Cost of Imported Soybeans on the Rise in China

China's imports of Brazilian soybeans shrank to 7.1 million metric tons in October from 11 mmt in November. This was the lowest since April's 4.6 mmt. However, imports from Argentina rose to 1.57 mmt in October, supplemented by 710,000 mt from Uruguay. No U.S. soybeans were imported in October. The total import volume of 9.5 mmt during October was roughly equal to the monthly volume being crushed.

China customs data.

China customs data.

The cost of Brazilian soybeans has been rising. Brazil's monthly customs data for 2025 shows that the average value of soybeans shipped to China rose from a low of $384 per metric ton in April to $430 in October, a cumulative increase of 12.1%. China's customs data show that the cost of Brazilian soybeans entering China rose from $431 per metric ton in June to $464 in October, a cumulative increase of 7.7%.

Brazil & China customs data.

During October the average cost of Brazilian soybeans imported to China went up 3.6% from the previous month. The fob price in Brazil's Paranagua state dropped during September, but it rose during October and November.

Brazil & China customs data and Brazil CEPEA.

Despite the increase in price Brazilian beans have improved their price advantage versus U.S. soybeans. U.S. soybean export prices rose during October, and during November 2025 U.S. soybean bids at U.S. Gulf ports have been slightly higher than the fob price of Brazilian soybeans in Paranagua. Estimates of C&F costs of imported soybeans arriving in China show a clear advantage for Brazilian soybeans versus both Gulf and Pacific Northwest soybeans. The tariff on U.S. soybeans is now 13%, compared with 3% for soybeans from Brazil and other countries. 

A Chinese soybean meal market analysis on Friday said that some Chinese buyers are not purchasing U.S. beans because the cost is relatively high. 

China Wants its Anti-Poverty Efforts to be the World Model

China is promoting its poverty alleviation program as a model for world. Today the "Global South Modernization Forum" was held in Beijing where 60 poverty alleviation scholars from China and abroad praised China's approach to poverty reduction. China considers itself to be a leader of the "Global South," a label for developing countries used by the UN and some other international organizations.  The forum was featured in multiple Chinese State media outlets such as China Daily. Xinhua and China Daily posted articles about the forum on Facebook and Youtube, platforms that are banned in China.

Xinhua featured a speech to the foum by the head of the Communist Party's propaganda department.

A seminar on "China's Poverty Alleviation and the Global South's Poverty Reduction Efforts" focused on "the global significance of China's victory in the battle against poverty." The description in Chinese news media included the Chinese regime's usual stock phrases: "building a community with a shared future for mankind" free from poverty and with common development. China wants to "share its experience in poverty reduction," "deepen cooperation among the Global South," and "jointly address global challenges in poverty reduction and sustainable development," and work together to implement the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

According to State media, "guests" gave Xi Jinping accolades for his leadership in "winning the war on poverty" and consolidating its achievements in development that is "people centered," "equitable," and "inclusive."

"Guests" were probably shown pretty pictures of neatly planned model villages while speaking only in the abstract about aging rural people with no pension and no children to care for them, "hollow villages," "cooperatives" that are fronts for companies, piles of trash, insolvent rural banks, closed rural schools, and nutritional deficits.

News articles did not mention that Chinese government officials have been under orders to prevent rural regions from regressing into poverty over the last two years. 

The forum probably did not include any discussion of recent unrest in Hainan where farmers were enraged that a rubber company claiming ownership of their land pulled up betel nut trees they had planted. 

A Vice Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs attended the meeting, but Minister Han Jun apparently did not. Last week Minister Han was in Gansu Province investigating results of antipoverty efforts from potato and beef cattle industry development strategies. The article on Han's visit hailed the results of a Dingxi County potato project but did not mention that funds and work effort have been poured into this county's potato project for 20 years. Han also investigated Kangle County's beef industry development project. After antipoverty efforts gave loans to pork, dairy and beef companies to set up operations in impoverished areas these sectors have been coping with excess supply, depressed prices and losses. Last year the agriculture ministry held a meeting to discuss rescue efforts for the beef and dairy industries. This year all hog producers are losing money except indebted behemoth companies Muyuan and Wens who claim to have cut production costs.

