China's Vanishing Soybean Self-Sufficiency Rhetoric

Chinese propagandists appear to have given up on soybean self-sufficiency now that China has gained the upper hand over the U.S. on the soybean trade war front. The barrage of Chinese articles about finding soymeal substitutes, low protein animal diets, corn-soy intercropping, etc. has quietly faded from Chinese media. China's plan to bolster soybean self-sufficiency actually failed, but Brazil's bottomless soybean supplies nevertheless enabled China to snub U.S. soybean producers during last year's trade war. Xi Jinping now is free to make offers of soybean purchases to President Trump in trade negotiations without appearing to do so from a weak position. Mission accomplished, but not in the way Chinese strategists planned.

Back in 2019--at the height of the first U.S.-China trade war--China's "Number 1 Document" announced a "soybean revitalization plan" to increase self-sufficiency in soybeans. Soybeans were pronounced to have strategic significance and were included in several important documents. Xi Jinping endorsed the plan. When the program was announced, China had just harvested 16 million metric tons of soybeans in the Fall of 2018 and imported 88 million metric tons of soybeans during calendar year 2018. Those numbers imply nearly 85% of China's soybean supply was imported and a self-sufficiency rate of 15.4%.

In 2025, China produced 20.9 million tons of soybeans, and China imported 108 million metric tons of soybeans. Thus, between 2018 and 2025 China increased its soybean output by 4.9 million metric tons, but its imports increased by 20 million tons. Those numbers imply 84% of China's soybean supply was imported in 2025, marginally less than the percentage in 2018. Quick calculations suggest there has been no secular increase in self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency peaked at 18% in 2022 and has fallen 2 percentage points since then. It seems unlikely that self-sufficiency will ever reach even 20%.

Chinese leaders are not too concerned about the increase in soybean imports, because the increase came from Brazil, not the United States. Brazil supplied China with 82 million tons of soybeans during 2025, enabling China to shut down imports of U.S. soybeans most of the year and create angst among U.S. farmers. 

The Chinese soybean revitalization plan's measures failed to reduce soybean consumption. In 2025 China imported and consumed a record volume of soybeans. The plan also failed to increase soybean production. China's soy output did increase during 2018-20, but that was mainly due to low corn prices during those years that incentivized a return to soy planting. Soy output plateaued at just above 20 million metric tons during 2022-25. Nor did China find substitute protein meals or new suppliers of soybean imports as envisioned in the 2019 plan. China simply increased its reliance on Brazilian soybeans. 

Chinese officials now seem less concerned with raising soybean self-sufficiency. At a January press conference celebrating last year's rural policy achievements, a vice minister of agriculture praised last Fall's 20.9-million-ton soybean harvest as the fourth year in a row with production exceeding 20 million metric tons. He celebrated this as success in "consolidating the increases in soybean and oilseed production," the objective included in the 2025 and 2026 "Number 1 Documents" on rural policy. The real objective of the soybean revitalization was to prevent Chinese soybean production from vanishing, not to actually become self-sufficient. They now implicitly acknowledge that striving for further increases in soybean self-sufficiency is unrealistic. 

This week, a Chinese academic told the Chinese public not to be concerned that China imports over 100 million metric tons of soybeans because the beans are needed to supply soybean meal for China's growing demand for animal feed. He went on to reveal that China's farmers can't even sell the 20-million-tons of domestic soybeans they produce. The Chinese scholar explained that China's soybeans are distinct from imported soybeans because they have a high protein content suitable for food products like tofu and soy milk. The Chinese academic explained that the market demand for food-grade soybeans in China has been steady at about 16 million metric tons, about 4 million metric tons less than the amount produced. 

(The government buys up the surplus Chinese soybeans to store in government reserves in order to prevent the price from falling. Keeping prices of domestic soybeans high, in turn, perpetuates the reliance on cheaper imported soybeans in the crushing sector.)

Chinese leaders have a long history of going back and forth between rhetoric about soybean import angst and acceptance of the economic reality of importing them. As this blog pointed out in 2019, Chinese officials have rolled out initiatives and plans to revive the soybean industry for decades, and now most have been memory-holed. Many of the plans targeted increases in high-oil content soybeans with breeding programs, demonstration farms, and targeted subsidies. During 2010-15, subsidies and plans couldn't stop the decline in soy production when Chinese farmers were planting their land in corn to take advantage of high prices. Recovery of soybean output from 2016-19 was due to a collapse in corn prices. Soy production dipped in 2021 following a new spike in corn prices.

Xi Jinping is probably happy at the moment that he can promise soybean purchases as a bargaining chip in negotiations with President Trump without appearing weak, but no one else is really happy in the soybean industry. 

Chinese officials are assuring their farmers they are doing all they can to ensure farmers get good prices, and they doled out direct payments to Chinese soy producers equivalent to about USD 300-to-400 per acre last year to keep soy production above 20 million tons. China spends about USD 3 billion annually on soybean subsidy payments, according to its submissions to the WTO.

There are traces of dissent in China's soybean processing industry. An article last week about financial losses incurred by a State-owned Beijing food company complained that the reliance on South American soybeans increased its cost of producing soybean oil and the quality of the soybeans was unsatisfactory. The article also blamed lengthy customs inspection times for rising costs. This blog previously reported on Chinese allegations of Brazilian price gouging on soybeans.

The U.S. Government is giving its farmers $12 billion in "Bridge Payments", promising to use more soybeans in biodiesel, and there is talk of a farm crisis. 

Meanwhile, there are grumblings from Brazil about soybean prices that don't cover production costs, and a report of growing financial pressure on Brazilian entities in the soybean sector.

Can't Stop, Won't Stop: Chinese Pork Giants Keep Expanding

Giant Chinese pork producers are expanding aggressively to achieve scale economies and exert control over every link in the supply chain. Wringing every penny (or fen) out of unit cost is viewed as the key in this winner-takes-all competition for a market that is not growing. Government authorities ordered companies to scale back capacity last year, but no one dares to let up on their expansion plans.

China's 39 largest hog enterprises (slaughtering 1 million or more hogs) produced 295 million hogs in 2025, accounting for 41% of the national total, according to data from a "high level hog farming forum" released by China Feed Information Net. All but 2 of the 39 largest hog producers increased their output during 2025, many of them by double-digit percentages. 

• The million-plus-head companies together increased their hog output by 51 million head (up 21%) in 2025,
• National hog slaughter reported by the National Bureau of Statistics increased by 17 million head (up 2.4%). 
• If these numbers are consistent, that means farms selling less than 1 million head reduced their production by 34 million head (down 7.4%).

