China 2025 Grain Output Data; Corn Accounts For Most of Increase

China produced another record grain crop of 714.88 million metric tons (mmt) in 2025, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Production increased 8.38 mmt (+1.2%) from last year. As usual, corn accounted for most of the increase. The Bureau acknowledged the impact of mold on the Fall harvest but the statisticians have no way of measuring how much mold and resulting aflatoxins will impact the effective supply of corn this year.

Corn production was estimated at 301.235 mmt for 2025, and this year's 6.32 mmt increase in corn output accounted for most of the increase in grain output. Rice production (209 mmt in 2025) increased 1.5 mmt from last year. Wheat production (140 mmt) decreased slightly (-250,000 metric tons). 

Compiled from China National Bureau of Statistics.

Most of the increase in grain output was achieved by increasing average yields by 66 kg per hectare (up 1.1%) over the previous year. Grain area expanded 90,000 hectares (up 0.1%). There was a slight shift toward corn area (up 0.5%) but increases in corn yield (up 108 kg per hectare, +0.5%) accounted for most of the increase in corn output. The Bureau said that the increased area planted in corn (which has a relatively high yield) contributed to the increase in overall grain output. The Bureau noted that northeastern provinces (the main corn-producing area) contributed most of the increase in grain output.

The NBS corn output figure was even larger than the 300 mmt previously estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs CASDE earlier this week. The NBS soybean output figure almost exactly matches the MARA estimate. 

The Bureau's lead agricultural statistician attributed the bumper harvest to "strict protection of grain area and food security responsibility by each region," "overcoming impacts of drought, floods and other natural disasters," and "no slacking off on grain production work." According to the Bureau, policy support mobilized farmers and local officials to keep a tight hold on grin production: 

• continuing to raise the support price for wheat and early rice, 
• improving each kind of subsidy policy, 
• expanding full-cost and income insurance, 
• launching a mechanism for grain deficit regions to compensate grain surplus regions, and 
• increased financial support for grain-producing counties. 
• Local authorities have strengthened protection of grain land, shifted the mix of crops, carried out land rectifications, increased the use of abandoned land and reclaimed unused land.

This blog previously discussed the impact on rains in September-October, showed images of fields and ears of corn, and discussed how the effective supply of corn has been reduced despite the "bumper harvest." The Bureau could not dodge this issue, and its report acknowledged that continuous heavy rains in the Huang-Huai Hai region of northern China caused molding that affected grain production "to a certain degree." The Bureau claimed that after taking into account the impact of mold on output fall-harvested grain output still grew by 8.2 mmt (+1.5%). The Bureau did not reveal the impact of mold on grain output, nor how they estimated it. The Bureau's surveys weigh grains cut from fields before harvest. The high degree of moisture would have increased the weight of crops. They have no way of knowing which fields were not harvested nor how much grain was dried or developed mold post-harvest.

Ecological Police to Make Rural China Beautiful Again

China is setting up an ecological police system (生态警务机制) that combines citizen surveillance with law enforcement and prosecution to crack down on "environmental and resource crimes" as a strategy for beautifying the countryside. 

The system is led by the Ministry of Public Security--highlighting the focus on law enforcement--in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, the central government's planning ministry, and ministries responsible for environment, agriculture, water management, grasslands, forests, and the coast guard. The plan set forth in an "Opinion on Building an Ecological Police Mechanism" (关于加强生态警务机制建设的意见 which does not seem to be publicly available) aims to have the basic mechanism in place by 2027 and fully operational by 2035. 

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs said the policing system will severely punish environmental pollution, destruction of wild flora and fauna resources, damage to ancient and famous trees, illegal fishing, illegal mining of mineral resources, illegal extraction of river sand and gravel, and illegal occupation of agricultural land. The Opinion promises to investigate and coordinate large-scale strikes on professional violators, organized crime, and interregional exploitation schemes.

Building on experiments by localities over the last several years, localities will be encouraged to designate river and lake police chiefs (河湖警长), forest police chiefs (林警长), and ecological police chiefs (生态警长). Law enforcement officials will link up with officials responsible for watching fishing, mining, farming, forests, and other resources in "ecological policing joint operation centers" (生态警务联勤中心) and "joint operation workstations" (联勤工作站). Local prosecutors are included in the mechanism to ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted. 

"River-Lake Chief + Police Chief + Prosecutor" officials in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province
gather for a photo-op

An example is a "River-Lake Chief + Police Chief + Prosecutor" (河湖长+警长+检察长) mechanism set up in Shicheng County, a district of Ganzhou Municipality in Jiangxi Province. A coordination meeting held 3 years ago was led by the county public security bureau and prosecutorial office with participation by the county branch of the environmental protection bureau, forestry bureau and river chiefs from each township in the county. The deputy director of the public security bureau reported that 7 cases of illegal fishing and 34 cases of illegal hunting of wildlife had been filed during the year, 17 people had been disciplined, and authorities had seized 100 wild animals, 100 kg of fish, and 300 hunting implements.

Farmland is one of the resources monitored with this system. This blog previously reported on "field captains" (田长, I previously translated as "field boss") established several years ago to monitor use of farmland. Some localities have implemented a "Field Captain + Prosecutor + Police Chief" system that relies on field captains to monitor land use, while public security and prosecutorial organs provide law enforcement powers to punish violators. The so-called "iron triangle" is meant to maintain rural stability, rule villages by law, and resolve land and ecological protection disputes and strengthen public security management.

River chiefs meet with prosecutors

A description of the "Field Captain + Police Chief + Prosecutor" system in Fangcheng, Guangxi Province said work focused on farmland protection, crackdowns on illegal mining, and restoration of abandoned mines. In Liaoning Province's Anshan City the system was set up to detect and punish shoddy construction of "high standard fields." In Zhaoqing, Guangdong Province the system led to the arrest of people who converted farmland to fish ponds. 

It is unlikely that this system will work since it requires cooperation and coordination among 10 different organizations as well as coordination between rural, municipal and provincial officials. The ratio of organizational effort to benefits for officials seems high. One thing it does demonstrate is that China's vague and incomplete assignment of property rights inevitably leads to ever-increasing degrees of surveillance and application of force by the State. 