There was probably no mention of rural families who are deep in debt because they bought apartments in county towns before the property market imploded.

Not visible from Beijing conference room.

Hog Farms Lose Money, Cancel Expansions

Farms will incur losses of RMB -179 per head from fattening hogs, according to a November 11 report from China's National Development and Reform Commission. The report said farms are reluctant to stock up on pigs or engage in "second fattening." Similarly, a weekly report from Shandong Province estimated an average loss of RMB -80 from farrow-to-finish and RMB -170 from fattening purchased piglets to market weight. The Shandong report attributed losses to low prices under pressure from strong supplies and weak demand. 

A year ago hog prices were high and feed prices were dropping. In October 2024, the NDRC estimated profits of RMB 322 from fattening hogs. Since then, hog prices have dropped dramatically, and profits have turned to losses. 

Data from China Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

Big companies sold large volumes of hogs during October, adding downward pressure on prices. Sales by the top 3 companies during October were their largest of the year. Muyuan sold 7.076 million head during October, up 13.17% from a year ago, Wens Foodstuff sold 456,900, up 45.7% yoy, and New Hope sold 344,400, up 34.4% yoy. A second tier of companies increased their October sales by 60% from a year ago. Hog prices reported by Muyuan and Wens were down by about 33% from a year earlier.

Compiled from monthly reports.

Chinese hog farming companies are in a game of "chicken" to see who can last out the down cycle. Several elite companies claim to have cut their production costs to RMB 11.5 per kg and are close to breakeven at the recent low level of prices. Other companies and small farms with production costs of RMB 13.5 or higher are incurring heavy losses. 

 An analysis posted on Chinese livestock industry news sites last week suggested that Chinese companies have canceled dozens of giant pig farming projects over the past year. Most announcements cite financial losses for the cancellations and said they plan to shift funds to shore up working capital. The news appears to signal a reversal of last year's breakneck expansion plans, but it could be meant to demonstrate fealty to government officials who have been nagging them to cut back production capacity over the last 6 months.

A year ago, Muyuan Foods announced plans to invest RMB 576.8 million in 7 huge swine farming projects with combined capacity of over 1.3 million head. The company has now proposed terminating fund-raising for the projects and instead says it will devote funds to working capital and daily operations. 

Wens Foodstuff halted construction of two giant pig breeding projects in Hubei Province that had been funded as part of RMB 9.3 billion bond issuance in 2021. Fourteen other projects are also being suspended. Wens will use funds for biosecurity upgrades and other projects.

This month, pig company Luoniushan told investors the company will terminate its collaboration with a pig farm in Guizhou Province to stem losses incurred by the farm and protect the company's stockholders from the industry's deteriorating outlook. On the same day, Bunge Technology announced it was canceling acquisition of 6 pig farming companies in several Chinese provinces, according to the analysis. The acquisitions had been part of a plan to create a vertically integrated industry chain extending operations from pig feed to livestock farming. 

In September, Tianbang announced it had cut the number of its sow farms in Shandong Province and carried out renovations in order to improve performance in swine breeding and bring down operation costs.

In July, Shennong Group canceled a plan to issue RMB 290 million in in stock to fund a giant 240,000-head piglet production base. The decision was prompted by changes in the swine market and capital market situation.

In March, Tiankang Biological terminated plans for a farming project in Gansu Province that would have produced 300,000 piglets and 200,000 finished hogs annually. Funds meant for the project are being used to supplement working capital and fund core business operations. Tiankang is focused on improving efficiency through upgrading existing facilities, optimizing breeding pig quality, and adopting a light asset expansion strategy. 

