Corn Quota Applicants Reveal Booming Import Demand

This year 1,230 Chinese companies applied to import corn, including the world's biggest feed-milling  and swine-producing companies. Starch and ethanol producers that were subsidized in past years to sop up excess corn are now clamoring to import corn as well. 

China flipped from corn exporter to importer in a short space of time. Twenty years ago China exported 16.5 million tons of corn, but in 2022 China imported 20.5 million tons and will probably import a similar quantity this year. 

Note: Calendar years.

Source: China customs statistics.

Clues about China's soaring demand for corn can be gleaned from a list of applicants for the tariff rate quota (TRQ) that allows up to 7.2 million tons of corn to be imported at a 1-percent tariff each year. Imports outside the TRQ system are charged a deal-breaking 65 percent tariff. Prospective importers have to apply every September for a share of the following year's quota.

Chinese authorities grudgingly agreed to publicly release the list of applicants each year as a baby step toward transparency. The list shows the companies that applied, their addresses, products and production capacity. They don't reveal how much quota applicants requested nor which applicants are awarded quota because Chinese officials insist this would be an invasion of privacy. 

The chairman of Tongwei Feeds complained at last year's National Peoples Congress that the 7.2-million-ton quota is not nearly big enough to meet the needs of big feed companies. Indeed, corn imports have exceeded the quota by a wide margin each of the last three years. Apparently, some companies are being allowed to import beyond the quota without being charged the 65 percent tariff for out-of-quota purchases.

Nevertheless, the quota seems to be valuable since the number of applicants for corn quota grew by 75 percent between 2020 and 2023--an indication of growing demand for corn imports. The cotton TRQ used to attract the most applicants, but the number of applicants for cotton quota has fallen by half since six years ago. The 1,230 applicants for this year's corn TRQ exceeds the number of applicants for wheat, rice, or sugar TRQs as well. 

Source: Tariff rate quota applicant lists posted by National Development and Reform Commission.

The applicants for corn import quota said they had a total of 378 million tons of corn processing capacity. This exceeds USDA's estimated 297 million-ton domestic consumption of corn in China and the Chinese agriculture ministry's 290 million-ton estimate. Of course capacity exceeds actual use and reported capacity may be exaggerated, but the large capacity number reported by quota applicants suggests potential to use a lot of imported corn and indicates that just about every major corn-user applies for permission to import.

Over 90% of the applicants said they produced animal feed or livestock. Companies whose main product was feed said they had 332.8 million tons of capacity. 

More interestingly, there were also applications to import corn from dozens of producers of industrial corn products such as starch, citric acid, ethanol, sweeteners, and monosodium glutamate. Many of these companies received subsidies to process domestic corn during past years of corn gluts--most recently about 4 years ago. Now these companies are looking to import corn:

• 6 fuel ethanol manufacturing plants belonging to state-owned companies COFCO and SDIC. One ethanol plant constructed in Guangxi Province 15 years ago--hailed as a producer of ethanol from cassava that would not compete for grain--applied to import corn and reported that it has 700,000 tons of corn processing capacity. 
• 2 manufacturers of DDGS (distillers dried grains with solubles)--China just renewed its "anti-dumping and countervailing duties" on imported DDGS from the United States to protect these producers from imports yet these manufacturers (and the ethanol manufacturers who also produce DDGS as a by-product) are clamoring to import corn as a raw material. Part of China's rationale for singling out U.S. DDGS for exorbitant tariffs is that U.S. subsidies make its corn artificially cheap, yet China is ramping up imports of Brazilian corn which is cheaper than U.S. corn.
• 5 branches of two companies that manufacture amino acids such as lysine and threonine. Note that Chinese officials are pushing an initiative to reduce soybean imports by expanding use of these synthesized amino acids in swine and chicken feed, but these manufacturers use 3.9 million tons of corn as their raw material. Thus, China will likely have to import more corn to achieve their amino acid plan. 
• Applicants for corn import quota included 2 branches of the Fufeng Group that produce amino acids and monosodium glutamate. Fufeng's plans to construct a corn-milling plant to produce amino acids in North Dakota have been cited repeatedly by U.S. politicians and news media as evidence of a sinister Chinese plan to buy up American farmland.