Mold is Tightening China's Corn Market

This month Chinese statisticians will probably report a record 2025 corn crop, but a significant portion of the harvest is unusable. Continuous heavy rain during September and October flooded fields in some of the leading production areas of the North China Plain region, preventing equipment from harvesting some fields and caused mold and sprouting on corn that was harvested. While Chinese news media have been showing photos of giant corn drying facilities to allay concerns about mold, social media showed some farmers scrubbing corn cobs to remove mold. A screenshot from another Chinese video below shows an individual spraying piles of corn to kill mold.

Farmer attempts to scrub mold off corn cobs.

Spraying corn to kill mold

China's corn futures prices dropped 4.6% during September and early October following what appeared to be another "bumper harvest." News of the impact of heavy rains on the north China corn crop spread in mid-October, and the price rose 7.3% from late October to early December. 

Daily closing prices on Dalian Commodity Exchange.

The impacts of mold are gradually filtering into various segments of China's corn market. Tightness first showed up in regions of North China like Shandong Province that were heavily impacted by rains. Prices did not fall steeply after harvest in Shandong. In North China, according to some reports 70% of the corn offered on the market is high in moisture and unusable for animal feed. Meanwhile, northeastern provinces Jilin and Heilongjiang had a bumper corn harvest with few quality problems. Jilin and Heilongjiang prices did fall after harvest in October, although the decline was brief as prices turned up in November. Now some feed mills in North China are purchasing local wheat or high-quality corn from the Northeast to augment the limited supply of high-quality corn. The interregional movement of corn, however, has been impeded by tight supplies of rail cars and snowfall. There is some speculation that increased sales by northeastern farmers at the end of December could ease upward pressure on prices.

Source: China National Grain and Oils Information Center, reported by FAO GIEWS database.

Relatively soft final demand also eases upward pressure on corn prices. Southern feed companies--seeing signs of a downturn in the livestock sector--are cautious in building up inventories. Still, some feed companies are reportedly seeking lower-priced alternative grains and have begun inquiring about imported barley and sorghum. A rebound in imports of feed grains in Q1 2026 is possible.

The downturn in Chinese corn prices this year was less pronounced and briefer than it was a year ago during the 2024 harvest. Last year's plunging prices continued a lengthy decline in Chinese corn prices that began in 2023 and surely alarmed Chinese officials who constantly fret over potential rural unrest and collapse in grain output. Grain imports were abruptly shut down in August 2024. With minimal imports, Chinese corn prices rebounded early this year as the domestic marketing season passed its peak. Chinese officials may be happy that this year's rains prevented corn prices from falling as far as last year.  

Monthly averages through November 2025

Chinese officials never announced a tightening of corn import controls. Just before grain imports suddenly plunged in August last year an Economic Daily commentator whose articles echo official grain policy carefully explained how the tariff rate quota system limits imports of grains and asserted that the country needed to do a good job on storing and importing grain in order to strengthen prices for farmers. China's corn imports during the first 10 months of 2025 are down about 90% from a year earlier and lower than at any time this decade. China's feedtrade.com.cn reports that imported grains still have a price advantage in southern Chinese ports, but it also reports that stocks of imported grain are adequate.

China customs data, calendar years.

China's monthly imports of corn this year have been erratic from all suppliers except Russia which has supplied corn to China in 9 of 10 months. Top suppliers of China's corn this year are Brazil (540,000mt), Russia (333,000mt), Ukraine (231,000mt), and Myanmar (144,000mt). China has only imported 20,000 mt of corn from the U.S. in 2025, but this is not a concern since USDA export inspections indicate that U.S. corn exports for the current market year are on a record pace and about 7.9 million metric tons ahead of last year.

Are China's low and erratic feed grain imports in 2025 a return to normal for China? Or was the sustained import of 40-to-50 million metric tons annually during 2021-24 the "normal" that will be restored in the future?

China Worries Unemployed Migrants Will be Trapped in the Countryside

China's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) ordered officials to prevent unemployed rural migrants from becoming stranded in their hometowns. This order--alongside reports that village officials told returning migrants to stay away--was interpreted by many as a sign that China's sinking economy is stoking fears of rural unrest. Unemployed migrants milling around in the countryside are a nightmare for stability-obsessed officials. 

Chinese netizens noticed an order to prevent large numbers of returning migrants from becoming stranded in their hometowns (防止形成规模性返乡滞乡) in an article describing a MARA meeting held November 13, 2025 in an ethnic minority area in Yunnan Province focusing on training rural people in handicrafts as a strategy for addressing rural poverty (i.e. selling pots, baskets, and articles of clothing to generate income in remote areas populated by ethnic minorities). The final paragraph of the article published in Yunnan news media called for implementing an action plan to create jobs in the countryside to prevent jobless rural migrants from lingering in the countryside and returning to poverty. Employment assistance was also ordered for key counties targeted for revitalization, for areas where poor people have been resettled, and for disaster-stricken counties.

--update: The November 13 meeting in Yunnan was convened by a MARA vice minister. On November 25--the day of this blog post--Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Han Jun and Yunnan Governor Wang Yubo met to discuss rural issues, including solidifying results of poverty alleviation and establishing a normalized mechanism for preventing large scale relapsing of areas into poverty. 

There are anecdotal reports that laid-off factory workers are returning to their rural hometowns on a large scale. For example, a short video on China's Douyin platform showed workers in a garment manufacturing district of Guangzhou boarding a bus, claiming that the workers were laid off and have no choice but to return to their home in Hubei Province.

Douyin video comments that workers are returning well before
the customary peak period that begins in December ahead of
the Lunar New Year holidays.

Another factoid circulating on the Chinese social media is a photo that claims to show a meeting where officials discussed using police to round up returned unmarried migrants and subject them to self-criticism and reeducation. Young, unmarried unemployed people are especially prone to create unrest--hence the focus on single returned migrants. Some returning migrants claim to have been prevented from returning home or urged to return to urban jobs. Chinese news media claimed that the photo was faked with photoshop and produced an unnamed worker in a Guizhou village who denied that the meeting took place. 