An increase in the average weight of hogs magnified the increase in pork supply. Despite orders from officials to stop the practice of "second fattening" -- in which companies sell mature hogs to independent farmers who fatten them to even larger weights -- the average carcass weight calculated from official data increased from 81.2 kg to 82.5 kg between 2024 and 2025.

Prices have fallen because "consumer demand is weak and unable to support the current level of supply" according to an article by "Zebra Consumption". Food service businesses are seeing low customer traffic, revenue is sluggish, and the food service sales index was at its lowest level in 16 months during November. The article said pork consumption is undermined by ample supplies of competing proteins such as poultry, beef, and lamb.

National Bureau of Statistics data show that the hog price fell after peaking in August 2024, stabilized during the first half of 2025. The price fell again during September 2025--normally a peak consumption period with reopening of schools and the October 1 National Day holiday. The average hog price at the end of December was down 25% from a year earlier. Prices rebounded slightly in January 2026--leading up to the Lunar New Year holiday--but prices are still lower than during the last 2 years.

National Bureau of Statistics raw material prices paid by enterprises.

The index for hog prices received by Chinese farmers in Q4 2025 was down 23.7% from a year earlier, the largest decline of any farm product category. China's December 2025 CPI report showed that consumer pork prices were down 14.6% from a year earlier, the largest decline of any category.

Three companies competing to be the top producers accounted for the lion's share of China's hog production expansion: Muyuan Foodstuff, Wens Food stuff, and Twins Group. Muyuan is the clear leader, producing 78 million hogs in 2025, up 6.4 million from the previous year. Wens is number-2, producing 40 million head, but it expanded output by 10.3 million in 2025. Twins produced 26.4 million head and increased output by 8.7 million head in 2025. Twins is merging with Zhengbang Technology, another top hog producer that is emerging from bankruptcy.  

Many large pig companies had announced plans to curb production capacity as far back as October 2024. Government officials held several rounds of meetings with hog companies in 2025, urging them to cut back on capacity, canceling subsidies, and issuing maximum sow quotas. The number of sows did fall moderately in Q4 2025 and year-end inventory was down 2.9% from a year earlier, but China is still glutted with pork. 

Many companies saw flat or declining revenue from hog sales during 2025 due to plunging prices offsetting expanded volume of hog output. Muyuan, for example, reported an 8.9% increase in volume of hogs sold, a 17.3% decrease in average sale price, and a 2.5% decrease in sales revenue year-over-year. Wens had stronger growth in slaughter volume, but its sales revenue was flat. Muyuan and Wens both reported declines in profit during 2025. 

A December analysis by Boyar examines the jockeying among top Chinese hog producers by highlighting the strategic maneuvers of Twins Group to challenge the top producers while accelerating the consolidation of China's hog and feed industries.

Central to Twins Group's strategy is its agreement to take over the assets of Zhengbang, a high-flying hog producer that went bankrupt after taking on debt to finance a breakneck expansion that unraveled when hog prices plummeted. After integrating Zhengbang's assets and taking the company public by 2027, Boyar expects Twins to surpass Wens as the number-2 hog producer and possibly challenge number-1 producer Muyuan. 

Boyar points to Twins' strategy of low margins and high volume setting off a scramble among companies to gain cost advantages by making investments in raw material procurement and logistics. Boyar notes that Twins has established trading companies and procurement teams and is expected to acquire more assets in grain storage, procurement, trucking, and shipping by utilizing funds from an anticipated IPO. The quest for cost savings motivates companies to expand operations so they can spread fixed costs over ever-larger volumes of raw materials and output, thus keeping unit costs low. 

Most of the hog-farming behemoths are feed manufacturers. Muyuan, Wens, Twins, New Hope, Haid, Zhengda (a subsidiary of Thailand's Chia Tai) and Liyuan were all in the top 10 of a ranking of global feed manufacturers. Boyar anticipates that this will also shake up the feed industry as Twins-Zhengbang consolidates control over feed sources and moves to the top of the feed industry rankings.

While New Hope and Haid (海大) are larger feed companies, they are deeply involved in poultry and aquaculture, respectively. Twins is focused on pigs and is the world's largest pig feed producer. Boyar speculates that competitors like Haid will be under pressure to make capital investments in supply chain to match Twins' cost advantage. A focus on pigs is a gamble, though, since consumption of poultry, fish and shellfish is growing much faster than pork.

Boyar sees more consolidation in the livestock industry as Twins leverages capital to pull more small and medium-sized feed mills and hog producers into its orbit through acquisitions, mergers, and collaborative relationships. Mid-size companies like Aonong Biological, the 9th-ranked hog producer in 2023, have been falling behind in part because they can't match the low unit costs of their huge competitors. New Hope has been falling behind in pig production and Boyar thinks they will also lose swine feed customers if Twins is able to use its cost control to cut prices. 

Twins' ability to wring cost savings out of its raw material procurement can help it challenge Muyuan's hog production cost advantage -- often attributed to Muyuan's integrated breeding-farrow-to-finish production model and its scale economies. Its digital production techniques, biosecurity system and "company + farmer" model will be promoted nationwide. Farms and feed mills that don't conform will be forced out of the market, Boyar predicts.

Boyar thinks Twins can expand rapidly to challenge Muyuan by using its "company + farmer" model to recruit farmers to fatten pigs. Twins' feed cost reductions can challenge Wens as the "company + farmer" leader and make inroads on Wens' home turf in southern China that has large numbers of independent hog producers.

A December 2025 "White Paper on the High-Quality Development of China's Pig Industry" made a similar point by citing eagerness of companies to achieve scale economies to explain the industry's overcapacity problem. While Boyar expects small and medium-size companies to be forced out, few seem to ever fail. Feed industry reports have complained since the 1990s about the vast number of small companies that won't go away as big companies expand, and chronic excess capacity is the result. The one big casualty of overexpansion -- Zhengbang -- never went away and is now a key player as part of Twins Group.

The amount of investment capital continually poured into this hamster wheel of an industry is surprising. It reflects the large amount of money sloshing around due to capital controls, financial repression in the State-dominated banking sector, and the collapse of the property sector that used to be the main destination for capital investment. 

The ability to absorb losses is also surprising. While the "Zebra Consumption" article remarked that "...the traditional hog cycle has been completely disrupted," the long-established pattern in China's hog industry of making lots of money on hogs in 1 year and losing money for 3 years has not really changed yet. This keeps companies in the game waiting for the next big payoff.