Syngenta, a Swiss seed and farm chemical manufacturer owned by China's state-owned chemical behemoth also requested corn import quota, as did premier Chinese seed manufacturer DBN (which is also a massive feed and pig manufacturer).

Applicants for corn import quota were located in all but two of China's provinces. Two provinces stood out: Shandong (247 applicants, 74.5 million tons of corn-processing capacity) and Guangdong (157 applicants, 39.7 million tons of capacity), also China's top feed-manufacturing provinces. Applicants were concentrated in south-central pig-producing regions, but even companies in corn-producing provinces of the northeast applied to import corn. Among the top regions for corn-importing interest are two of China's less-developed provinces that are pig-producing giants: Guangxi (91 applicants, 24 million tons of capacity) and Sichuan (78 applicants, 16 million tons).

Source: compiled from National Development and Reform Commission list.

Ten applicants had addresses in Pilot Free Trade Zones: 3 in Hunan Province's Yueyang City, 2 in Shanghai's zone, 2 in Sichuan's Chengdu zone, and 1 each in zones located in Beijing and Guangxi's Qinzhou and Nanning cities. (Mystery: If these zones have exemptions from tariffs or other favorable treatment, why do they apply for a TRQ?)

TRQ application rules stipulate that each branch of a company must apply separately for its own quota. Nearly half of the applicants were plants or headquarters that belonged to large multi-plant companies. Below is a list of 16 companies that had 10 or more applicants on the 2023 corn quota applicant list. Some companies listed their headquarters separately. The capacity numbers include only the branch plants (which in some cases exceed the company capacity listed by the headquarters).

The list included three of the largest feed companies in the world--New Hope-Liuhe, CP (known as Zhengda in China), and Haid--according to last year's Alltech global feed company ranking. State-designated grain trader COFCO's headquarters has been on the list since 2020 as a concession after the WTO case critiqued China's practice of setting aside 60 percent of the quota for COFCO's use without having to apply like other companies. 

• New Hope and Liuhe--a giant feed, swine and chicken producer--had 76 applicants with a combined 17.3 million tons processing capacity. New Hope Group was ranked no. 2 in the Alltech survey with a reported 28 million tons of production.
• COFCO's headquarters said its company's capacity was 9.5 million tons of corn. Twenty-nine of its individual plants producing feed, ethanol, starch and MSG applied for quota and reported a combined 8 million tons of capacity.
• Twins feed had 74 applicants with 16.9 million tons of capacity. Alltech ranked Twins no. 7 with 11 million tons of production.
• Wens Foodstuff, a leading poultry and swine integrator that supplies feed to contracting farmers, had 56 applicants and 11 million tons of capacity.
• Haid Feeds had 54 applicants with 13 million tons of capacity. Haid was ranked no. 3 by Alltech with 19.7 million tons of output.
• Muyuan Foods, the biggest swine producer in the world, had 42 applicants with 12.8 million tons of capacity.
• The Tongwei company--whose CEO complained about the TRQ last year--had 18 applicants for TRQ with 3.5 million tons of capacity.

Compiled from National Development and Reform Commission list.

China's demand for imported corn would be even larger if the high cost of corn were not pushing the price of final products so high that imports of meat are rising. This same process curbed demand for cotton imports--also restricted by a TRQ--by inducing Chinese textile companies to switch to importing cotton yarn which has no quota.

China Imported 7 Percent of its Meat Supply

China's statisticians claim meat output reached a record high in 2022, but meat prices and imports are still at historically high levels. 

Official data show that China's meat production increased to a record 92.3 million tons in 2022, up from 88.9 million tons in 2021. The 3.8-percent increase seems inconsistent with 0 growth in feed production through November shown by China's feed industry association and a decline shown by the Alltech feed survey. China's meat prices also remain at historically high levels despite the record output and large portions of the country locked down during 2022. 