Photo purportedly of a meeting discussing "how to
deal with returned unmarried migrants"

Another article in State media argued that the order to "prevent large scale return to rural areas" was taken out of context and claimed officials are working to promote rural employment and prevent recurrence of poverty. 

There are many indications that factories are closing, and many workers have not been paid. Exports declined unexpectedly in October. The extent of the impact on migrant workers is hidden by Chinese officials while the veracity of anecdotal evidence is uncertain. China's official data reported last month that the number of rural migrants at the end of Q3 2025 was up 0.9% year-over-year and monthly earnings were up 2.4%. While these numbers are not that alarming in isolation, they are low compared to the go-go years. Growth in the migrant workforce has been erratic since 2015 when China had a stock market meltdown, and the property market bubble began to deflate. Official data show Q3 2025's 0.9% year-on-year growth in migrants is the lowest non-pandemic growth since 2018.

 

Calculated from National Bureau of Statistics.

China's countryside has been a reservoir of unskilled labor since the 1950s. Rural people living in poverty could easily be enticed to staff factories during boom times and sent back home during downturns. The household registration (hukou) system was installed to prevent rural migrants from settling permanently in cities, and the rural land system gave each family plots of land to tie them to their home village. This system gave rural migrants a means of subsistence when not needed in factories or construction sites and ensured they would not stay in cities to form urban slums. 

Rural China's role as a sponge to soak up excess labor in a downturn is no longer viable. Many rural migrants have no experience farming, and some have no land. Authorities have encouraged farm mechanization and turned over an increasing share of farming resources to companies. During earlier economic slowdowns news media ran articles inspiring rural women returning from factory work to take up hog farming. This is impossible now, because capital requirements and regulatory measures raise the threshold, and most individually run hog farms are losing money this year. Authorities are also coping with the problem of unemployed college graduates, as evidenced by a separate plan to encourage urban youth to start businesses in the countryside. 

In February 2025 State media encouraged college graduates and white-collar workers
to return to their villages to start live-streaming sales businesses. 

In a commentary on the topic Chinese news media personality Hu Xijin praised MARA's efforts at rural job creation, but he argued that only cities can create enough jobs to prevent returned migrants from becoming stranded in the countryside. Hu admonished cities for focusing on creating a modern and beautiful appearance while neglecting their responsibility to create jobs for "the vast rural workforce." 

A Chinese commentary on Reddit criticized the Chinese Communist Party's approach to the unemployed migrant issue by comparing it to addressing diarrhea by plugging the buttocks with tape and declaring the problem to be solved. The Reddit commentator surmised that the Party avoids tackling the root cause because it might expose the shortcomings of the system and raise questions about the "emperor's" responsibility.

Cost of Imported Soybeans on the Rise in China

China's imports of Brazilian soybeans shrank to 7.1 million metric tons in October from 11 mmt in November. This was the lowest since April's 4.6 mmt. However, imports from Argentina rose to 1.57 mmt in October, supplemented by 710,000 mt from Uruguay. No U.S. soybeans were imported in October. The total import volume of 9.5 mmt during October was roughly equal to the monthly volume being crushed.

China customs data.

China customs data.

The cost of Brazilian soybeans has been rising. Brazil's monthly customs data for 2025 shows that the average value of soybeans shipped to China rose from a low of $384 per metric ton in April to $430 in October, a cumulative increase of 12.1%. China's customs data show that the cost of Brazilian soybeans entering China rose from $431 per metric ton in June to $464 in October, a cumulative increase of 7.7%.

Brazil & China customs data.

During October the average cost of Brazilian soybeans imported to China went up 3.6% from the previous month. The fob price in Brazil's Paranagua state dropped during September, but it rose during October and November.

Brazil & China customs data and Brazil CEPEA.

Despite the increase in price Brazilian beans have improved their price advantage versus U.S. soybeans. U.S. soybean export prices rose during October, and during November 2025 U.S. soybean bids at U.S. Gulf ports have been slightly higher than the fob price of Brazilian soybeans in Paranagua. Estimates of C&F costs of imported soybeans arriving in China show a clear advantage for Brazilian soybeans versus both Gulf and Pacific Northwest soybeans. The tariff on U.S. soybeans is now 13%, compared with 3% for soybeans from Brazil and other countries. 

A Chinese soybean meal market analysis on Friday said that some Chinese buyers are not purchasing U.S. beans because the cost is relatively high. 

China Wants its Anti-Poverty Efforts to be the World Model

China is promoting its poverty alleviation program as a model for world. Today the "Global South Modernization Forum" was held in Beijing where 60 poverty alleviation scholars from China and abroad praised China's approach to poverty reduction. China considers itself to be a leader of the "Global South," a label for developing countries used by the UN and some other international organizations.  The forum was featured in multiple Chinese State media outlets such as China Daily. Xinhua and China Daily posted articles about the forum on Facebook and Youtube, platforms that are banned in China.

Xinhua featured a speech to the foum by the head of the Communist Party's propaganda department.

A seminar on "China's Poverty Alleviation and the Global South's Poverty Reduction Efforts" focused on "the global significance of China's victory in the battle against poverty." The description in Chinese news media included the Chinese regime's usual stock phrases: "building a community with a shared future for mankind" free from poverty and with common development. China wants to "share its experience in poverty reduction," "deepen cooperation among the Global South," and "jointly address global challenges in poverty reduction and sustainable development," and work together to implement the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

According to State media, "guests" gave Xi Jinping accolades for his leadership in "winning the war on poverty" and consolidating its achievements in development that is "people centered," "equitable," and "inclusive."

"Guests" were probably shown pretty pictures of neatly planned model villages while speaking only in the abstract about aging rural people with no pension and no children to care for them, "hollow villages," "cooperatives" that are fronts for companies, piles of trash, insolvent rural banks, closed rural schools, and nutritional deficits.

News articles did not mention that Chinese government officials have been under orders to prevent rural regions from regressing into poverty over the last two years. 

The forum probably did not include any discussion of recent unrest in Hainan where farmers were enraged that a rubber company claiming ownership of their land pulled up betel nut trees they had planted. 