Last December Dongrui Co. announced termination of a 200,000-head multi-story pig farming project in Huizhou, Guangdong Province. Funds will be shifted to working capital.

A year ago, Tangrenshen announced termination of a pig farming poverty alleviation project in Guangxi Province it had announced after its IPO several years earlier. A farming project in Hainan was canceled because the land was designated as "permanent basic farmland" which banned use for livestock farming, and another project was canceled because it was not likely to achieve the expected economic and social returns. 

China Refused to Confirm U.S. Soybean Purchase Commitment

China's Commerce Ministry refused to confirm that China committed to U.S. soybean purchases at the October 30 Trump-Xi meeting. Reading the tea leaves, it looks like China is in a passive-aggressive state over bilateral trade with the U.S. and has no intention of fulfilling this commitment--if it was ever made.

At a November 13 press conference an unidentified "media reporter" asked whether the Ministry of Commerce could confirm the White House's claim that China committed to purchase 12 million metric tons of soybeans this year and 25 million metric tons in the following 3 years. Spokesperson He Yadong gave no direct confirmation, but he didn't deny it either. 

He responded with a word salad stating that "the Ministry of Commerce had recently released information regarding the joint arrangements for the China-US Kuala Lumpur trade consultations, outlining the main achievements and consensus reached, including on agricultural trade." He followed up with: "China is an important participant in global agricultural trade and will continue to uphold an open and cooperative attitude, deepening mutually beneficial cooperation with global trading partners to jointly safeguard an open, stable, and sustainable global trading system."

It's possible the spokesman was caught off guard by the question, but this is looking like a nonconfrontational approach to saying "no." He could have given a more friendly non-answer, but the non-answer he did give appears to be a disguised denial intended to give the White House a middle finger. Chinese leaders are undoubtedly furious that President Trump has been reaching out to ASEAN and Central Asian trade partners -- territories China views as its backyard where it has focused its foreign trade and investment initiatives as the foundation for expanding China's role as a global leader. 

Many Chinese news sites posted an abbreviated report with the title "The Ministry of Commerce briefed the public on issues related to China-US soybean trade" that omits the question about soybean purchase commitments and doesn't even mention soybeans in the text. I found only a couple of reports that actually reported that the soybean purchase question was asked at the press conference.

Commerce Ministry spokesman He Weidong at November 13 press conference.

It's unclear who raised the soybean question at the press conference. The transcript of the press conference identified the questioner only as "media reporter" (the reporter also asked about China's new rare earth export licensing system). Most reporters asking questions at the conference were identified as State-owned media: Phoenix TV, China Global TV Network, Fengmian News (operated by Sichuan Daily), and China News Service. But Deutsche Press asked the final question. The question could have bee planted by the Commerce Ministry in order to issue its passive-aggressive response on the soybean commitment. 

China Not Very Serious About Buying U.S. Soybeans?

Chicago soybean prices keep rising based on expectations of renewed Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans. Yet, nearly 2 weeks after Xi and Trump met in Korea China seems to be dragging its feet in buying U.S. soybeans. 

China has imported a cumulative 95.7 mmt of soybeans for January-October 2025, up 6.4 mmt from the same period in 2024. Imports from the U.S.in the first 10 months of 2025 are only 16.8 mmt. 

According to the White House, China committed to buy 12 million metric tons (mmt) of soybeans by the end of 2025, an amount that will be hard to achieve with less than 2 months left in the year. China also reportedly committed to buy at least 25 mmt annually during 2026-28. Beijing consultancy Boyar observed last week that China has not confirmed these figures, and traders are still closely watching for signs of large-scale purchases. 

On November 3 China waived punitive tariffs on U.S. agricultural products that had been imposed at the height of the trade war in March, but a 10% tariff on all U.S good (in retaliation for U.S. fentanyl tariffs) puts the tariff on U.S. soybeans at 13% versus 3% for Brazilian soybeans.