Customs data also show that meat imports reached 7.2 million tons in 2022, lower than the previous two years due to an increase in pork tariffs and declining pork prices during the first half of the year. However, last year's meat import figure was still higher than any year before African swine fever caused imports to spike during 2019-20. The sum of meat output and imports suggests that China's meat supply reached 99.5 million tons in 2022. 

Official data indicate that China's meat supply grew from 86.8 million tons in 2012 to 99.5 million tons in 2022, a 14.6-percent increase over ten years. Meat imports grew 5.1 million tons and meat output grew 7.6 million tons over ten years. The share of meat supply imported increased from 2 percent in 2012 to 7 percent in 2022.

Source: China National Bureau of Statistics and customs administration.

Source: China customs data.

Behind the surge of imports is the upward drift of Chinese meat prices. Chinese pork prices were below production costs for half of 2022, but Chinese prices converted to U.S. dollars were still about double prices in Brazil and the United States. Official data reported a 2.9-percent increase in beef output last year while beef prices fell during the year. However, beef prices were also about twice as high as U.S. and Brazilian beef prices, and China's 2.7-million-ton beef import total for 2022 was about 2.7 percent of China's beef supply. 

Source: China Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, USDA, FAO.

Source: China Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, USDA, FAO.

Record Soybean Harvest, but Buyers are Scarce

China's farmers boosted soybean output by 23.7 percent--as directed by authorities--but now they're having trouble finding buyers for the beans. 

Chinese officials launched a frenetic campaign to boost soybean output in 2022 in order to reduce reliance on imported soybeans. Statistics show that area planted in soybeans increased 21.7 percent, exceeding the goal for soybean and oilseed planting set by last year's "Number one document" to increase soybean self-sufficiency. Goaded on by very generous soybean subsidies and hectoring by officials, the output exceeded 20 million metric tons for the first time ever. 

The harvest total is nevertheless still far short of the 91-million-ton import total for the 2022 calendar year just announced by customs officials.

Soybeans harvested on the outskirts of Beijing.

The news is not all good for farmers, though. Today an agricultural official fretted about falling soybean prices at a press conference on agricultural affairs. The official blamed the problem on weak demand and speculated that things might improve as business returns to normal after the lifting of virus lockdowns and as cafeterias and restaurants reopen after the Spring Festival holiday. 

A Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences soybean analyst told State newspaper Xinjing Bao that the surge of buyers that usually appears in the weeks before the Spring Festival holiday has not materialized this year. He also blamed the low protein content of soybeans grown in the northeastern region. He said about 90 percent of soybeans grown in China are used for food products that require beans high in protein. Most of the soybeans are produced in the northeastern provinces where beans tend to have high oil content and less protein. These beans are too expensive to compete with imported soybeans to produce oil and soybean meal, but their protein content is not high enough to make them suitable for food processing. Soybeans grown in Provinces like Hubei, Anhui, Henan and Shandong have high er protein but the quantity is limited.

At the news conference, the agricultural official called on processors to buy more soybeans, gave out a hotline phone number, and promised to match up buyers with sellers in online trade fairs. The soybean analyst proposed even more subsidies--subsidies for farmers to tide them over as prices fall and costs rise, and subsidies for State reserve buyers that would help them keep their prices firm. The analyst said State reserve buyers have been cutting their prices, and private buyers typically use State reserve prices as a guide for setting their own prices. The analyst also recommended research on soybean varieties with high protein.

Hog Companies Increased Dominance in 2022

China's publicly listed hog companies continued boosting their share of sales during 2022. Data compiled by Futures Daily showed that 16 companies reported a combined 129.2-million head sales total in 2022. [update: This is 18.5 percent of national hog slaughter of 700 million head announced today by the National Bureau of Statistics.]

Compiled by Futures Daily from financial reports.