A Vice Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs attended the meeting, but Minister Han Jun apparently did not. Last week Minister Han was in Gansu Province investigating results of antipoverty efforts from potato and beef cattle industry development strategies. The article on Han's visit hailed the results of a Dingxi County potato project but did not mention that funds and work effort have been poured into this county's potato project for 20 years. Han also investigated Kangle County's beef industry development project. After antipoverty efforts gave loans to pork, dairy and beef companies to set up operations in impoverished areas these sectors have been coping with excess supply, depressed prices and losses. Last year the agriculture ministry held a meeting to discuss rescue efforts for the beef and dairy industries. This year all hog producers are losing money except indebted behemoth companies Muyuan and Wens who claim to have cut production costs.

There was probably no mention of rural families who are deep in debt because they bought apartments in county towns before the property market imploded.

Not visible from Beijing conference room.

Hog Farms Lose Money, Cancel Expansions

Farms will incur losses of RMB -179 per head from fattening hogs, according to a November 11 report from China's National Development and Reform Commission. The report said farms are reluctant to stock up on pigs or engage in "second fattening." Similarly, a weekly report from Shandong Province estimated an average loss of RMB -80 from farrow-to-finish and RMB -170 from fattening purchased piglets to market weight. The Shandong report attributed losses to low prices under pressure from strong supplies and weak demand. 

A year ago hog prices were high and feed prices were dropping. In October 2024, the NDRC estimated profits of RMB 322 from fattening hogs. Since then, hog prices have dropped dramatically, and profits have turned to losses. 

Data from China Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

Big companies sold large volumes of hogs during October, adding downward pressure on prices. Sales by the top 3 companies during October were their largest of the year. Muyuan sold 7.076 million head during October, up 13.17% from a year ago, Wens Foodstuff sold 456,900, up 45.7% yoy, and New Hope sold 344,400, up 34.4% yoy. A second tier of companies increased their October sales by 60% from a year ago. Hog prices reported by Muyuan and Wens were down by about 33% from a year earlier.

Compiled from monthly reports.

Chinese hog farming companies are in a game of "chicken" to see who can last out the down cycle. Several elite companies claim to have cut their production costs to RMB 11.5 per kg and are close to breakeven at the recent low level of prices. Other companies and small farms with production costs of RMB 13.5 or higher are incurring heavy losses. 

 An analysis posted on Chinese livestock industry news sites last week suggested that Chinese companies have canceled dozens of giant pig farming projects over the past year. Most announcements cite financial losses for the cancellations and said they plan to shift funds to shore up working capital. The news appears to signal a reversal of last year's breakneck expansion plans, but it could be meant to demonstrate fealty to government officials who have been nagging them to cut back production capacity over the last 6 months.

A year ago, Muyuan Foods announced plans to invest RMB 576.8 million in 7 huge swine farming projects with combined capacity of over 1.3 million head. The company has now proposed terminating fund-raising for the projects and instead says it will devote funds to working capital and daily operations. 

Wens Foodstuff halted construction of two giant pig breeding projects in Hubei Province that had been funded as part of RMB 9.3 billion bond issuance in 2021. Fourteen other projects are also being suspended. Wens will use funds for biosecurity upgrades and other projects.

This month, pig company Luoniushan told investors the company will terminate its collaboration with a pig farm in Guizhou Province to stem losses incurred by the farm and protect the company's stockholders from the industry's deteriorating outlook. On the same day, Bunge Technology announced it was canceling acquisition of 6 pig farming companies in several Chinese provinces, according to the analysis. The acquisitions had been part of a plan to create a vertically integrated industry chain extending operations from pig feed to livestock farming. 

In September, Tianbang announced it had cut the number of its sow farms in Shandong Province and carried out renovations in order to improve performance in swine breeding and bring down operation costs.

In July, Shennong Group canceled a plan to issue RMB 290 million in in stock to fund a giant 240,000-head piglet production base. The decision was prompted by changes in the swine market and capital market situation.

In March, Tiankang Biological terminated plans for a farming project in Gansu Province that would have produced 300,000 piglets and 200,000 finished hogs annually. Funds meant for the project are being used to supplement working capital and fund core business operations. Tiankang is focused on improving efficiency through upgrading existing facilities, optimizing breeding pig quality, and adopting a light asset expansion strategy. 

Last December Dongrui Co. announced termination of a 200,000-head multi-story pig farming project in Huizhou, Guangdong Province. Funds will be shifted to working capital.

A year ago, Tangrenshen announced termination of a pig farming poverty alleviation project in Guangxi Province it had announced after its IPO several years earlier. A farming project in Hainan was canceled because the land was designated as "permanent basic farmland" which banned use for livestock farming, and another project was canceled because it was not likely to achieve the expected economic and social returns. 

China Refused to Confirm U.S. Soybean Purchase Commitment

China's Commerce Ministry refused to confirm that China committed to U.S. soybean purchases at the October 30 Trump-Xi meeting. Reading the tea leaves, it looks like China is in a passive-aggressive state over bilateral trade with the U.S. and has no intention of fulfilling this commitment--if it was ever made.

At a November 13 press conference an unidentified "media reporter" asked whether the Ministry of Commerce could confirm the White House's claim that China committed to purchase 12 million metric tons of soybeans this year and 25 million metric tons in the following 3 years. Spokesperson He Yadong gave no direct confirmation, but he didn't deny it either. 

He responded with a word salad stating that "the Ministry of Commerce had recently released information regarding the joint arrangements for the China-US Kuala Lumpur trade consultations, outlining the main achievements and consensus reached, including on agricultural trade." He followed up with: "China is an important participant in global agricultural trade and will continue to uphold an open and cooperative attitude, deepening mutually beneficial cooperation with global trading partners to jointly safeguard an open, stable, and sustainable global trading system."

It's possible the spokesman was caught off guard by the question, but this is looking like a nonconfrontational approach to saying "no." He could have given a more friendly non-answer, but the non-answer he did give appears to be a disguised denial intended to give the White House a middle finger. Chinese leaders are undoubtedly furious that President Trump has been reaching out to ASEAN and Central Asian trade partners -- territories China views as its backyard where it has focused its foreign trade and investment initiatives as the foundation for expanding China's role as a global leader. 