China Acknowledges Tomato Price Spike to Head Off Dissatisfaction

Dozens of Chinese news reports have called attention to high tomato prices over the past month. The large number of similar reports coming out at the same time is an effort to shape public opinion about the Government's control of prices, heading off any discontent that could lead to social instability during a sensitive time. 

Chinese news media are not free to report on any trend or events they deem to be important. This blog has previously discussed how China's State-controlled media is expected to shape public opinion. The large number of articles appearing at the same time, using the same language indicates that articles on tomato prices represent a coordinated effort by propaganda authorities to address this issue. 

The tomato price reports seem to have begun in mid-December with an article in Southern Daily noting vigorous discussion over whether vegetables have become unaffordable. Since then, dozens of articles have appeared in news outlets all over the country citing high prices collected from e-commerce sites or from visits to local markets and stores, noting that tomato prices are 80% to 100% higher than a year ago and acknowledging citizens' consternation over tomatoes being more expensive than eggs or pork.

On January 9, 2026, the Consumer Price Index report for December 2025 showed that vegetable prices were the fastest growing CPI component -- up 18.5% from a year-earlier. It also showed that egg prices were down 12.7%.

Several days later around January 14-16, the number of articles on tomato prices ballooned. Articles continued to come out this week from all over the country, including western regions Xinjiang, Kunming, Chengdu, and Chongqing. This week authoritative articles appeared in Farmers Daily -- the national mouthpiece for agricultural propaganda -- as well as Shanghai's The Paper and Beijing's Xinjing Bao--outlets with a national audience. 

Beginning with the Southern Daily article, nearly every article has featured the same phrase “鸡蛋配不上西红柿” complaining that eggs can no longer be paired with tomatoes in a popular dish combining scrambled eggs and tomatoes (西红柿炒鸡蛋) because tomatoes are now more expensive than eggs. (Is it a coincidence that vegetables and eggs had the largest price changes in the CPI report?) The use of the same phrase in every article suggests it was dictated by propaganda authorities. Xinjing Bao added another sardonic aphorism supposedly being repeated by common people: "I'm too poor to eat vegetables."

Data compiled from Beijing's Xinfadi wholesale market confirms that tomato prices have increased from RMB2-per-500g in June-July to a December peak of RMB5.25-per-500g (RMB 10.5 per kg). Most of the increase occurred after Sept-Oct heavy rains and the early onset of low temperatures in northern China that are cited by many of the articles. However, the Xinfadi data also show that prices also spiked to a similar level in October 2024--an event that failed to generate attention. The spike could have been the result of a second factor cited by many of the articles: farmers abandoned production during a period of extremely low prices earlier in the year. 

Price of tomatoes in Styrofoam boxes compiled from xinfadi.com.cn

A longer history of national tomato prices shows that prices fluctuate wildly every year, and price spikes are not uncommon. Big spikes also occurred in January 2022 and in February 2020 -- both months that correspond to the beginning of zero-covid lockdowns -- that also were ignored by news media. So why all the attention on this tomato price spike?

Monthly rural market prices compiled from China National Bureau of Statistics.

Chinese authorities are concerned about food price stability because it could lead to social unrest, threatening their rule. They undoubtedly recall that spikes in food prices were a core part of the "Arab Spring" uprisings in North Africa. Several of China's friends have been deposed recently in countries like Syria and Nepal, and Chinese leaders have surely been watching protests explode in Iran over the past month. China itself is vulnerable with millions of families underwater on real estate investments, unemployment, unpaid wage issues and an embarrassing decline in the birth rate.

Nearly all of the Chinese articles on tomato prices subtly shift blame away from the government to uncontrollable weather (Xinjing Bao cited an La Niña phenomenon) and irrational farmers who overproduce and exit production when prices fell. Farmers Daily explained that "...extreme weather is posing increasingly severe challenges to agricultural production..." 

Chinese news media never mention a problem unless they can assure readers that the government has the problem under control. True to form, all the tomato price articles predict a decline in prices in the Spring, and they cite Chinese Government actions to ensure vegetable supplies. Southern Daily, for example, claimed that prices are overall stable due to the "vegetable basket" system that arranges production areas across the country to ensure year-round supplies. Farmers Daily cited the "vegetable basket" program and claimed that the agriculture ministry sends technicians to advise farmers on disaster-resistant varieties, inspects greenhouses, and advises farmers on emergency heating measures, and coordinates post-production sales of vegetables. Southern Daily claimed that the predominance of large-scale farms in egg production had stabilized their prices (the chart above shows that egg prices are not so stable). Farmers Daily reminds readers vegetable supplies are much improved from the old days when families in Beijing queued up to buy cabbage and leeks as the only vegetables available during winter months.

The weather problems cited for high tomato prices are real. Spikes in tomato prices can't be hidden from the public. However, there have been no reports on how the September-October rains are impacting supplies of corn, food grade soybeans and late planting of winter wheat -- except for very brief mentions in obscure reports on market conditions that are safely out of the public's eye. 

China Meets Soybean Purchase Commitment; Keeps it Hidden

China has met its 12-million-ton U.S. soybean purchase commitment, according to reports by Reuters and other Western news media--based mostly on USDA reports of sales to China since the October 30 Trump-Xi meeting. U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent declared in Davos, Switzerland that he was assured by Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng that China had met the commitment. 

The commitment has been met largely (perhaps entirely) by State-owned Chinese companies buying beans at inflated prices to stock Government reserves, an indication that the Chinese Government is making an effort to please the Americans. However, the Chinese Government has never acknowledged the commitment. Back in November 2025 China's Ministry of Commerce refused to acknowledge that the soybean purchase commitments had been made.

So far this week, the news of about fulfillment of the purchase commitment is mostly absent from Chinese news sites reporting on soybeans. Reports could come out later this week after propagandists have finished debating how to spin the story and massage the news. 

One article on a Chinese edible oils market news site did report that the purchase commitment had been fulfilled, citing Secretary Bessent and "trade sources," with shipments taking place between December and May. "Uncle Biao," who blogs about international affairs, trumpeted Bessent's declaration and boasted that soybeans are now a bargaining chip, asserting that financial pressure on Midwestern farmers who had mostly voted for Trump will put pressure on the U.S. administration to make a trade deal. 

Facts in the Chinese articles so far are regurgitated from foreign news reports. Neither the edible oils news article nor "Uncle Biao" cited any Chinese sources, nor did they mention the Chinese Vice Premier. "Uncle Biao" cited the White House as the source of China's commitment to continue buying 25 million tons annually for the next 3 years. 