Combined sales by listed companies were up about 30 percent from 2021. The largest company, Muyuan, has tripled its output since 2020. Muyuan sold 61.2 million head last year, up from 40.3 million in 2021 and 18.1 million in 2020. Wens Foodstuff recovered its number-2 position with 17.9 million head after seeing a dramatic drop during the African swine fever years of 2019-20. Financially troubled Zhengbang Sci-tech saw a decline in sales while New Hope Group had another year of expansion. [update: National hog slaughter increased 4.3 percent during 2022, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.]

Compiled from financial reports.

China's hog prices, meanwhile, had another roller coaster year. Average Chinese hog prices fell to about 15 yuan per kg--roughly $1/lb--in early January 2023, about where prices started the year. The current price is below production costs announced by listed companies that ranged from 15.5 yuan per kg for Muyuan to 18.4 yuan for several other companies. Hog prices reported by the National Bureau of Statistics were below production costs during the first half of 2022, soared to highly profitable levels during July-October. Prices then plunged to loss-making territory as the year closed out. Many listed companies reported 20-percent declines in price during December 2022, and average prices dipped another 5 percent in the first week of January. 

Market reports say large volumes of hogs have come on the market, including many that were held back for "second-time fattening." Consumption during the traditional holiday peak season has been disappointing with virus transmission peaking in cities during December and with a slow Chinese economy. Some farmers are still holding back hogs from the market that could be slaughtered after the Lunar New Year, maintaining a degree of downward pressure into February. 

China's National Development and Reform Commission is alarmed by plunging hog prices. The Commission promises to buy up pork for reserves, is calling in hog company executives to discuss the situation and promises to scrutinize markets for price manipulation.

China Dumps Surplus Rice in Developing Countries

China is dumping its surplus rice in developing countries at below-market prices. In doing so, China has now fully replicated the policy missteps made by North American and European countries during the last century. 

China is simultaneously one of the world's largest importers of rice and one of the largest exporters. China imported 2.6 million metric tons of milled rice in the first 11 months of 2022, but it also exported nearly 2 million tons. (This excludes 3.4 million tons of broken rice imports used for animal feed discussed here last September.) 

Note: excludes broken and rough rice. *2022 for January-November.

Until 2016, China's rice exports were a dribble of medium grain rice sold to merchants in Japan and South Korea. Then exports suddenly boomed to about 2 million tons annually beginning in 2018. What happened?

The exports are mainly medium grain rice, a variety grown in northeastern provinces and the Yangtze River delta. Northeastern rice has a reputation for quality, yet massive surpluses were accumulated in Government warehouses. About 5 years ago officials began grumbling about massive surpluses of northeastern rice. 

A rice market report in December 2017 explained that rice exports had more than doubled due to a 45-percent reduction in prices to "increase market competitiveness" and the exports were linked with plans to reduce rice inventories. In January 2018 the head of the National Commodity Reserves Administration proclaimed that disposing of excessive rice reserves would be a priority. That year rice exports boomed. He indicated that much of the rice was too poor in quality to be eaten safely and some might be used to manufacture alcohol.

The exported rice is sold at an average unit value about 30-to-40 percent less than market prices for medium grain milled rice in China. This is called "dumping" when goods are exported at prices that are below the domestic market price. The exported rice is probably old rice held in public granaries for years that officials are eager to get rid of. Another clue is that customs data indicate that nearly all the rice is exported by companies based in Beijing. This is always an indicator that COFCO, China's state-owned grain trader is the exporter since there are few commercial agribusiness entities based in Beijing.

Domestic raw material purchase prices reported by National Bureau of Statistics
and average value of exported rice. *2022 export data through November.

The rice surplus is one of many massive commodity stockpiles built up by Chinese price support programs. In each case--for soybeans, rapeseed oil, cotton, corn, and wheat--China set a price support that exceeded world market prices and the government then had to purchase most of the harvest while China's commercial agribusinesses purchased cheaper imported commodities. Authorities built up reserves until warehouses were full and they were forced to dispose of the surpluses. For cotton and corn this was accomplished by clamping down on imports and holding auctions to sell the reserves over 4-to-5 years. 

