a secure and stable society.

Official sprays disinfectant on frozen food nabbed near
Shanghai in an anti-smuggling operation. Source: Xinhua.

The Chinese-language edition of China Daily reported that 700 metric tons of frozen meat were seized from two ships intercepted by the coast guard May 24-25 in waters near Zhejiang Province. China Daily explained that huge demand and strict requirements for exporters are responsible for sustained smuggling. China Daily explained that not that many foreign companies can satisfy the strict requirements to qualify for a license to export frozen food to China. Moreover, there are tariffs and value added taxes levied on legal imports. China Daily cited the impact of China's covid virus control procedures for frozen food--nucleic acid testing, disinfection of imports, and destruction of products--as another factor boosting the cost and time required to clear customs for legal imports. China Daily explained further that imported meat offal is much cheaper than in China--due to American and European differences in eating customs--and waivers of tariffs and other import barriers for residents of border areas are frequently abused to facilitate smuggling.

The articles on smuggling interdictions often report that smuggled items had no documentation or lacked certificates showing that the country of origin had been approved for export to China. 

The number of rejected seafood and meat shipments reported by China's customs officials has increased noticeably since June 2020 when China first began emphasizing the risk of covid-on-frozen-food after attributing an outbreak in Beijing to Norwegian salmon. None of these rejections cite covid, but lack of documentation and lack of inspection and quarantine approval are two common reasons. Covid is never cited in these rejections but dozens of rejections of shrimp from Ecuador that have been reported as contaminated with the virus have cited "animal disease" as the reason for rejection. 

Rejections of seafood and meat reported by China customs.

Rural Chinese Stimulus Launches

China's agriculture ministry launched a multi-pronged rural investment program in a teleconference broadcast to officials all over the country on June 9. The program is part of a national economic stabilization program ordered by the country's State Council leadership.

Local officials were ordered to resolutely carry out orders from the central communist party leadership to:

• focus on stabilizing grain production 
• expand soybean and oilseed production 
• firm up supplies of seeds, land, and machinery as the foundation for agriculture 
• nurture industry chains that produce, process and market local specialty products 
• implement a rural construction action plan
• move ahead on key tasks in agricultural green development 

These are all initiatives Chinese officials have already prioritized this year for "rural revitalization." Officials were ordered to raise the political position (of spending on rural projects) and be proactive in addressing "pain points," blockages and difficulties in rural areas. 

Officials are to: 

• combine policies 
• make sure funds for subsidies and aid are available in a timely manner 
• increase the proportion of revenue from rural land expropriations used for agriculture and rural projects
• issue local government bonds to finance the investment program 
• expand government loan guarantees 
• increase credit and financial services from banks and insurance companies 
• broaden channels for "rural backyard strategic investment" 
• ensure that more "investment from society" flows into rural areas to stabilize the economy.

Last month, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued a list of preferred investments to guide private investment into the countryside:

• Investments to ensure food supplies, including "food security industry belts" for grain, cotton, oilseeds, sugar, and rubber; soybean and oilseed production bases; dryland farming; "smart" grain storage; vegetables and greenhouses; "factory-type" concentrated livestock; and fish farming in oceans.
• Modernized seed companies that combine R&D with commercial seed production in order to create internationally competitive companies.
• Industries to enrich rural people, including agricultural industrial parks, rural specialty industry clusters, fishing harbor economic zones. 
• Agricultural processing, food manufacturing, organic agriculture, and geographic-indicated products, storage for grain-cotton-sugar, and cold chain logistics.
• Rural tourism services, including sightseeing, farm experiences, country houses, and agricultural heritage sites.
• "Green development", such as collection and utilization of animal manure and crop stalks; recycling agricultural plastics, pesticide bottles, and fishing nets; and disposal of dead animals.
• Innovation in agricultural science and technology
• Rural human resources development
• Rural infrastructure, including upgrades of fields, roads, electric and water facilities; roads for rural industry, mining, forestry and tourism
• Rehabilitation of rural housing
• Digital countryside and "smart" agriculture
• Companies' overseas investment in agriculture and processing "Belt and Road" countries

"Wheat Battle" Against Lockdowns & Burning Fields

China's wheat harvest is up against Covid lockdowns as officials also cope with burning fields in a "wheat battle." 