"Uncle Biao" said the commitment had been fulfilled "on time," but the original announcement from the White House said the purchases would be made by the end of 2025 (3 weeks ago).

Both of the Chinese articles emphasized that purchases by China's State-owned companies COFCO and Sinograin had fulfilled the commitment and that most of the U.S. soybeans will go into national reserves, and that private Chinese companies continue to buy cheaper South American soybeans. Uncle Biao mentioned that 4 auctions since December have sold soybeans from reserves to make way for the American beans. (These auctions sold a cumulative 2 million metric tons.) He boasted that the purchases are a masterstroke of import diversification while simultaneously bolstering reserves to maintain national food security.

The Chinese Government's actions in orchestrating the purchases indicate that China's leadership really wants a trade deal with the U.S. But they do not want to acknowledge that they made the purchase commitment since they want to present themselves as having the upper hand in negotiations.

China: Record Meat & Grain Output in 2025; Declining Farm Prices and Imports

China's 2025 agricultural production data shows meat output grew 4.2%, exceeding 100 million metric tons for the first time, while grain output grew 1.2% to 714.88 mmt. Soybeans stood out with growing imports during 2025, but most of China's other agricultural imports went down. Most agricultural prices also went down, reflecting an economy that appears weaker than the 5% GDP growth reported for 2025.

Meat output growth featured 4.1% growth in pork output, 6.7% growth in poultry, and 2.8% growth in beef, according to the China National Bureau of Statistics preliminary data release for 2025. Milk production grew marginally, and production of eggs and mutton fell. This blog previously reported the Bureau's report of a record grain harvest and 7.7-percent increase in cotton output.

Trade data released by the customs administration show imports of wheat, corn and cotton plummeted during calendar year 2025. Imported soybeans rose 6.5 percent last year to 111.83 mmt, comprising 84% of China's soybean supply. Meat imports declined by 8.7% last year. Imports comprised 5.7% of China's meat supplies, including a 26% share of beef supplies which likely explains why China implemented beef safeguard tariffs last month. Imports comprise 13.9% of cotton supplies. Exports of apparel were down 5% in 2025. China's overall agricultural imports were down 3.6% to $207 billion, while its agricultural exports were up 1.2% to $104 billion.

China did not escape its pork glut despite Chinese authorities browbeating hog companies to cut back on capacity for half the year. In 2025, the number of slaughtered hogs hit a record 719.73 million (up 2.4% year over year), and pork output rose to a record 59.38 million metric tons (up 4.1% as "second fattening" boosted slaughter weights). The end-of-year inventory of swine was up 0.5% from a year ago. The swine inventory ended 2024 at 427.43 million, rose to a peak of 437 million in Q3 2025, and fell to 429.67 million at the end of 2025.

Most farm prices went down during 2025 since China's market did not grow enough to absorb the extra farm output. Hog prices fell 11.2% for the year, and Q4 2025 prices were down 23.7% year-over-year. Egg prices crashed 12%. The 1.2-percent increase in grain output was more than offset by a 2.6-percent decrease in grain prices. On the other hand, cattle prices were up 2.8% in 2025 and 14.7% year-on-year for Q4. Vegetable prices were up 5.6% in Q4 after heavy rains during the fall crimped production, causing prices of tomatoes and some other vegetables to double year-over-year in December.

The CPI was unchanged from 2024, but that hides year-over-year declines in CPI during February-September, with a slight recovery in prices at year-end. The December CPI was up 0.8% year-over-year. The food, alcohol and tobacco component of the CPI was down -0.7% for the year, but it was up 0.8% in December. The December CPI showed vegetable prices were up 18.2% year-over-year, fruit prices were up 4.4%, egg prices were down 12.7%, and pork prices were down 14.6%.

The Bureau of Statistics reported that GDP grew 5% in 2025, which turns out to be exactly the target Xi Jinping had previously set (wow, it must be amazing to have a national leader who can predict economic growth with such precision!). The "primary sector," which includes mainly agriculture, grew 3.9%, and its share of GDP fell to 6.7%. Fixed asset investment in agriculture grew only 2.3%, but real estate investment dropped 17.2%. 

Per capita disposable income also grew exactly 5% to RMB 43,377, but retail sales grew only 3.7%. The unemployment rate was reported to be 5.1%. Per-capita consumer expenditure grew 3.7% for urban residents and 5.3% for rural residents

The population decreased 3.39 million, with 11.31 million deaths and 7.92 million births reported. The population of rural residents declined 13.69 million and the urban population increased by 10.2 million. The population is 67.89% urban.

The number of rural people with nonfarm employment rose 0.5% to 301.15 million, of which 180 million were migrants working away from home in 2025. Their average monthly earnings were RMB 5,075 (about $725), an increase of just 2.5%.

China's Soybean Imports Hit 111.83 MMT Record in CY2025

China imported 111.8 million metric tons (mmt) of soybeans in calendar year 2025, a record high. Imports were up 6.78 mmt from 105 mmt in CY2024. China's 2025 soybean imports were valued at $50.35 billion. Imports for December 2025 were 8.04 mmt, down just 70,000 metric tons from the previous month and about the same as a year earlier.

Compiled from China customs data.

The unit value of December imports was $482 per metric ton, the highest monthly value of the year. The unit value has increased 11% since June's $434 per metric ton (the year's lowest value).

Imports have declined each month since September, reflecting shrinking supplies of Brazilian soybeans. Monthly imports will likely shrink again in January-February. However, China's monthly soybean imports equaled or exceeded year-earlier same-month imports in each month from May to December of 2025. 

Compiled from China customs data.

Chinese customs has not yet released detailed data for December 2025 showing sources of soybean imports, but that data will likely show that imports were mostly from Brazil and none came from the United States. USDA export inspections show 1.2 mmt of soybeans were exported to China in December and 900,000 mt in the first week of January, but these will not clear customs in China until February or later. It is rumored that Chinese customs will also increase the time needed to complete inspections to 25 days. The uptick in Chinese purchases from the U.S. during December-January will probably not clear customs in China until March-May when imports from Brazil will also begin their seasonal spike.  

Beef Safeguards: Blaming Imports for China's Own Destabilizing Events

China's commerce officials blamed surging imports for a decline in beef prices to justify "safeguard" tariffs on imported beef announced last week. In fact, gyrations in Chinese beef prices were due to destabilizing events in China's own market. 