China has had minimum support prices for rice since 2004. The minimum price is a floor under the market meant to assure farmers that the price will never go below the minimum; authorities begin buying up grain when market prices fall below the minimum. Authorities raised minimum prices aggressively from 2008 to 2012 as they sought to keep prices rising faster than production costs. Surpluses of medium grain rice began to balloon during 2012-15, and authorities cut the minimum price sharply in 2017 and 2018 to deal with the surplus. The minimum price has been less than the market price in the last few years, but Chinese farmers now get a cash subsidy payment that encourages them to keep planting rice. 

Prices announced annually by China National Development and Reform Commission.

Most of the cheap rice is exported to Egypt, Turkey, Papua New Guinea, Puerto Rico, and numerous African countries like Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. China's exports of rice to Japan, South Korea and the United States mainland have continued--but at much higher prices, presumably representing commercial transactions.

China's dumping of surplus rice in developing countries completes China's replication of widely criticized practice of the United States and other developed countries during the 20th-century when massive stockpiles of surplus commodities were accumulated and then dumped in developing country markets as food aid, depressing prices for poor farmers. As far back as the 1940s, University of Chicago economist T.W. Schultz warned that the United States was about to embark on "concealed dumping" of surplus farm commodities purchased to maintain high support prices. The Uruguay Round of GATT and the WTO adopted limits on farm subsidies and export subsidies to curb these notorious market distortions. China had to limit its subsidies to 8.5 percent of the value of output and agreed not to subsidize farm exports when it joined the WTO in 2021 2001, precisely because negotiators worried that China would dump commodities on the international market. 

NGOs still complain that the United States and Europe "dump" farm commodities in developing countries, but it is now China that is accumulating huge commodity stockpiles and dumping them overseas at the same time the country is importing rice. 

Xi's "New Journey" to a Strong Agricultural Country

Xi Jinping laid out his vision for building a "strong agricultural country" in the next phase of China's socialist modernization in the communist party's second century of ruling China. The "important speech" given at the December 24, 2022 Rural Work Conference in Beijing was meant to kick off a "new journey" in China's building of a "strong Socialist country" [English in Xinhua]. The speech was riddled with insecurities and contradictions as the country's growing demand for food clashes with the country's shortage of resources, lack of innovation and the leadership's insistence on Maoist dogma and self-reliance.

Xi's high-profile speech is unusual for the rural work meeting which is usually conducted with no fanfare. Xi also brought along his new henchmen Li Qiang, Wang Huning, Han Zheng, Cai Qi and Ding Xuexiang. Xi made outgoing Premier Li Keqiang--snubbed for Xi's new leadership team--give a speech extolling Xi's remarks. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs posted a pledge by Minister Tang Renjian to study the speech carefully and another in which a series of officials praised the speech. 

Worries about food insecurity were front and center in the speech. The major issue for building a strong agricultural country identified in Xi's speech was to maintain a steady secure supply of food and important ag products. When Xi came to power he immediately espoused a new version of the food security strategy that jettisoned the 5% maximum import ceiling set in 1996. Xi's strategy includes vague slogans about maintaining basic self-sufficiency in grains, boosting domestic output through technology and allowing "moderate" imports. Under Xi's watch grain imports have nevertheless exploded. Imports of grains and soybeans (China's definition of staple foods) were equal to 23.6% of domestic grain output in 2021. Supplies of "nonstaple" foods like meat, milk, and vegetables have also become concerns. 

Note: China classifies cereals and soybeans as staple foods

One "new" initiative Xi announced is a campaign for a 50-million-ton increase in grain production capacity--an idea cut-and-pasted from a 2008 food security plan formulated during Hu Jintao's reign. The target equals a 7-percent increase from the 686.5-million-ton output in 2022. No time frame for achieving the goal was revealed. China has no new land available, so the strategy is to prevent further loss of farmland and boost the productivity of the existing stock of land. Moreover, authorities have pledged to cut back on excessive use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides. 