Many Chinese news sites posted an abbreviated report with the title "The Ministry of Commerce briefed the public on issues related to China-US soybean trade" that omits the question about soybean purchase commitments and doesn't even mention soybeans in the text. I found only a couple of reports that actually reported that the soybean purchase question was asked at the press conference.

Commerce Ministry spokesman He Weidong at November 13 press conference.

It's unclear who raised the soybean question at the press conference. The transcript of the press conference identified the questioner only as "media reporter" (the reporter also asked about China's new rare earth export licensing system). Most reporters asking questions at the conference were identified as State-owned media: Phoenix TV, China Global TV Network, Fengmian News (operated by Sichuan Daily), and China News Service. But Deutsche Press asked the final question. The question could have bee planted by the Commerce Ministry in order to issue its passive-aggressive response on the soybean commitment. 

China Not Very Serious About Buying U.S. Soybeans?

Chicago soybean prices keep rising based on expectations of renewed Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans. Yet, nearly 2 weeks after Xi and Trump met in Korea China seems to be dragging its feet in buying U.S. soybeans. 

China has imported a cumulative 95.7 mmt of soybeans for January-October 2025, up 6.4 mmt from the same period in 2024. Imports from the U.S.in the first 10 months of 2025 are only 16.8 mmt. 

According to the White House, China committed to buy 12 million metric tons (mmt) of soybeans by the end of 2025, an amount that will be hard to achieve with less than 2 months left in the year. China also reportedly committed to buy at least 25 mmt annually during 2026-28. Beijing consultancy Boyar observed last week that China has not confirmed these figures, and traders are still closely watching for signs of large-scale purchases. 

On November 3 China waived punitive tariffs on U.S. agricultural products that had been imposed at the height of the trade war in March, but a 10% tariff on all U.S good (in retaliation for U.S. fentanyl tariffs) puts the tariff on U.S. soybeans at 13% versus 3% for Brazilian soybeans.

China's State-owned COFCO reportedly purchased 3 cargoes of U.S. soybeans just before the October 30 Trump-Xi meeting. Widely interpreted as a symbolic gesture, that amounts to about 180,000 metric tons. It has been rumored that COFCO has purchased several additional cargoes.

On November 7 COFCO signed a soybean purchase agreement at a "China-US Agricultural Trade Cooperation Forum" held at the Shanghai International Import Expo, but no amounts or timing have been publicly announced. The U.S. Soybean Export Council had meetings with buyers at the meeting, but no deals were announced. 

This week China restored import rights that had been suspended in March for Minnesota cooperative CHS, grain trader Louis Dreyfuss, and a partnership that includes Bunge and Pan Ocean America.

Today Chinese media revealed that COFCO also signed a separate agreement to purchase nearly 20 mmt of Brazilian soybeans, soybean oil, palm oil and other agricultural products at the Shanghai Expo. The agreement was signed on November 6--the day before the agreement to buy U.S. soybeans. The Brazilian agreement to strengthen agricultural economic ties with Brazil was signed with four so-called ABCD multinational grain trading companies that China has in the past identified as working to advance American interests. They included Bunge and Louis Dreyfuss whose import rights had been restored the previous day.

At the China-U.S. forum, the director of a Ministry of Commerce's Office of American and Oceania Affairs said that China would buy U.S. soybeans if "the price is competitive, the quality is good and supply is sufficient." These caveats appear to give China an excuse for not meeting targets.

As if they are reading from the same cue cards, most market analyses on Chinese web sites now point out that, indeed, the price of U.S. soybeans is not competitive versus Brazilian soybeans, so there is no incentive to buy from the U.S. Estimated C&F values posted daily on a Chinese feed market site show that the cost of importing soybeans from U.S. origins is now higher than costs of importing from Brazil. Many analyses cite a Chinese purchase of 20 Brazilian cargoes to highlight Brazil's price advantage. 

Source: Data from feedtrade.com.cn.

It is also a bad sign that China's Sinograin--the government's grain reserve company--did not show up to buy at the Shanghai International Import Expo where Sinograin had made deals in the past. At the 2023 Expo Sinograin signed an agreement to purchase 12 mmt of soybeans from the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The 2023 purchases followed Sinograin commitments to buy a cumulative 39.8 mmt of soybeans at the previous 5 Shanghai Import Expos. 

State media spoke glowingly of the Shanghai International Import Expo, a signature initiative of Xi to promote consumption and use China's big market to gain global influence. Besides claiming that the U.S. agricultural forum represented a revival of trade ties, Economic Daily pointed out how COFCO's agreements to buy wheat from 7 countries, sugar from Brazil, coconut water from Thailand, wine from Italy and Chile, and cheddar cheese from New Zealand advance China's Belt and Road Initiative, embody its "buying globally and benefiting the world" concept, and improve residents diets by providing more high-quality protein sources. 

China's Grain Fields are a "Hotbed of Espionage"

China's Security Ministry warned today that grain-producing areas are a "hotbed of espionage" where rampant collection of Chinese seeds by foreign spies threatens China's national food security. The warning posted on numerous Chinese sites effectively puts the kibosh on independent on-the-ground gathering of agricultural market intelligence in China.

The article (English summary in Global Times) warned against an increase in foreign espionage and intelligence agencies'--"black hands of foreign powers"--infiltration of grain-producing regions to obtain genetic data by illegally collecting soybean, corn, and rice seeds. The article cites "a certain foreign intelligence agency" that "coveted the country's grain data and germplasm resources" and bribed an individual named Zhu to export seeds in falsely declared shipping containers. Later in the article the focus narrows to rice seeds.

Foreign "black hands" infiltrating China's grain industry.
screen shot from propaganda video on Douyin.

The Ministry of State Security emphasized that seeds are the "silicon chips" of agriculture and warns that national food security is threatened by allowing foreigners to obtain them. Foreign sale of parent seeds used in breeding is strictly prohibited. 

The Ministry's warning cast suspicion on any agriculture-related investigations by foreigners. It cited an interdisciplinary team of investigators sent by the consulate of "a certain country" to an important agricultural area under the guise of "conducting visits and investigations" (走访调查). The foreign investigation team illegally "probed and collected information" on the production and reserves of a specific crop, traveling on rural roads and making temporary stops near fields. The foreign investigators were excessively cautious in their work, and allegedly evaded detection by changing modes of transportation when traveling between grain-producing areas. 