Chinese officials suggested that a rising trend in beef imports drove down beef prices during 2019-2024. In fact, 2019-24 was a 6-year-long beef bubble that inflated and then popped. The phony "analysis" by China's Commerce Ministry ignored the inverted-U-shaped pattern of prices: the average price of beef reported by China's Ag Ministry rose 20% from RMB 73.20 per KG in 2024 to a peak of RMB 87.59 in 2022. Then the price fell 18% to RMB 71.89 in 2024. During 2019-2022 China's beef imports AND its domestic prices both increased, undermining the claim that rising imports caused prices to fall. Beef imports then stabilized between 2022 and 2024. Prices declined sharply in 2024, but the increase in imports that year was much more moderate than in earlier years. 

Average annual wholesale prices from China Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.
Import data from China Customs Administration.

The rise in beef imports during 2019-21 helped fill a meat shortage in China that turned into a glut. Monthly price data from China's Ag Ministry show that the increase in beef prices occurred during a concentrated period of 2019-20. This was exactly the time that China had a severe pork shortage due to an African swine fever epidemic. The boom in beef prices exactly corresponds to the much larger spike in pork prices during that time. The shortage of pork spurred an increase in demand for beef that drove up prices. Most of the increase in China's beef imports occurred during 2020.

The peak in beef prices during 2021-22 corresponds to the recovery of the pork industry which drove down pork prices, reducing the incentive to substitute beef for pork. Beef imports continued growing at a more moderate pace. 2022-23 was a time of high commodity prices across the board.

Data from China's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

In early 2023 China's demand for beef and many other commodities crashed. After China ended its zero-covid lockdowns in late 2022 the economy began to tank in early 2023. Beef demand peaked and beef prices began a severe decline. Pork was in excess supply as a handful of huge pork companies raced to open industrial-scale farms and capture market share. The dairy industry also encountered a glut, and a massive cull of dairy cows added to the beef supply in 2023. 

Last year this blog discussed the recent fluctuation in China's beef and dairy industry and the announcement of emergency measures to bail out beef and dairy farms in September 2024. The safeguard tariff investigation began about 3 months later; bailouts for beef and dairy were also ordered in the 2025 "Document No. 1" on rural policy. 

Converting China's domestic prices to U.S. dollars and comparing them with export prices reported in FAO's GIEWS database shows that China's price rose much faster than U.S. or Brazilian prices during 2019-20, creating a huge spread between Chinese beef prices and imported beef prices. Brazil is the predominant supplier of China's imports. Brazil's price is still about half of China's internal price after the drop in Chinese prices. U.S. beef prices have risen to parity with Chinese prices. 

China's Ministry of Ag price converted to USD.
U.S. and Brazil export prices from UN FAO GIEWS database.

China is blaming its trading partners for gyrations in its beef industry that actually were created by destabilizing events within China and by subsidized overexpansion of its beef and pork production capacity. The surge of beef imports filled a vacuum in meat supply during 2019-20. When China's domestic pork and beef producers overexpanded and drove down prices, officials spuriously interpreted correlation as "causation" and falsely blamed the industry's troubles on imports. 

Brazilian industry groups quoted by Reuters raised concerns about the Chinese tariffs. An Australian official suggested that the Chinese safeguards are an example of departure from the rules-based trading order and inconsistent application of rules. A kowtowing Uruguayan meat industry official praised China's transparency and its adherence to WTO law in imposing the safeguard measures. 

Fortunately, the safeguards will not have a major impact on exporters because global beef supplies are tight and prices are high. The safeguard tariffs don't kick in until trading partners' exports exceed an annual quota based on recent export volumes. Brazilian and Australian officials were confident they could find other markets for their beef if sales to China are curtailed. China's beef imports for the first 11 months of 2025 were about the same as the previous year. Beef prices in China are up nearly 8% year-over-year in December 2025--one of the few agricultural commodities with rising prices this year. 

China Expands Farming on Deserts, Mountains and Oceans

China is gearing up to grow food in its deserts, on its mountains and in the ocean. Propagandists show beautiful pictures and recite fake statistics, but no outsiders will be allowed to monitor these ecologically risky ventures. The plan envisions chains of mechanized farms and fisheries feeding warehouses, processing plants, and retailers controlled by industrial conglomerates to replace chaotic hordes of impoverished aging peasants, nomads, fishing boats and mountain dwellers collecting wild plants. 

The 2025 communist party "Document No. 1" on rural policy priorities called for building "a diversified food supply system" by building deep-sea "marine ranches", creating "forest granaries" in mountainous areas, improve the edible fungus industry, and promote the cultivation of algae as part of China's "big food concept" and "big agriculture concept." These will likely be included in new 5-year plans to be issued in 2026.

The initiative to ramp up grain output in Xinjiang is a headline project. Last year this blog reported on China's celebration of Xinjiang for exceeding its targeted grain output of 22 million metric tons in 2024 a year after it was designated as a "national reserve granary", a status that comes with numerous subsidies and political status. Last month the Food and Commodity Reserves Administration held a video conference promising to invest in infrastructure for procuring, storing, processing and distributing grain in Xinjiang with the goal of building up the region as a major national supply base for agricultural and livestock products. The project will utilize the "aid to Xinjiang" platform (援疆平台) that matches up companies, bureaucratic entities and universities in rich eastern provinces with counterparts in Xinjiang to establish processing and sales networks there, invest in Xinjiang's grain storage and logistics facilities, provide training and R&D, and create Xinjiang food brands. Entities involved include COFCO, Food and Commodity Reserve Bureaus in Sichuan and Henan Provinces, a food company in Shandong, and a technical university in Henan. Others attending the video conference included Sinograin, ChemChina, Beidahuang Nongken Group, China Rongtong Asset Management Group, CITIC Construction, and JD.com.

This year's Xinjiang grain output was not as stellar as last year's, but it was one of only 3 regions that increased its grain output by more than 100,000 metric tons (others were Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia, also on China's periphery). Xinjiang had the highest grain yield per hectare of any region.

In March 2025 a proposal to build "grain production bases" in arid regions of the Loess Plateau was made to the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference by a professor at Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University. This region of North Central China at the western end of the Great Wall is known for brown sandy soil prone to erosion and crushing poverty. The proposed project would harvest rainwater, use irrigation techniques, cover fields with plastic to prevent evaporation, fully mechanize farming, apply Beidou (China's GPS) to control farming equipment and application of water and fertilizer, and integrate crop and livestock farming. The professor called for including the project in the 15th 5-year plan to cover 2.67 million hectares with a goal of raising grain output by 4 million metric tons. 