The 1.8-billion-mu (120 million hectare) "red line" for cultivated farmland must not be breached, and more money must be spent on bulldozing the countryside to build flat "high standard" fields with accompanying roads, irrigation canals and power lines. Reasonable profits for farmers must be maintained to encourage production despite ever-rising costs. Xi obliquely warns local officials they will be punished if they fail to meet food production targets. On the demand side Xi insists on reducing food waste.

Xi also pledged to pursue low carbon agriculture, but orders to boost grain yields are sure to require more carbon-based fuel and electricity for the foreseeable future. Xi didn't mention mechanization but other strategic plans emphasize mechanization with a focus on fully mechanizing rice transplanting and designing machinery for cultivation and harvest of hilly fields and intercropped corn and soybeans. "High standard" fields entail building roads to facilitate access by machinery, and diesel fuel and electricity are needed to power pumps and other mechanized irrigation equipment. Plastic sheets to mulch fields and cover cold frames are petroleum-based. Other pledges to automate livestock barns and greenhouses will boost electricity consumption and plans to concentrate pig production in the hinterlands, to supply vegetables to cities from far-flung production bases, and adding cold storage warehouses, trucks and rail cars throughout the supply chain also requires more fossil fuels. 

Despite his self-styled role as a leader of globalization Xi demands that China remain self-reliant in agriculture, North Korea-style. Xi said China cannot follow any other country's model, and Chinese food bowls must remain firmly in their own hands. Fast growth in crop yields are necessary to achieve greater production, but Xi proclaimed at the rural work conference three years ago that China cannot rely on imported seeds. Instead, Chinese companies must duplicate the expensive R&D done by multinational companies to develop their own seeds. Xi acknowledges the fragmentation and weak innovation in the seed industry by criticizing low-level duplication that characterizes much of the industry's R&D and calling for more cooperation between companies.

Xi has a plan to send city technicians, administrators, businessmen and students to rural areas to assist with revitalization and modernization that sounds like the Mao-era "sending down to the countryside" during Xi's youth.

Two decades ago urban Chinese residents were enriched by gifting them with cheap housing and allowing them to buy and sell properties at will. For rural people, Xi promised more tentative experimentation in trading of rural land rights for housing, farmland and commercial parcels. In his speech, Xi insisted that the collective land ownership and household land contracting system will remain in place and the fragmented distribution of plots made 40 years ago will remain frozen in place another 30 years. The rights to use the land are separated from the ownership rights, in theory allowing plots of land to be consolidated by family farms, cooperatives, trusts, and agribusinesses, but progress on this front has also been slow. Another of Xi's rural thrusts is to firm up industry chain links from farms to processors and distributors through rural industrial parks and towns or villages focused on growing, processing and marketing local specialty products.

What Xi didn't mention was how much it will cost for Chinese people to clutch their food bowls so tightly. A Ministry of Finance report in December 2020 told the National Peoples Congress that 16.07 trillion yuan (about $2.5 trillion) had been spent on agricultural and rural affairs from 2016 to 2019, with an annual growth rate of 8.8 percent.

Most of the rural spending is laundered through loans made by the Agricultural Development Bank of China, a policy bank that makes loans to finance grain, cotton and vegetable purchases and--in recent years--rural development projects. The bank's outstanding loan balance has grown rapidly and is now near $1 trillion.

Source: annual bank reports.

An unusually candid essay by a retired National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) official two years ago fretted that many loans financing irrigation projects are in arears, funding for high standard fields is insufficient, and many field construction projects are built in a shoddy manner. He also voiced growing worries about a possible "landslide" in grain output that could result from farmers' shrinking net returns. Notably, the Commission still has not published its farm production cost and return data for 2021. The NDRC author called for finding ways to boost subsidies without violating WTO rules. 