As the summer harvest swung into high gear in late May, local officials in wheat-growing provinces issued directives that the "summer grain battle" must be won. Urgent orders to both uphold virus-prevention and ensure a good harvest reveal the dilemma Chinese officials face: upholding "zero covid" while also ensuring a big wheat crop. 

Zero-covid and food security objectives are in conflict because China's wheat harvest relies on a massive movement of people. Many rural migrants working in cities are unable to return to their villages to harvest and sell their crops due to covid lockdowns, and those who do return must meet strict requirements for registration and prove they are covid-negative. Meanwhile, constant covid-testing must be carried out on crews of wheat-harvesters traveling from village to village to cut the wheat. The marketing of the crop relies on itinerant traders and truck drivers who comb the countryside to buy up wheat at the edge of fields or from farmers' homes, transport it to granaries and shovel it into bags.

"Volunteers" harvest wheat in Jiangsu Province's Xuzhou City. Jiangsu Net.

Another part of the "wheat battle" is a crackdown on burning wheat fields. Farmers like to burn the straw left in their fields after harvesting summer crops so they can immediately plant a second crop to be harvested in the fall, usually corn. The practice was banned as an air pollution control measure about ten years ago, but it may have had a resurgence this year due to covid controls that also crimp the process of gathering up, transporting and processing the wheat straw. Most news articles mention bans on field burning as part of this year's wheat harvest campaign.

On May 15, officials in Henan Province's Wangzhuangzai Town were ordered to conscientiously prepare for the "three summers" harvest (summer-harvested wheat, rapeseed, early rice) while also building a solid line of defense against the epidemic. The work program involves registering and recording all the members of itinerant wheat-harvesting crews and their machinery who must report to local authorities a day before entering a village. The town currently has 62 harvesters and 85 crew members registered. Officials are supposed to tally up wheat fields and workers, identify labor shortages, and send out "volunteers" to help with harvest and sale of wheat to address migrants' difficulties. Officials are ordered to publicize virus prevention and distribute notices and leaflets about bans on burning wheat fields. Officials who don't take their responsibility seriously will be penalized.

In Gulou District of northern Jiangsu Province's Xuzhou City, community officials formed supervision teams to compile statistics on wheat fields and local farm machinery. They assigned teams to be responsible for specific tracts of land. Communist party members reportedly were formed into teams to help harvest the wheat of families who could not return to their fields. Officials are ordered to ensure that covid-prevention work is performed on interregional wheat-harvesting crews. The Gulou District strictly forbids the destruction of wheat fields and forbids harvesting wheat for silage. Officials are deploying fire-fighting equipment to put out fires in wheat fields. As rainy weather arrived, harvesting equipment was having difficulty accessing fields. 

Working on a wheat-harvesting machine. Source: Minquan County Government. 

The wheat harvest program in Henan Province's Qi County tries to boost the image of its pesky covid-prevention workers by reporting that medical staff braved the hot sun to deliver bottled water, towels, essential oils, toilet water (?), watermelon, and face masks to harvester operators and workers in fields. The medical workers explained fire safety to agricultural machinery operators, reminding them to work without smoke or fire. 

Meanwhile, a youtube video shows an official in Henan ordering farmers to leave their fields while waving a cigarette as he yells, pacing through a field of flammable wheat straw about 20 feet from an unharvested stand of wheat.

Henan Province's Hebi City was hit hard by flooding last summer and fall. In Hebi's Jun County officials are also undertaking the "wheat battle" by ensuring wheat is harvested and banning the burning of fields in a 300,000-mu model wheat-farming tract. This article tacitly admits that last year's serious flooding was due to busted dikes: families in the area have been removed to temporary settlements while destroyed dikes and canals are being repaired. Families and grain traders in the area are being warned not to store their grain in their houses in order to avoid risk of floods ruining the grain. The dike-restoration project is targeted for completion in June and families are to be returned to their homes by October (presumably in time to plant next year's winter wheat crop).