In August, China's agriculture ministry responded to the proposal by explaining that the ministry has been conducting similar work in the Loess region and will include elements of the proposal in the new 5-year plan. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs plans to promote water-saving agriculture in the Loess region, build "high-standard farmland", resolve drought-induced water shortages, share information between meteorological, water conservancy, and emergency management departments, and scale up farms by nurturing "family farms" and cooperatives, and create industrial chains led by big companies. Shaanxi Province's water management department described its plans to upgrade irrigation to create a "second granary" in the province. Last winter and spring the Loess region experienced a serious drought that impacted wheat production, but authorities insisted they had averted declines in output by crash irrigation programs. Data released this month show Shaanxi and neighboring Ningxia were the only two provinces that had a decline in grain output in 2025.  

Another initiative to create a "plateau granary" on the Tibetan Plateau of western Sichuan and Tibet has been underway for several years. The Tibetan climate is not suited to rice, wheat or corn, so authorities upgraded highland barley and potatoes--common crops in Tibetan regions--to be included in the official definition of "grain" crops for food security evaluations. Last year the academies of agricultural science in Chongqing and Sichuan Province agreed to supply seeds to grow a variety of broad beans in a Tibetan area of Sichuan. In Tibet, highland barley production was revived by planting improved seed and using "earthworm compost" to treat salinized soil. Mechanized planters were used to expand rapeseed production in an area of Tibet. Tibet and neighboring Qinghai have the smallest grain output of all Province-level regions (excluding the Beijing and Shanghai municipalities) and their grain production increased only marginally in 2025.

China's industrialized food production is also moving offshore. Buoys and nets stretching to the horizon and big fishing boats are features of a "blue granary" of marine farming off the coast of Shandong Province, one of 169 national-level "marine ranches." The "Changdao Marine Ecological Civilization Comprehensive Experimental Zone" raises oysters in cages over a 467-hectare patch of ocean off the coast of Rongcheng City in Shandong Province. A manager emphasizes the stable profits of factory-style cage-farming and low labor requirements of 4 workers to produce 1 million fish. The project is run by a subsidiary of CIMC, a state-owned shipping container conglomerate that also builds boats and makes IT equipment for high-tech monitoring and mapping. Securities Times' description of other cage-farming and kelp-breeding ventures also highlighted a specially built vessel to harvest krill in the Arctic.

These initiatives are part of Xi Jinping's vision for national food security. He views himself as a new (and perhaps better) incarnation of Mao Zedong who was also obsessed with the possibility of war over Taiwan (and with the Soviets) and consolidating control over Tibetan, Uighur, Manchurian and Mongolian regions the communists had conquered. Mao was obsessed with "modernization", put excessive trust in "science" that he didn't understand, and his paranoia drove him to build underground tunnels and to move industry to the hinterland. 

China's 1950s-era "Great Leap Forward" claimed to have made scientific breakthroughs that eliminated scarcity and created huge improvements in grain output. Xi Jinping's plan to produce crops in deserts, mountains and oceans also relies on purported scientific breakthroughs in seeds, "smart" farming, and machinery. Xinjiang's military-run Production Corps claims they have raised production by intercropping corn and wheat and by increasing planting density of winter wheat. "Smart" farming will monitor everything and automatically turn irrigation pipes, sprinklers, sprayers and heaters on and off. Irrigation experts have supposedly figured out how to bring irrigation water to places where crops have never been viable before. 

China's1950s Great Leap Forward put excessive faith in science, comparing high-tech farming to the Soviet Sputnik satellites

China's farming now relies on the currently fashionable "smart" technology, promising to achieve great productivity gains by using mostly unproven technology made by Chinese companies.

The Communist Party's obsession with secrecy is the most dangerous feature. No one knows anything about actual production except what is shown in staged propaganda photos. Visitors are only allowed to see model farms on tours guided by foreign affairs officials. During the Great Leap Forward city people and most officials in Beijing did not know people in the countryside were actually starving. Statistics reported fantastic increases in grain output, so officials were ordered to procure more grain and export it to Eastern Europe to buy industrial and military gear. 

Because of the obsession with secrecy, no one can verify that technologies are working. No one can verify that statistics provide an accurate portrayal of production and use of land, water, and soil quality.

Secrecy security meeting held for agricultural technicians in Chongqing during 2024.
The agricultural extension network will be used to disseminate secret information.

Moreover, the Chinese system has built-in incentives to embellish progress. Agricultural projects are funded by government subsidies and loans to Chinese companies that build and run the projects and sell the IT equipment, tractors, drones, fishing vessels, and infrastructure. Local governments and companies, therefore, have incentive to report great progress to keep the money flowing. 

An example of the tendency toward hidden corruption and shoddy implementation is a directive to improve the quality "high standard field" projects--probably China's biggest agricultural program--issued this month. The directive promised to conduct surprise inspections, tests and evaluations to rectify shoddy, substandard projects that have been "causing public dissatisfaction." It took 5+ years and billions of dollars spent on 50,000 projects for Chinese authorities to admit there was a problem. You can bet that projects hidden away in China's mountains, deserts and grassland have an even higher degree of corruption, waste, and fakery.

China's past devastation of its farming areas going back decades is tacitly acknowledged in the 2025 Document No.1 which called for measures to address problems of gully erosion of the country's rich "black soil" region in the Northeast, acidified land in the South, schemes to farm salinized land, and a series of orders to crack down on encroachments on farmland by construction of houses, digging scenic lakes, and planting non-grain crops. The document called for tracing and controlling heavy metal contamination of farmland and pledged to clean up black and odiferous bodies of water in rural areas. Years ago, China retired wheat fields in part of Hebei Province due to serious depletion of underground aquifers used for irrigation, idled rice fields in Hunan due to cadmium poisoning of soil, banned farming in arsenic-laced land in mining areas, and curtailed subsidies for rice irrigated from shrinking aquifers in Heilongjiang Province. A 10-year ban on fishing in the Yangtze River is in effect because it had been severely over-fished. An agriculture ministry discussion of the fishing ban this month emphasized policing activity, a demonstration of the lack of actual control authorities have on the ground.

Chinese authorities think they can address the ecological devastation by putting secretive, subsidized state-run companies in charge of farming, but there are still few deterrents to ecological destruction and strong incentives to hide problems.