The fragility of China's poverty reduction program--achieved by pumping huge bank loans into poor areas and twisting arms of companies to invest there--is reflected in Xi's directive to prevent villages and towns from slipping back into poverty.

China Prepares for Rural Virus Deluge

China is on alert for the impending spread of the COVID-19 virus in the countryside. A December 24 videoconference on rural COVID-19 prevention and control ordered officials to be on the alert to fight the spread of the virus in rural areas expected as millions of people return to their home towns during the January holidays. 

Today's Securities Times reported that the virus was spreading rapidly in late December. An online survey conducted by provincial disease control authorities showed that 35% of Hainan Province's population was infected during the week of December 19-25, up from 5.6% the previous week. Hainan authorities expect the infection rate to reach 50%. Various cities in Zhejiang Province had infection rates of 30%-to-40%, and Sichuan Province estimated its infection rate at 64.5% during the last week of December 2022.

Officials at the December 24 meeting were warned that the countryside is a weak spot for virus control due to the vast population with low vaccination rates. With city hospitals already apparently overwhelmed with COVID cases, officials are concerned that the rickety system of village clinics and crude county hospitals will be unable to cope with a flood of sick people. Authorities in agricultural and rural offices at each level were ordered to 

• distribute medical supplies, improve medical services and critical care
• focus virus prevention work on key rural regions and populations
• concentrate on vaccination and health services for the elderly population
• ensure that winter vegetable and livestock production is unimpeded
• set detailed emergency programs to supply farm inputs for spring cultivation and seeding

The elderly have the highest risk of severe illness and mortality from COVID-19--a tendency that seems to be confirmed by recent videos of hospital wards in China crowded with elderly people. According to China's 2020 population census, China has 264 million people aged 60 and older, of which 121 million reside in rural villages and 53 million in towns. People 60 and older comprised 24% of the countryside's population and about 16% of people in towns and cities. 

Source: China's 2020 population census.

The spread of COVID-19 among the rural elderly could also affect the agricultural workforce. China's last agricultural census in 2016 showed that 105 million agricultural operators were aged 55 and older, about one-third of the total.

Source: China's third agricultural census, 2016

On December 29, state news media warned that the virus was expected to surge in rural areas during the January 1 and Lunar New Year holidays. All regions are expected to gradually face pressure from the epidemic and medical treatment as people move around the country during the holidays. Officials were admonished to be "more precise," "more scientific in prevention," to treat severe cases and ensure daily medical and health services in order to prevent medical resources from becoming exhausted. 

National Health Commissioner Jiao Yahui prioritized distribution of medications to county and  township hospitals and village clinics and transferring severely ill rural patients to higher-level hospitals with better treatment capabilities. 

Officials have been instructed to identify high-risk groups, including the elderly with co-morbidities, and to establish links between city and county hospitals, dispatch teams of medical professionals to bolster diagnosis and treatment in rural areas, and refer severely ill patients to higher-level hospitals.

A December 29 document issued by the State Council's rural leading group provided more details on the rural virus control strategies. Agricultural measures focus on hitting targets for winter vegetable production, ensuring no interruption of feed and forage supplies for livestock, vigilance against animal disease, tending of over-wintering wheat and rapeseed crops, and ensuring supplies of fertilizer and pesticide. 

A collection of documents and stories about rural virus control strategies in various provinces is posted on the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs web site. 

Propaganda shows photos of medical teams standing around rural clinics for photo-ops and cartoons showing doctors rushing off to the countryside. It is unclear how this plan will be accomplished with urban hospitals already overwhelmed and pharmacy shelves picked clean of medications all over the country. 

Propaganda showing city medical staff rushing to help the countryside with COVID-19

Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian was apparently absent from the December 24 meeting on this "urgent" rural matter. The chairmanship of the meeting was entrusted to the director of the Central Revitalization Bureau on behalf of Minister Tang, according to the Ministry's news release. Minister Tang may have been preoccupied with preparations to chair a December 27 meeting to study Xi Jinping's important directives on agriculture and rural development.