The warning also is meant to warn citizens against sharing information with foreigners. The article notes that Zhu was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months in prison and 17 individuals engaged in the case received varying degrees of administrative penalties. The article encourages readers to report suspicious activities to security officials, noting that Zhu was caught through a tip from the public.

Warnings against foreign spies and bans on unapproved investigations of crop status have been common for years, but the agriculture specificity of this warning is unusual. There are several possible interpretations:

• Security Obsession: Is this the latest in the obsession with security under Xi Jinping that has already led to security laws on Anti-Terrorism, Management of Overseas NGOs, Cybersecurity, Nuclear Safety, the Biosecurity, and the Data Security. China may have ramped up seed theft again as leaders have prioritized the seed breeding industry in the last few years. 
• Projection: China often accuses a foreign country of unsavory activity to divert attention from China's engagement in the same activity. China has been stealing seeds for years. In 2016 employees of a Chinese seed company were caught stealing corn seeds in the U.S. Midwest (details were very similar to the accusations in today's article: the Chinese thieves drove to seed company test plots around Iowa and Illinois and sent seeds to China disguised in popcorn jars), and in 2017 a Chinese national working for a rice breeder in Kansas was sentenced to prison for passing rice seeds to visitors from a Chinese crop research institute. 
• Tit-for-tat: This warning could be retaliation for the prosecution of a scientist from China working at the University of Michigan who smuggled a wheat fungus into the United States.
• Covering up: China could be trying to cover up problems in its countryside the leaders don't want foreigners to know about...such as rural protests over low farm prices, unpaid migrant wages and failure to pay crop insurance claims; impacts on corn and peanut crops from calamitous floods in north China this month; devastating floods in southern provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan; the spread of African swine fever from Vietnam or other animal disease epidemics; fake grain reserves; bankrupt pig and chicken farms.

It is unclear why the United States or any other country with espionage capabilities would want to steal Chinese rice seeds. Multinational companies have had seed research enterprises in China for decades. Chinese leaders have often bristled at the popularity of corn and vegetable seeds from foreign companies. 

A 2021 celebration of the anti-espionage law warned that
foreign organizations had illegally collected specimens from
protected natural areas in China.

The warning's proscription on foreign sales of rice seeds, in particular, is seemingly at odds with China's efforts to build goodwill with African and Asian countries by establishing rice-breeding centers and demonstration farms in those countries. 

China does not distinguish between industrial espionage and gathering of market intelligence, and the warning makes it clear that any foreign efforts to collect market intelligence in the world's largest agricultural country could be considered espionage. With a ban on unsupervised travel in the countryside, it will become that much harder to verify official Chinese data and market reports. Chinese contacts threatened with punishment for helping spies will be less willing to share any information with foreigners. Chinese leaders seem eager to revert to Mao-era secrecy, a time when foreign diplomats had to base their assessments of the rural situation in China on Peoples Daily headlines and interviews with refugees who escaped to Hong Kong. 

Social media comments by Chinese viewers of a video version of the warning show varying reactions:

• "Agriculture is the most poisonous drug of them all."
• "Besides rice, what else?"
  
• "Sentenced to death"
• "Constantly blaming this and that is just a way to divert public attention! It's 2025 now, let's not go back to the old ways...
• "It's true that the food situation is precarious.  I heard that while some people make money or lose money in business, farmers now lose money even when growing grain?"

Chinese Buyers Grumble Over Pricey Brazilian Soybeans

Most commentary leading up to today's Trump-Xi meeting seems to ascertain that China doesn't need U.S. soybeans. Beneath the surface, though, Chinese soybean buyers are showing signs of angst as they pile up financial losses and look longingly at U.S. soybeans that are substantially cheaper than the Brazilian beans that have comprised 80-to-90% of their supplies since May. Cracks are appearing in the seemingly cozy China-Brazil soybean relationship as Chinese buyers try to scarf up as many beans as possible from the shrinking Brazilian supply.

China purchased 180,000 metric tons of U.S. soybeans this week -- probably meant as a show of good will ahead of today's inconclusive Trump-Xi meeting. The only signal to markets from the meeting itself was President Trump's vague assurance that Xi has authorized "massive" Chinese purchases of American soybeans. 

Chinese crushing plants have been processing about 9-to-10 million metric tons of soybeans monthly since record-large Brazilian supplies began arriving in May. The crushers are pumping out huge volumes of soybean meal for the Chinese feed manufacturing industry which is also producing at record levels. Soybean oil is also flooding the market and keeping a lid on prices, contributing to China's emergence as a significant soy oil exporter for the first time this year. 

Trouble is, China's soybean processors are not making money. With Brazilian soybean prices edging up and prices weak for soybean meal and oil, the crushers have had negative margins for several months. Market reports from China indicate availability of cheaper U.S. soybeans would be welcomed by crushers who have been watching losses pile up.

An October 17 article posted on the Chinese soybean industry association web site reported that high Brazilian prices were deterring Chinese buyers from purchasing beans to cover needs for December and January. The article reported an 8-to-9 million-ton gap in supplies that Chinese buyers were hoping would be filled by a release of Chinese State reserves and/or by renewed access to cheaper U.S. soybeans in the event of a Trump-Xi agreement. 

An October 27 Futures Daily soymeal market analysis echoed a similar slowdown in purchases due to a negative RMB 230 yuan/ton crushing margin for Brazilian soybeans for December shipment. According to Futures Daily, as of mid-October China had bought 5.26 mmt of soybeans for November, covering 88% of needs. They had bought just 726,000 mt for December, covering 16% of needs; and none for January. The article predicted a significant shortage of soybeans for January to March 2026. 

An October 27 National Grain and Oils Information Center (NGOIC) analysis reported that the cost of December Brazilian soybean shipments increased $8 per metric ton last week, translating to a RMB 65 per metric ton increase in C&F cost for importers in southern China to RMB 3943 per ton. The crushing margin for December Brazilian soybeans was estimated at negative RMB 263 per ton.