China's State-owned COFCO reportedly purchased 3 cargoes of U.S. soybeans just before the October 30 Trump-Xi meeting. Widely interpreted as a symbolic gesture, that amounts to about 180,000 metric tons. It has been rumored that COFCO has purchased several additional cargoes.

On November 7 COFCO signed a soybean purchase agreement at a "China-US Agricultural Trade Cooperation Forum" held at the Shanghai International Import Expo, but no amounts or timing have been publicly announced. The U.S. Soybean Export Council had meetings with buyers at the meeting, but no deals were announced. 

This week China restored import rights that had been suspended in March for Minnesota cooperative CHS, grain trader Louis Dreyfuss, and a partnership that includes Bunge and Pan Ocean America.

Today Chinese media revealed that COFCO also signed a separate agreement to purchase nearly 20 mmt of Brazilian soybeans, soybean oil, palm oil and other agricultural products at the Shanghai Expo. The agreement was signed on November 6--the day before the agreement to buy U.S. soybeans. The Brazilian agreement to strengthen agricultural economic ties with Brazil was signed with four so-called ABCD multinational grain trading companies that China has in the past identified as working to advance American interests. They included Bunge and Louis Dreyfuss whose import rights had been restored the previous day.

At the China-U.S. forum, the director of a Ministry of Commerce's Office of American and Oceania Affairs said that China would buy U.S. soybeans if "the price is competitive, the quality is good and supply is sufficient." These caveats appear to give China an excuse for not meeting targets.

As if they are reading from the same cue cards, most market analyses on Chinese web sites now point out that, indeed, the price of U.S. soybeans is not competitive versus Brazilian soybeans, so there is no incentive to buy from the U.S. Estimated C&F values posted daily on a Chinese feed market site show that the cost of importing soybeans from U.S. origins is now higher than costs of importing from Brazil. Many analyses cite a Chinese purchase of 20 Brazilian cargoes to highlight Brazil's price advantage. 

Source: Data from feedtrade.com.cn.

It is also a bad sign that China's Sinograin--the government's grain reserve company--did not show up to buy at the Shanghai International Import Expo where Sinograin had made deals in the past. At the 2023 Expo Sinograin signed an agreement to purchase 12 mmt of soybeans from the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The 2023 purchases followed Sinograin commitments to buy a cumulative 39.8 mmt of soybeans at the previous 5 Shanghai Import Expos. 

State media spoke glowingly of the Shanghai International Import Expo, a signature initiative of Xi to promote consumption and use China's big market to gain global influence. Besides claiming that the U.S. agricultural forum represented a revival of trade ties, Economic Daily pointed out how COFCO's agreements to buy wheat from 7 countries, sugar from Brazil, coconut water from Thailand, wine from Italy and Chile, and cheddar cheese from New Zealand advance China's Belt and Road Initiative, embody its "buying globally and benefiting the world" concept, and improve residents diets by providing more high-quality protein sources. 

China's Grain Fields are a "Hotbed of Espionage"

China's Security Ministry warned today that grain-producing areas are a "hotbed of espionage" where rampant collection of Chinese seeds by foreign spies threatens China's national food security. The warning posted on numerous Chinese sites effectively puts the kibosh on independent on-the-ground gathering of agricultural market intelligence in China.

The article (English summary in Global Times) warned against an increase in foreign espionage and intelligence agencies'--"black hands of foreign powers"--infiltration of grain-producing regions to obtain genetic data by illegally collecting soybean, corn, and rice seeds. The article cites "a certain foreign intelligence agency" that "coveted the country's grain data and germplasm resources" and bribed an individual named Zhu to export seeds in falsely declared shipping containers. Later in the article the focus narrows to rice seeds.

Foreign "black hands" infiltrating China's grain industry.
screen shot from propaganda video on Douyin.

The Ministry of State Security emphasized that seeds are the "silicon chips" of agriculture and warns that national food security is threatened by allowing foreigners to obtain them. Foreign sale of parent seeds used in breeding is strictly prohibited. 