China Cotton Production Up in 2025; Imports Plummet

Subsidies prompted record-high cotton planting in China's Xinjiang region this year despite declining farm prices. Imports of cotton from Brazil fell dramatically. Imports from China's new friends in Africa and Central Asia also plummeted. U.S. cotton has been mostly frozen out of China's market since the trade war began.

China's 2025 cotton output reached 6.641 million metric tons, up 477,000 metric tons from the previous year, a 7.7% increase. The increase in output reflected a 5% increase in area planted (up 140,900 hectares) and a 2.6% increase in yield (up 57.4 kg/ha). Data were released by China's National Bureau of Statistics in the 2025 cotton production communique. 

This year was China's second successive annual increase in cotton production and the highest value since output dropped below 7 mmt in 2009. China's record cotton production was 7.6 mmt in 2007.

Xinjiang Autonomous Region accounted for all of the boost in China's cotton output. Xinjiang produced 6.165 mmt, up 479,000 metric tons from last year. Xinjiang accounted for 93% of China's cotton output and 87% of area planted in cotton in 2025. The second-leading provinces were Shandong (output 128,000 metric tons), Hubei (9,200 mt), and Hunan (8,500 mt). 

Compiled from China National Bureau of Statistics.

China's cotton planting has collapsed in regions outside of Xinjiang since the 2007 peak. In contrast, area planted rose gradually in Xinjiang during 2009-18 and then stabilized at roughly 2.5 million hectares. After 2 years of expansion, the 2.59 million hectares planted in 2025 is a record for Xinjiang.

Compiled from China National Bureau of Statistics.

A Statistician from China's Statistics Bureau explained that Xinjiang is amenable to large-scale farms, is highly mechanized, and the "target price" in Xinjiang was relatively high this year, incentivizing production and prompting 2 years of expansion in area planted. (A subsidy proportional to the difference between the market price and a target of RMB 18,600 is given to Xinjiang farmers.) The statistician explained that relative returns to cotton are low in other regions of China, causing cotton area to shrink outside of Xinjiang. The statistician cited favorable weather, good field management and improved varieties for high yields in Xinjiang. 

China's cotton imports during the first 11 months of 2025 totaled 887,718 metric tons, down dramatically from 2.473 million metric tons during the same period in 2024. Imports from both of the top suppliers crashed. The 11-month total of China's cotton imports from Brazil plummeted from over 1 mmt during 2024 to just 358,000 metric tons in 2025. Imports from the United States fell from 865,000 metric tons during Jan-Nov 2024 to 106,000 metric tons in Jan-Nov 2025. Imports from Australia and Turkiye were steady but imports from most other countries declined. 

China's imports of cotton from 18 African countries shrank from over 60,000 metric tons in Jan-Nov 2024 to 25,000 metric tons this year. Imports from 4 Central Asian neighbors fell from 44,000 metric tons to 20,000 metric tons.

Compiled from China customs administration data.

Brazil was the top supplier of imported cotton during January-March this year. Australia was the main supplier during July-October. Brazil resumed its position as top supplier in November as imports from Brazil rebounded. Imports from the U.S. mostly stopped after the trade war heated up in March-April. 

Compiled from China customs administration data.

The expansion of cotton production in Xinjiang during the 2024 and 2025 harvest seasons (August-September) was accompanied by declines in Chinese cotton prices. These declines followed a surge in farm prices at harvest in 2023 and a bump in prices paid by companies that year--indicating a relatively tight cotton supply.  The modest rebound in imports during August-November 2025 comes despite the increase in output this year and another drop in domestic prices. 

Compiled from China National Bureau of Statistics and customs data.

Note that the "target price" of RMB 18,600 per ton (constant during 2023-25) exceeds the unit value of imported cotton by more than RMB 4300. Subsidies incentivize production in Xinjiang even when the price of imported cotton is falling. Moreover, declining cotton prices are not necessarily a big deterrent to production in Xinjiang if farmers are assured of a higher subsidy. (Note the farm price is a seed cotton price which is lower than the price of lint cotton. The seed cotton price is converted to a lint-equivalent price to calculate the subsidy based on its spread versus the target price which is also for lint cotton). The target price subsidy does not operate outside Xinjiang.

Soy Imports from Brazil in Seasonal Lull; Slide in Market Prices Suggests Spring Rebound

China's soybean imports dipped to 8.1 million metric tons in November 2025, and the calendar year total for January-November hit 103.79 mmt. November 2025 imports were up from 7.15 mmt from a year ago, and January-November 2025 imports are up from last year's pace of 97.1 mmt during the same period.

November's import volume was the second monthly decline in a row, reflecting seasonal decline in shipments from Brazil. In November China imported 5.85 mmt from Brazil, down from nearly 11 mmt in September 2025. Brazil supplied 72% of China's November soybean imports. Imports from Argentina increased marginally to 1.78 mmt in November, while imports from Canada increased slightly to 16,630 metric tons. Imports from Uruguay, Russia and Ukraine dropped in November. China had no imports of U.S. soybeans during November. The first shipments of U.S. beans since the resumption of purchases last month likely will show up in Chinese customs data in January. 

Compiled from China Customs data.

Compiled from China Customs data.

Soybean imports from Brazil have been rising in price as its shipping season winds down. The average value per ton of Brazilian soybeans arriving in China bottomed out at $431 per ton in June and has since risen to $474 per ton in November, a cumulative increase of 9.8%. This is consistent with Brazilian customs data which shows a rise from $384 per ton shipped to China in April to $436 per ton shipped in November, a cumulative increase of 13.6%. (There is a 2-month lag between Brazilian shipments and arrivals in China, so the increases in Brazilian beans during October-November will be reflected in China's December-January import data.)

Compiled from China and Brazil customs data.

During December Brazilian prices have been declining again as prospects of another record soybean crop in Brazil solidify. Brazil's Paranaguá FOB quote peaked at about $12.40 per bushel at the end of November, a slight premium over the U.S. Gulf price. Since then, the Paranaguá quote has fallen below $10.50 per bu. CBOT and U.S. Gulf FOB quotes fell in parallel as euphoria over underwhelming Chinese purchases deflated and prospects for the upcoming Brazilian were strengthened by weather and planting progress. Paranaguá FOB fell marginally below U.S. Gulf quotes last week. Chinese estimates of CNF costs followed a similar pattern.  

Compiled from International Grains Council web site.