A rise in Brazilian prices since mid-2025 led to an unusual premium of Brazilian over U.S. soybean prices as China stopped buying U.S. soybeans and turned to purchasing Brazilian soybeans almost exclusively. Historically, FOB prices for U.S. and Brazilian beans were typically near parity. But the price of Brazilian beans soared more than 17% from early March to a mid-September peak, resulting in a rare premium for Brazilian beans. The fob price of Brazilian beans rose above the U.S. fob price in late May, and the spread between them widened to 12% in mid-September.

The Brazilian currency appreciated about 7% against the U.S. dollar between March and September this year, a factor contributing to the rise in Brazilian prices. The price of soybeans in local Brazilian currency shows a spike in April when Chinese buyers first flocked to buy from Brazil. After a decline in early May, the Brazil price in local currency rose 9 percent to its peak in August. The price dropped 5% in a week during September 17-24--apparently when Chinese buyers browbeat Brazilian sellers into cutting prices, as discussed below. Since then, the Brazilian price has rebounded less than 2%.

Source: CEPEA, converted to Reais at official exchange rate.

Brazil also crushes its soybeans, so Chinese buyers have to offer higher prices to lure soybeans away from Brazilian users. One recent analysis observed that crush margins in Brazil also deteriorated with the rise in prices for Brazilian soybeans. An American Soybean Association analysis noted this competition and estimated that Brazilian ending stocks could fall to half of a month's crush demand.

Outrage over accusations of Brazilian price gouging erupted in dark corners of Chinese media this month. An October 25 article, "2 Million Tons of Soybeans Rot at Port! Brazil Gambled but Forgot China Already Held 3 Trump Cards," told a bombastic story of Chinese traders banding together during September to resist alleged price-gouging by Brazilian suppliers by postponing 8 million tons of sales and leaving 2 million tons of beans to rot on Sao Paulo docks. According to this account, Brazilians emboldened by their monopoly position demanded an increase in soybean prices that would have priced their beans at a $66 per ton premium over U.S. beans (a premium of about 11%--consistent with the fob prices reported above.) The author of the article claimed that China pressured Argentina to suspend its tax on soybean exports last month so Chinese traders could buy from Argentina as leverage against Brazilian price increases. Global news media reported this was an emergency measure to bolster Argentine foreign currency holdings. However, the timing of the tax suspension did coincide with the drop in Brazilian soy prices and so many Chinese buyers pounced on Argentine beans that the tax suspension meant to last more than a month was canceled within days.  

Chinese social media reactions to the article--widely posted on Chinese and Hong Kong sites--reveals that the China-Brazil relationship may not be as cozy as most outsiders presume. Here are sample comments: 

• "Is Brazil's short-sighted price increase a misjudgment of the situation and a risky gamble, or a display of confidence based on leverage?"
• "What kind of underlying strength lies behind China's calm response? The answer lies in the strategic chessboard that both sides have already laid out." 
• "Brazil is truly ungrateful and treacherous, burning bridges after crossing them."  
• "Seeing that we weren't buying American soybeans, they thought they had us cornered and arbitrarily raised soybean prices. Have they forgotten that they're not the only country in the world that produces soybeans?" 

A puzzling aspect of the Chinese market situation is that low prices and financial losses are not curbing Chinese soybean crush volumes. According to the NGOIC analysis cited above, volume by main crushing plants was 2.37 mmt during the week of October 24, up 200,000 mt from the previous week and up 100,000 mt from a month earlier. Similarly, there has been little reduction in hog and poultry production despite these producers also incurring losses. Feed demand is expected to remain strong into Q4. The peak demand season for meat and oils is during the January-February Chinese holiday period.

While Brazil's new harvest will begin in January--predicted to be even larger than this year--those beans are unlikely to effectively add to Chinese supplies during Q1 2026. Analysis of 2025 customs data from Brazil and China shows it took 2 months for Brazilian exports to show up as imports in China customs data. During Q1 2025 China's crushers scraped by and Chinese soybean meal prices spiked before Brazilian beans began arriving in April. 

It's not at all clear how many soybeans are in China's State reserves. China reveals nothing about the volume and estimates by USDA and other organizations outside China are wild guesses. Many soybeans in reserves are domestic soybeans purchased to support prices. This month authorities have been releasing domestic soybeans from reserves--thousands of tons with only tepid sales--but these beans are not competitively priced for use by crushers. There has been no indication from authorities that they will release imported soybeans from reserves in large enough volumes to effectively supplement supplies in December-January.

China Promotes International Food Safety Scheme for BRI Countries

A country with a bad food safety record aspires to lead a new approach to setting food safety practices in international trade. This is part of China's plan to leverage its Belt & Road Initiative in order to boost its influence in setting international rules, standards, and inspection practices. So far, it's off to a slow start.

On October 15, China's customs administration held a meeting of its 2-year-old "Import & Export Food Safety Cooperation Mechanism for the Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative" in Shanghai with participants from food agencies and embassies of 21 Belt and Road countries. 

Director General of the Customs Administration Sun Meijun stated that China's customs administration is willing to work with food safety authorities of all countries to collaborate on food safety regulation and promote safer and more efficient trade in food and agricultural products. At the meeting member countries affirmed the "Shanghai Declaration on Promoting Trade Facilitation and Sharing Food Safety" and launched a "Silk Road Food Safety" information platform.  

No, not a game show. 11 country reps + China Customs Director Sun signed the
terms of reference for China's import-export food safety initiative at the Shanghai meeting.

According to Director Sun, the food safety mechanism will:

• be guided by morality and rule of law 
• give food enterprises the primary responsibility for quality and safety
• adhere to scientific supervision that gives full play to international rules and standards
• strive for shared responsibility for food safety throughout the entire chain from farm to table. 

Sun also mentioned that this food safety initiative is part of China's aspiration to engage in global governance. She did not mention it, but the idea for the BRI food safety initiative dates back 10 years to the 2016-20 and 2021-25 five-year plans. 

China launched the "Import & Export Food Safety Cooperation Mechanism for the Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative" in 2023. At this month's meeting 11 new countries signed the charter, bringing the total member countries to 18. My arithmetic indicates there were only 7 countries before this month's meeting was held. China claims to have over 150 countries in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), so participation is not overwhelming. There does not seem to be a list of members, but countries mentioned in articles about the initiative include Indonesia, Belarus, Iran, South Africa, Turkey, Cambodia, Bolivia, Brunei, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. 