The Ministry's warning cast suspicion on any agriculture-related investigations by foreigners. It cited an interdisciplinary team of investigators sent by the consulate of "a certain country" to an important agricultural area under the guise of "conducting visits and investigations" (走访调查). The foreign investigation team illegally "probed and collected information" on the production and reserves of a specific crop, traveling on rural roads and making temporary stops near fields. The foreign investigators were excessively cautious in their work, and allegedly evaded detection by changing modes of transportation when traveling between grain-producing areas. 

The warning also is meant to warn citizens against sharing information with foreigners. The article notes that Zhu was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months in prison and 17 individuals engaged in the case received varying degrees of administrative penalties. The article encourages readers to report suspicious activities to security officials, noting that Zhu was caught through a tip from the public.

Warnings against foreign spies and bans on unapproved investigations of crop status have been common for years, but the agriculture specificity of this warning is unusual. There are several possible interpretations:

• Security Obsession: Is this the latest in the obsession with security under Xi Jinping that has already led to security laws on Anti-Terrorism, Management of Overseas NGOs, Cybersecurity, Nuclear Safety, the Biosecurity, and the Data Security. China may have ramped up seed theft again as leaders have prioritized the seed breeding industry in the last few years. 
• Projection: China often accuses a foreign country of unsavory activity to divert attention from China's engagement in the same activity. China has been stealing seeds for years. In 2016 employees of a Chinese seed company were caught stealing corn seeds in the U.S. Midwest (details were very similar to the accusations in today's article: the Chinese thieves drove to seed company test plots around Iowa and Illinois and sent seeds to China disguised in popcorn jars), and in 2017 a Chinese national working for a rice breeder in Kansas was sentenced to prison for passing rice seeds to visitors from a Chinese crop research institute. 
• Tit-for-tat: This warning could be retaliation for the prosecution of a scientist from China working at the University of Michigan who smuggled a wheat fungus into the United States.
• Covering up: China could be trying to cover up problems in its countryside the leaders don't want foreigners to know about...such as rural protests over low farm prices, unpaid migrant wages and failure to pay crop insurance claims; impacts on corn and peanut crops from calamitous floods in north China this month; devastating floods in southern provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan; the spread of African swine fever from Vietnam or other animal disease epidemics; fake grain reserves; bankrupt pig and chicken farms.

It is unclear why the United States or any other country with espionage capabilities would want to steal Chinese rice seeds. Multinational companies have had seed research enterprises in China for decades. Chinese leaders have often bristled at the popularity of corn and vegetable seeds from foreign companies. 

A 2021 celebration of the anti-espionage law warned that
foreign organizations had illegally collected specimens from
protected natural areas in China.

The warning's proscription on foreign sales of rice seeds, in particular, is seemingly at odds with China's efforts to build goodwill with African and Asian countries by establishing rice-breeding centers and demonstration farms in those countries. 

China does not distinguish between industrial espionage and gathering of market intelligence, and the warning makes it clear that any foreign efforts to collect market intelligence in the world's largest agricultural country could be considered espionage. With a ban on unsupervised travel in the countryside, it will become that much harder to verify official Chinese data and market reports. Chinese contacts threatened with punishment for helping spies will be less willing to share any information with foreigners. Chinese leaders seem eager to revert to Mao-era secrecy, a time when foreign diplomats had to base their assessments of the rural situation in China on Peoples Daily headlines and interviews with refugees who escaped to Hong Kong. 

Social media comments by Chinese viewers of a video version of the warning show varying reactions:

• "Agriculture is the most poisonous drug of them all."
• "Besides rice, what else?"
  
• "Sentenced to death"
• "Constantly blaming this and that is just a way to divert public attention! It's 2025 now, let's not go back to the old ways...
• "It's true that the food situation is precarious.  I heard that while some people make money or lose money in business, farmers now lose money even when growing grain?"