Beans from the upcoming Brazil harvest will likely begin pouring into China and appear in April-May Chinese customs data in a big way. As this blog previously reported, China is dumping some reserves into the domestic market to make way for imported U.S. beans (buyers are to take delivery by March-April). Chinese ports and crushers have some inventories and soy meal inventories are also high. China's markets for meal and oil are already glutted, but final demand will soften after the mid-February Chinese New Year holiday. That could shape up for another steep drop in prices next Spring.

2nd Auction Sells 323,000 tons of Imported Soybeans to Make Room for U.S. Purchases

Sinograin's second auction of imported soybeans on December 16 received a less enthusiastic response than the December 11 auction. The percentage of beans sold declined to 62% and the average price declined to RMB 3852 per metric ton. A cumulative 720,000 metric tons have been sold in the first two auctions. 

Chinese commentary attributes the auctions to Sinograin's need to relieve storage pressure as large volumes of U.S. soybeans purchased are expected to arrive. It also cites a need to generate funds for purchases of American soybeans. The second objective will be challenging if Sinograin has to pay off loans that financed purchase of these soybeans at peak prices 2-to-3 years ago.

The next auction is scheduled for December 19 when 550,000 metric tons will be offered. The auctions are composed predominantly of soybeans imported during years of much higher prices in 2022 and 2023. Auctions of imported soybeans held in March also featured soybeans from 2022-23, but auctions held earlier this year during summer months offered beans from last year and this year.

The first two auctions in December featured soybeans stored in Shandong Province and Tianjian Municipality. Next week's auction will offer a larger volume of soybeans stored in Hunan, Liaoning, and Sichuan Provinces. Fewer soybeans are being offered in Shandong and none in Tianjin.

China Auctions Reserves to Make Way for U.S. Soybean Purchases

The U.S. soybeans "China" has been buying over the last two months will apparently go directly into China's State reserve. Old beans are being auctioned off from reserves to make room for the new beans. The old beans are being offered to processors at bargain prices to give them some relief from negative margins as they await the arrival of another monster Brazilian crop that will drive market prices down again.

On December 11 China auctioned 512,500 metric tons of imported soybeans from its State reserves to make room for U.S. soybeans that China has been buying to fulfill its part of the U.S.-China trade agreement reached in October. This was the first in a series of auctions to be held over coming weeks to clear space for American soybeans China has been buying to fulfill the soybean purchase pledge made in late October. A second auction will be held tomorrow (December 16), offering another 513,884 metric tons. Chinese traders think the total amount auctioned over coming weeks will total about 4 million metric tons.

The December 11 auction sold 397,043 metric tons (77.5% of the beans offered) at an average price of RMB 3,935 (about $558) per ton. Some of the auctioned beans sold for prices as high as RMB 4,040 per ton. In comparison, the average price for imported soybeans reported by Shanghai Mysteel was RMB 4,220 in the first week of December. 

The auctioned beans were offered mostly in lots of about 10,000 to 45,000 metric tons scattered across 8 Chinese provinces. About half of the beans offered are located in Shandong Province and Tianjin Municipality. Others were in Liaoning, Sichuan, Hebei, Henan, Hunan and Zhejiang Provinces. Buyers must take delivery of the beans between December 20 and March 2026. 

The auction news suggests that newly purchased U.S. beans will be stockpiled in China's reserves. This is consistent with reports that nearly all Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans have been made by COFCO--China's State-trading enterprise for grains and oilseeds--which imports on behalf of Sinograin. The 4-million-ton total expected for the auctions is close to the volume of sales of U.S. soybeans to China announced since late October. 

China's extra 10-percent tariff on U.S. beans still prevents them from being commercially viable for imports by private sector buyers. Presumably, COFCO/Sinograin imports are either exempt from the tariff or an accounting trick washes it out.

The displaced old beans released from reserves via auctions are being sold to crushing enterprises and feed mills. Sinograin has not revealed the origin (e.g. U.S. or Brazil) of the old reserves being released.

Sinograin lost money on the December 11 auction. The beans auctioned had been produced -- and presumably imported -- in 2022 and 2023 when soybean prices were at their peak. Based on customs data, I calculate that the average cost of importing the 512,500 soybeans offered for auction was $659 per ton, which exceeds the average sale price (at the current exchange rate) of $558 per ton. Thus, Sinograin sold 397,000 metric tons of soybeans at $101 less than they paid for them, a loss of over $40 million. Additionally, I estimate that interest cost on the beans could be $68 per ton and the storage cost could be $41 per ton, a total cost of $210 per metric ton. The total loss on the auction could have been at least $83 billion.

(It is unclear whether Sinograin paid tariffs (3%) and value added taxes (10%) on the imported soybeans it is releasing from reserves. It is also unclear what happens to the 112,500 tons of unsold beans -- if they failed to sell on December 11 at a bargain price, why would they sell in a future auction? If the unsold beans have to be written off, their acquisition cost of $74 million would be an additional loss.)

Sinograin will incur similar losses on the December 16 auction which will offer mostly 2022 beans (487,000 metric tons) and about 13,000 tons each from 2023 and 2024. The regional distribution of the Dec. 16 beans is similar to those offered last week. 

Chinese authorities are orchestrating these auctions and imports to satisfy crushing demand for beans while insulating the domestic soybean crop--now being marketed--from lower international prices. 

The Chinese market built up stockpiles of beans and meal during summer and early fall months when imports exceeded monthly crush. China's monthly soybean imports dropped from 12.9 mmt in September to 9.5 mmt in October, and 8.1 mmt in November. Over those same months the average cost of imported soybeans indicated by customs data ratcheted up from $447 per ton to $467 per ton.

Crush is still running at a torrid pace but now exceeds monthly imports. In November crush was estimated at 9 million metric tons (830,000 tons more than November last year). Crush is estimated to reach 8.6 million tons in December (up 400,000 tons from a year ago). Crushing margins appear to be negative, a problem that is exacerbated by increases in costs of imported soybeans. Thus, the auction of cheap beans from reserves supplements the shrinking flow of imports and constitutes a subsidy to keep crushers from seeing their negative margins grow even bigger.

Meanwhile, China's own soybean crop is being marketed. Authorities hope to nudge domestic soybean prices higher. The price of domestic beans exceeds the price of imported beans, so no auctions of reserves were held in main production areas of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Inner Mongolia. They probably want to slow the pace of imports while the domestic crop is being marketed to keep the general level of prices up.

Market news reports say Chinese customs authorities are also preparing to slow-walk inspections of imported soybeans, extending the time needed for customs clearance to 25 days. Authorities previously delayed inspections during the first months of 2025, then returned to normal when Brazilian beans began arriving in April.