Chinese Customs held a belt and road food safety training session in Shanghai during September 2025 
for attendees from Brunei, Mongolia, Pakistan, Serbia, Rwanda, South Africa, Papua New Guinea, and Panama

News about the October 15 Shanghai meeting was featured in several articles on the Chinese version of the customs web site and other Chinese state media. English articles in China Daily and other State media outlets briefly mentioned the Shanghai meeting, emphasizing granting of access to new products and downplaying the BRI food safety mechanism.

State media claims that food trade with BRI countries grew 2.5% this year. That was less than half the 6.2% growth in all trade with BRI countries.

In a world under China's food safety governance, look for inflexible and overly detailed traceability requirements, zero tolerances for certain substances, blanket bans of meat from an entire country when a disease outbreak occurs in a particular region, enforcement/inspections that oscillate between lax and excessively strict depending on China's market/political situation, and promises of efficient transmission of documents belied by numerous rejections of imported foods each month for documentation problems. In short, excessively complex requirements for which Chinese inspectors can always find a violation if they want to.

In September Chinese customs rejected 443 food shipments, but the list is released only in a Chinese pdf. Rejections included dozens of shrimp shipments from Ecuador containing sodium metabisulfite or animal disease, bird nests from Indonesia that contained aluminum, beef from Argentina and Brazil with incomplete documentation, bird nests from Vietnam with registration problems, milk chocolate candy from India with improper labels, shrimp from Pakistan with incomplete documents, non-GMO rapeseed oil from Kazakhstan containing GMOs, beef broth from Vietnam with salmonella, degraded pistachios from Iran, and beef from Mongolia with high bacteria counts.

U.S. Soy Exports to Non-China Destinations up 45% so far

U.S. soybean exports to non-China destinations have increased 45% year-over-year in the first 7 weeks of the 2025/26 marketing year. But that growth made only a slight dent in offsetting the lost demand from China's boycott of U.S. beans.

Analysis of USDA export inspection data for September through October 16--the first 7 weeks of the 2025/26 market year--shows that exports are overall down -2.5 million metric tons from the same period in 2024. Sifting through the USDA database shows that exports to China during this period last year were 4.2 mmt versus 0 this year. Exports to non-China destinations were 3.8 mmt in the first 7 weeks of MY2024/25, but they increased to 5.5 mmt so far in 2025/26. That's a year-on-year increase of 1.7 mmt, or 45%, but plugs less than half of the 4.2-mmt hole left by China's snub of U.S. beans. 

Most of the top overseas markets for U.S. soybeans have increased their purchases. The U.S. has exported soybeans to 34 destinations so far in MY 2025/26. The top markets are Mexico, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Japan, each of which registered increased sales year-over-year. Sales to Bangladesh and Pakistan each increased by about 400,000 mt from last year. Italy, Spain, Turkey, Taiwan, and Iraq registered increases ranging from 76,340 mt to 194,642 mt. Germany, the 6th-largest destination so far, had a drop in sales of nearly 240,000 mt. 

China is also a top buyer of U.S. sorghum, and the latest USDA report indicates that exports of sorghum for MY 2025/26 are down -346,397 mt year-over-year. On the other hand, MY 2025/26 corn exports are up 3.5 mmt and wheat exports are up 1.9 mmt year-over-year, despite lack of sales to China for these grains.

How Long Can Brazil Sustain China's Soybean Supply?

It's confirmed that Brazilian beans continued to almost single-handedly sustain China's soybean supply during September 2025--and actually increased supplies from the previous month. However, China probably cannot sustain its supplies year-round without importing U.S. soybeans. The Brazilian beans arriving in September represent the end of Brazil's peak shipping season. Brazilian shipments to China began to drop in August and September, which probably means Chinese supplies will begin to shrink in October and November. While Brazil is expected to have another monster harvest beginning in January, the new Brazilian beans probably won't clear Chinese customs until April.

As reported last week, China's September 2025 soybean imports increased by 592,000 metric tons from the previous month to reach 12.87 million metric tons (mmt). Detailed customs data confirm that China's imports of Brazilian soybeans increased by 476,000 mt in September, accounting for most of the increase. Brazil supplied 10.96 million metric tons (mmt) of China's September soybean imports during September, an 85% share (nearly the same as in August). Imports from Uruguay were up 239,000 mt and imports from Argentina were up 123,000 mt. China imported small volumes from Russia, Canada, and Ukraine. (Phantom imports from the U.S. reported by Chinese customs in August did not reappear in September.)  

As reported here last week, the volume of soybeans exported by Brazil to China in a given month roughly corresponds to the volume of Brazilian bean imports reported by Chinese customs 2 months later. However, the comparison does not match exactly and suggests that soybeans seem to have gained some weight somehow in their journey from Brazil to China. 

Brazil exports to China from Brazilian customs.
China's imports from Brazil from Chinese customs.

For example:

• In July 2025 Brazil reported exporting 9.58 mmt of soybeans bound for China. 
• In September, China reported that 10.96 mmt of Brazilian soybeans cleared customs--nearly 1.4 mmt more than Brazil had reported exporting two months earlier. 

The cumulative trade for 2025 so far suggests inflation of China's import volume by about 2.1 mmt

• From January to July 2025, Brazil reported exporting a cumulative total of 58 mmt of soybeans bound for China. 
• From March to September (a 2-month lag), China reported importing a cumulative total of 60.1 mmt of soybeans from Brazil--2.1 mmt more than Brazil reported exporting to China. 

It's evident from the chart above that July was the end of the peak export season for Brazil's soybeans. Brazil's August exports to China totaled 7.93 mmt, down about 1.6 mmt from July. In September Brazil exported 6.77 mmt to China, down 1.16 mmt from August. These monthly declines in Brazilian shipments should result in a drop in China's arrivals of soybeans in October and November. More declines are likely in December 2025 through March 2026. Purchases from Argentina earlier this month will arrive in early 2026 and only fill part of China's deficit if there are no purchases of U.S. soybeans.